IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
User Account Creationedit
Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 10 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.6.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.2.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
## Triage and analysis ### Investigating User Account Creation Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems. This rule identifies the usage of `net.exe` to create new accounts. #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree). - Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action. - Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation. - Investigate other alerts related to the user/host in the last 48 hours. ### False positive analysis - Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign. ### Related rules - Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - Delete the created account. - Reset the password for the user account leveraged to create the new account. ## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule queryedit
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.name : ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and not process.parent.name :
"net.exe" and (process.args : "user" and process.args : ("/ad",
"/add"))
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Create Account
- ID: T1136
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 10 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 9 (7.16.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 8 (7.13.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and process.name:(net.exe or net1.exe) and not process.parent.name:net.exe and process.args:(user and (/ad or /add))
-
- Version 7 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 6 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 5 (7.10.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 4 (7.9.1 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.9.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.action:"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)" and process.name:(net.exe or net1.exe) and not process.parent.name:net.exe and process.args:(user and (/ad or /add))
-
- Version 2 (7.7.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.action:"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)" and process.name:("net.exe" or "net1.exe") and not process.parent.name:"net.exe" and process.args:("user" and ("/add" or "/ad"))
-