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Potential Data Exfiltration via Rclone

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Potential Data Exfiltration via Rclone

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Identifies abuse of rclone (or a renamed copy, e.g. disguised as a security or backup utility) to exfiltrate data to cloud storage or remote endpoints. Rclone is a legitimate file sync tool; threat actors rename it to blend with administrative traffic and use copy/sync with cloud backends (e.g. :s3:) and include filters to exfiltrate specific file types.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • endgame-*
  • logs-crowdstrike.fdr*
  • logs-endpoint.events.process-*
  • logs-m365_defender.event-*
  • logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*
  • logs-system.security*
  • logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
  • winlogbeat-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Windows
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Exfiltration
  • Resources: Investigation Guide
  • Data Source: Elastic Defend
  • Data Source: Sysmon
  • Data Source: SentinelOne
  • Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
  • Data Source: Crowdstrike
  • Data Source: Elastic Endgame
  • Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs

Version: 1

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Triage and analysis

Investigating Potential Data Exfiltration via Rclone

Rclone is a legitimate file synchronization tool. Threat actors abuse it (often renamed, e.g. to TrendFileSecurityCheck.exe) to exfiltrate data to S3, HTTP endpoints, or other cloud backends, using copy/sync with --include filters and high --transfers to move specific file types at scale.

Possible investigation steps

  • Confirm the command line for copy/sync, cloud backend (e.g. :s3:, :http), and options like --include, --transfers, -P.
  • If the process name is not rclone.exe, compare with process.pe.original_file_name; a mismatch indicates a renamed copy used to evade name-based detection.
  • From the command line, identify the source path (e.g. UNC or local) and the remote backend (S3 bucket, HTTP endpoint) as the exfil destination.
  • Review --include/--exclude and --max-age/--max-size to understand what data was targeted (documents, CAD, archives, etc.).
  • Correlate with the process executable path (recently dropped?), parent process, and user; look for outbound network to the same backend.

False positive analysis

  • Legitimate backup or sync jobs using rclone from a known path and config may trigger; allowlist by process path or --config path for approved rclone usage.

Response and remediation

  • Terminate the rclone process and isolate the host if exfiltration is confirmed.
  • Identify and revoke access to the destination (S3 bucket, API keys, etc.); preserve logs for the exfil session.
  • Determine scope of data exposed and notify stakeholders; rotate credentials and secrets that may have been in exfiltrated paths.

Rule query

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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 (process.name : "rclone.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "rclone.exe") and process.args : ("copy", "sync") and
  not process.args : ("--config=?:\\Program Files\\rclone\\config\\rclone\\rclone.conf", "--config=?:\\Program Files (x86)\\rclone\\config\\rclone\\rclone.conf") and
  not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files*", "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\Program Files*")

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

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