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Process Created with an Elevated Tokenedit
Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 1
Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule queryedit
/* This rule is only compatible with Elastic Endpoint 8.4+ */ process
where event.action == "start" and /* CreateProcessWithToken and
effective parent is a privileged MS native binary used as a target for
token theft */ user.id : "S-1-5-18" and /* Token Theft target
process usually running as service are located in one of the following
paths */ process.Ext.effective_parent.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"?:\\ProgramData\\*") and not
(process.Ext.effective_parent.executable :
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and
process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and
process.parent.args : "/debug") and not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\windows\\system32\\WerMgr.exe", "?:\\W
indows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.e
xe") and not process.parent.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", "?:\\Program Files
(x86)\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\*") and not
(process.code_signature.trusted == true and
process.code_signature.subject_name in ("philandro Software GmbH",
"Freedom Scientific Inc.", "TeamViewer Germany GmbH", "Projector.is,
Inc.", "TeamViewer GmbH", "Cisco WebEx LLC", "Dell Inc"))
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/