Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executableedit
Identifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
- endgame-*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
- Elastic Endgame
Version: 102 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.10.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
Rule queryedit
process where event.type == "start" and process.pe.original_file_name : "psexesvc.exe" and not process.name : "PSEXESVC.exe"
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: System Services
- ID: T1569
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 102 (8.6.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 101 (8.5.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and process.pe.original_file_name : "psexesvc.exe" and not process.name : "PSEXESVC.exe"
-
- Version 7 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 5 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 4 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.11.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and (process.pe.original_file_name:(psexesvc.exe or PSEXESVC.exe) or winlog.event_data.OriginalFileName:(psexesvc.exe or PSEXESVC.exe)) and process.parent.name:services.exe and not process.name:(psexesvc.exe or PSEXESVC.exe)
-