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Execution via OpenClaw Agent

Detects suspicious child process execution from the OpenClaw, Moltbot, or Clawdbot AI coding agents running via Node.js. These tools can execute arbitrary shell commands through skills or prompt injection attacks. Malicious skills from public registries like ClawHub have been observed executing obfuscated download-and-execute commands targeting cryptocurrency wallets and credentials. This rule identifies shells, scripting interpreters, and common LOLBins spawned by these AI agents.

Rule type: eql
Rule indices:

  • logs-endpoint.events.process-*

Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • Domain: LLM
  • OS: Linux
  • OS: macOS
  • OS: Windows
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Execution
  • Tactic: Command and Control
  • Data Source: Elastic Defend
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 1
Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

OpenClaw (formerly Clawdbot, rebranded to Moltbot) is a personal AI coding assistant that can execute shell commands and scripts on behalf of users. Malicious actors have weaponized the skill ecosystem (ClawHub) to distribute skills that execute download-and-execute commands, targeting cryptocurrency wallets and credentials.

  • Verify if OpenClaw/Moltbot is an approved application in your organization.
  • Review the child process command line for indicators of malicious activity (encoded payloads, remote downloads, credential access).
  • Check the parent Node.js process command line to identify which OpenClaw component initiated the execution.
  • Examine recently installed skills from ClawHub for malicious or obfuscated code.
  • Correlate with network events to identify data exfiltration or C2 communication.
  • Review the user's AI conversation history for prompt injection attempts.
  • Developers legitimately using OpenClaw/Moltbot for AI-assisted coding may trigger this rule when the AI executes build scripts, curl commands, or other legitimate automation.
  • If the tool is approved, consider tuning based on specific command patterns or adding exception lists.
  • If the child process activity appears malicious, terminate the OpenClaw gateway and investigate the skill that initiated the command.
  • Review and remove any suspicious skills from the OpenClaw configuration.
  • If credentials may have been accessed, rotate affected secrets and API keys.
  • Block known typosquat domains (moltbot.you, clawbot.ai, clawdbot.you) at the network level.
process where event.type == "start" and
  process.parent.name : ("node", "node.exe") and
  process.parent.command_line : ("*openclaw*", "*moltbot*", "*clawdbot*") and
   process.name : ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "bash.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "curl.exe", "curl", "base64", "xattr", "osascript", "python*", "chmod", "certutil.exe", "rundll32.exe")

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK