Azure AKS Ephemeral Container Added to Pod
Detects an identity injecting an ephemeral (debug) container into a running AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service) pod via the pods/ephemeralcontainers subresource, excluding known AKS control-plane and platform identities. Ephemeral containers share the target pod's namespaces and give stealthy interactive access to its processes and mounted secrets without creating a new pod. Coverage includes workload service accounts (system:serviceaccount:*), so a compromised in-cluster token used to attach a debug container is not excluded.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- logs-azure.platformlogs-*
Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-application/debug-running-pod/#ephemeral-container
- https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/
Tags:
- Domain: Cloud
- Domain: Kubernetes
- Data Source: Azure
- Data Source: Azure Platform Logs
- Data Source: Kubernetes
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Execution
- Resources: Investigation Guide
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
The Azure Fleet integration collecting AKS diagnostic logs forwarded through Event Hub into the azure.platformlogs
data stream is required for this rule. Enable either the kube-audit or the kube-audit-admin log category (Microsoft
recommends kube-audit-admin alone to reduce volume, as it only drops read-only get/list events). Mutating
ephemeral-container writes are recorded in both categories with the same auditID, so clusters that enable both
categories may generate two alerts per injection.
AKS kube-audit events are carried under the flattened azure.platformlogs.properties.log.* subtree and share the ARM
operation event.action: Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read. An ephemeral container is
attached to a running pod (via kubectl debug) and shares that pod's process and network namespaces. Adversaries use it
as a stealthier alternative to exec to read mounted secrets and interact with the workload.
- Identify the acting identity in
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.username(and its groups inazure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.groups) and whether it should debug pods. A username ofmasterclientwith thesystem:mastersgroup is the AKS local cluster-admin certificate (az aks get-credentials --admin); on clusters with local accounts disabled it should not appear at all, so its presence is itself notable. Entra-integrated admins appear as their UPN/objectId instead. - Inspect the injected container in the
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.requestObject.spec.ephemeralContainers.*fields: theimage,command, andtargetContainerNameshow what was run and against which container, andsecurityContext.capabilities.add(e.g.SYS_PTRACE,SYS_ADMIN) or a privileged context indicates offensive debugging. - Review
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.userAgentto distinguish an interactivekubectl debugfrom automation or custom tooling, andazure.platformlogs.properties.log.responseStatus.codeto tell a successful injection (200) from a denied attempt (403) by an identity lacking RBAC. - Identify the target pod in
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.name/azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.namespace. - Evaluate the source in
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.sourceIPsand pivot on it for related exec sessions, secret reads, or RBAC changes.
- Operators and support tooling use ephemeral containers for legitimate troubleshooting; baseline expected users and exclude verified break-glass or platform identities.
- If unauthorized, remove the ephemeral container (delete or replace the pod), revoke the acting identity's tokens, and review the RBAC that permitted the injection.
- Inspect the target pod for accessed secrets or tampering and rotate any exposed credentials.
- Collect kube-audit and identity artifacts per incident response procedures.
data_stream.dataset:azure.platformlogs and
event.action:"Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read" and
azure.platformlogs.category:("kube-audit" or "kube-audit-admin") and
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.stage:"ResponseComplete" and
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.resource:"pods" and
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.subresource:"ephemeralcontainers" and
azure.platformlogs.properties.log.verb:("update" or "patch") and
not azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.username:(
system\:node\:* or "aksService" or "hcpService" or "readinessChecker" or
system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*
)
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- Id: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
Technique:
- Name: Deploy Container
- Id: T1610
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610/