Threat Command

Primary threat research from Elastic Security Labs Threat Command.

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Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission

Inside the loop: Five AI attack frameworks that never ask permission

Five agentic offensive frameworks act in bursts of two to 25 seconds, and none enforces authorization in code. What ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, Cairn, PentAGI, and HexStrike leave in your telemetry, and the ES|QL hunt that catches them.

Mika Ayenson
56 AWS API calls in 141 milliseconds: Inside an AI-run intrusion

56 AWS API calls in 141 milliseconds: Inside an AI-run intrusion

A CyberStrikeAI server spent 16 days in four AWS accounts using eight identities, and the CloudTrail record shows why six detection rules each caught only part of it.

Samir Bousseaden
0% GPU utilization: How SANSAR hides Linux cryptomining

0% GPU utilization: How SANSAR hides Linux cryptomining

Elastic Security Labs analyzes SANSAR, a Linux cryptomining orchestrator that manages miners over Tor, alongside a kernel rootkit, GPU monitoring hooks and a backdoor that retrieves its C2 address from Ethereum.

Salim Bitam
How CVE-2026-73570 turns a Zimbra log file into remote code execution

How CVE-2026-73570 turns a Zimbra log file into remote code execution

We reproduced the Zimbra command injection vulnerability and found that several public PoCs write a payload Swatchdog never matches, so a failed test looks like a patched server.

Eric Forte
php2shell: Assessing Elastic detection coverage relevant to CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619

php2shell: Assessing Elastic detection coverage relevant to CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619

CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are critical PHP core RCE flaws that leaked ahead of disclosure. We cover what is verified, why exploitation converges on a web server spawning a shell, and the Elastic detections developed to catch this behavior.

Ruben Groenewoud
Auditing the auditor: Unmasking Apex Accelerator

Auditing the auditor: Unmasking Apex Accelerator

REF8801 exposes how Apex Accelerator combines convincing Web3 services with malicious npm packages, attacker-controlled AI infrastructure, and cross-platform malware delivery.

Jia Yu Chan
Cloud Threat Emulation on Autopilot: Context is Everything

Cloud Threat Emulation on Autopilot: Context is Everything

Cloud threat emulation is more than detonation. A plan-first methodology for cloud detection engineering: scope, victim model, telemetry, coverage, cleanup. Learn how to properly leverage AI to automate your emulations.

Terrance DeJesus
The extension you never installed: KREMLIN forges Chrome's own integrity checks to steal banking sessions

The extension you never installed: KREMLIN forges Chrome's own integrity checks to steal banking sessions

Elastic Security Labs tracked this malicious browser extension across seven campaigns and 15 months, through Brazilian bank lures and the Ethereum smart contracts that hold its C2 configuration.

Cyril François
Linux Detection Engineering - Local Privilege Escalation

Linux Detection Engineering - Local Privilege Escalation

Seven of the thirteen Linux privilege escalation CVEs we tracked in 2026 turned out to be the same copy-on-write bug pointed at different kernel interfaces. We ran the public proof-of-concept for eleven exploits and two misconfigurations, and noted which rules fired.

Ruben Groenewoud
How to correlate Kubernetes audit logs with container runtime data

How to correlate Kubernetes audit logs with container runtime data

Two fields join the Kubernetes API to what ran inside the pod, and one turns up a container escape your process events never recorded.

Isai Anthony
REVSTEALER ramps up: analysis of up-and-coming infostealer

REVSTEALER ramps up: analysis of up-and-coming infostealer

Elastic Security Labs deep dives into REVSTEALER, an emerging infostealer targeting browsers, wallets, and gaming accounts.

Daniel Stepanic
Linux Detection Engineering - Fileless Execution

Linux Detection Engineering - Fileless Execution

We reproduced five Linux fileless execution patterns with FENIX, including memfd_create staging, interpreter one-liners, deleted binaries, and in-memory kernel module loads, then mapped each to the Elastic Defend rules that catch it.

Ruben Groenewoud

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