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Execution via GitHub Actions Runner

This rule detects potentially dangerous commands spawned by the GitHub Actions Runner.Worker process on self-hosted runner machines. Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host. This behavior may indicate malicious or unexpected workflow activity, including code execution, file manipulation, or network exfiltration initiated through a compromised repository or unauthorized workflow.

Rule type: eql
Rule indices:

  • endgame-*
  • logs-crowdstrike.fdr*
  • logs-endpoint.events.process-*
  • logs-m365_defender.event-*
  • logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*
  • logs-system.security*
  • logs-windows.forwarded*
  • logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
  • winlogbeat-*
  • auditbeat-*
  • logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*

Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: ?
References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Linux
  • OS: Windows
  • OS: macOS
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Execution
  • Tactic: Initial Access
  • Data Source: Elastic Endgame
  • Data Source: Elastic Defend
  • Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs
  • Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
  • Data Source: Sysmon
  • Data Source: SentinelOne
  • Data Source: Crowdstrike
  • Data Source: Auditd Manager
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: ?
Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host.

  • Review the execution details like process.command_line and if it's expected or not.
  • Examine associated network and file activities and if there is any ingress tool transfer activity.
  • Verify if there is adjascent any sensitive file access or collection.
  • Correlate with other alerts and investiguate if this activity is related to a supply chain attack.
  • Authorized github workflow actions.
  • Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized command execution and potential lateral movement.
  • Terminate any suspicious child processes that were initiated by the Github actions runner.
  • Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs and configurations to identify any unauthorized changes or additional indicators of compromise.
  • Restore the system from a known good backup if any unauthorized changes or malicious activities are confirmed.
  • Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution.
  • Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on the broader network.
process where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
 process.parent.name in ("Runner.Worker", "Runner.Worker.exe") and
 (
   process.name like ("curl", "curl.exe", "wget", "wget.exe", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "pwsh.exe", "certutil.exe", "rundll32.exe", "bash", "sh", "zsh", "tar", "rm",
                     "sed", "osascript", "chmod", "nohup", "setsid", "dash", "ash", "tcsh", "csh", "ksh", "fish", "python*", "perl*", "ruby*", "lua*", "php*", "node", "node.exe") or
   process.executable : ("/tmp/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "?:\\Users\\*")
 )

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK