KRBTGT Delegation Backdooredit
Identifies the modification of the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute to KRBTGT. Attackers can use this technique to maintain persistence to the domain by having the ability to request tickets for the KRBTGT service.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-system.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Persistence
- Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
- Data Source: Active Directory
Version: 107
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Setupedit
Setup
The Audit User Account Management logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure). Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Advanced Audit Policies Configuration > Audit Policies > Account Management > Audit User Account Management (Success,Failure)
Rule queryedit
event.action:modified-user-account and event.code:4738 and winlog.event_data.AllowedToDelegateTo:*krbtgt*
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
-
Technique:
- Name: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- ID: T1558
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/