OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise Jailbreak Prompt Heuristics
editOpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise Jailbreak Prompt Heuristics
editDetects ChatGPT Enterprise user messages that combine two or more common jailbreak techniques: overriding prior or system instructions, switching the assistant into an unrestricted persona or mode (for example DAN or developer mode), asking it to operate without safety restrictions or filters, or asking it to reveal its system prompt. Jailbreak prompts stack these techniques to talk the model out of its safety policy, and a user doing so in a managed workspace may be attempting to generate prohibited content or to probe the workspace’s controls. Requiring more than one technique keeps documents that merely quote a single jailbreak phrase from alerting.
Rule type: esql
Rule indices: None
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: GenAI
- Platform: OpenAI
- Data Source: OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise
- Service: OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise
- Use Case: Policy Violation
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Rule Type: ES|QL
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0051
- Mitre Atlas: AML.T0054
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
editTriage and analysis
Investigating OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise Jailbreak Prompt Heuristics
A ChatGPT Enterprise user message matched two or more jailbreak technique categories. The categories are tracked
separately in Esql.has_instruction_override, Esql.has_persona_switch, Esql.has_restriction_removal, and
Esql.has_system_prompt_extraction, and their total is Esql.indicator_count.
Possible investigation steps
-
Read
messageand decide whether the user is attempting a jailbreak or is quoting, analyzing, or documenting one. A short prompt addressed to the assistant is more suspicious than a long pasted document. -
Review the rest of the conversation using
openai_chatgpt_enterprise.conversation_message.conversation.id. Look at whether the assistant refused, and whether the user rephrased and retried. -
Check
user.emailanduser.idfor related alerts, such as OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise Repeated Assistant Refusals, credential sharing in conversations, or unusual connector use. - Determine whether the user belongs to a team that legitimately researches jailbreaks or prompt injection.
False positive analysis
- AI safety and security researchers analyzing jailbreak techniques. Add exceptions for these users.
- Documentation that lists several jailbreak phrases. These messages tend to be long and descriptive rather than addressed to the assistant.
Response and remediation
- If the attempt is not sanctioned, follow the organization’s acceptable use process for the user.
- Review whether any content produced in the conversation should be reported or removed, and whether workspace policies or custom GPT instructions need tightening.
Setup
editSetup
This rule requires the OpenAI ChatGPT Enterprise integration to collect compliance logs into Elasticsearch, including
the conversation_message data stream.
https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/openai_chatgpt_enterprise
Rule query
editfrom logs-openai_chatgpt_enterprise.conversation_message-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| where
data_stream.dataset == "openai_chatgpt_enterprise.conversation_message" and
openai_chatgpt_enterprise.conversation_message.message.author.type == "user" and
message is not null
| eval
Esql.message_text = to_lower(message),
Esql.message_length = length(message)
| eval
Esql.has_instruction_override = case(
Esql.message_text rlike """.*(ignore|disregard|forget|override) (all |any )?(of )?(your |the |my )?(previous|prior|above|earlier|original|system|developer) (instructions|prompts?|rules|guidelines|directives|programming).*""" or
Esql.message_text rlike """.*(ignore|disregard|forget) (all |any )?(of )?(the )?(instructions|rules|guidelines) (you (got|were given|received)|given to you).*""" or
Esql.message_text like "*forget everything you were told*",
1, 0
),
Esql.has_persona_switch = case(
Esql.message_text rlike """.*(you are|act as|pretend (to be|you are)|roleplay as|from now on,? you are) (now )?(dan|stan|dude|aim|an? (unfiltered|unrestricted|uncensored|amoral) (ai|assistant|model|chatbot)).*""" or
Esql.message_text like "*do anything now*" or
Esql.message_text rlike """.*(enable|enter|activate|switch to) (developer|god|jailbreak|unrestricted|dan) mode.*""",
1, 0
),
Esql.has_restriction_removal = case(
Esql.message_text rlike """.*(without|with no|free (of|from)|ignoring) (any |your |all )?(ethical |content |safety |moral )?(restrictions|filters|guidelines|limitations|censorship).*""" or
Esql.message_text rlike """.*(bypass|disable|turn off|ignore) (your |the |all )?(safety|content) (filters?|polic(y|ies)|guidelines|guardrails).*""" or
Esql.message_text rlike """.*(do not|does not|don't|doesn't) have to (abide by|follow|obey) (the |any |your )?(rules|guidelines|policies).*""",
1, 0
),
Esql.has_system_prompt_extraction = case(
Esql.message_text rlike """.*(reveal|print|show|repeat|output) (me )?(your |the )?(full |hidden |original )?(system prompt|initial instructions|hidden instructions).*""",
1, 0
)
| eval
Esql.indicator_count = Esql.has_instruction_override + Esql.has_persona_switch + Esql.has_restriction_removal + Esql.has_system_prompt_extraction
| where Esql.indicator_count >= 2
| keep
_id,
_version,
_index,
@timestamp,
message,
user.id,
user.email,
openai_chatgpt_enterprise.conversation_message.conversation.id,
openai_chatgpt_enterprise.conversation_message.conversation.title,
openai_chatgpt_enterprise.conversation_message.message.id,
Esql.message_length,
Esql.indicator_count,
Esql.has_instruction_override,
Esql.has_persona_switch,
Esql.has_restriction_removal,
Esql.has_system_prompt_extraction,
data_stream.*
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- ID: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/