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AWS CloudTrail Log Suspended

Detects Cloudtrail logging suspension via StopLogging API. Stopping CloudTrail eliminates forward audit visibility and is a classic defense evasion step before sensitive changes or data theft. Investigate immediately and determine what occurred during the logging gap.

Rule type: query
Rule indices:

  • filebeat-*
  • logs-aws.cloudtrail-*

Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-6m
Maximum alerts per execution: ?
References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Cloud
  • Data Source: AWS
  • Data Source: Amazon Web Services
  • Data Source: AWS Cloudtrail
  • Use Case: Log Auditing
  • Resources: Investigation Guide
  • Tactic: Defense Evasion

Version: ?
Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

AWS CloudTrail is a service that enables governance, compliance, and operational and risk auditing of your AWS account. It logs API calls and related events, providing visibility into user activity. This rule identifies the suspension of an AWS log trail using the StopLogging API. Attackers can do this to cover their tracks and impact security monitoring that relies on this source.

  • Actor & scope
    • Identify aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn, user_agent.original, source.ip.
    • Determine which trail stopped (target.entity.id) and whether it’s multi-region or organization-wide.
  • Timing and impact
    • When did logging stop and resume (if at all)? Are there overlapping detections indicating activity during the gap?
  • Correlate activity
    • Search for sensitive API activity around the stop event (IAM changes, S3 policy changes, EC2 exports, KMS changes).
    • Check for preceding UpdateTrail (e.g., destination change) and subsequent DeleteTrail.
  • Planned suspensions: Rare; verify maintenance tickets and ensure post-change validation.
  • Restart logging (StartLogging) immediately.
  • Investigate actor’s recent activity; rotate credentials if suspicious.
  • Validate trail configuration, destination bucket/CMK, and event selectors.
  • Hardening: Limit cloudtrail:StopLogging to break-glass roles; alert on any future stops; enforce via AWS Config/SCPs.
event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
    and event.provider: "cloudtrail.amazonaws.com"
    and event.action: "StopLogging"
    and event.outcome: "success"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK