Network Logon Provider Registry Modificationedit

Adversaries may register a rogue network logon provider module for persistence and/or credential access via intercepting the authentication credentials in clear text during user logon.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Persistence
  • Credential Access

Version: 2 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.13.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.1.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Potential false positivesedit

Authorized third party network logon providers.

Rule queryedit

registry where registry.data.strings != null and registry.path : "HKL
M\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\NetworkProvider\\ProviderPath"
and /* Excluding default NetworkProviders RDPNP, LanmanWorkstation
and webclient. */ not ( user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
registry.data.strings in
("%SystemRoot%\\System32\\ntlanman.dll",
"%SystemRoot%\\System32\\drprov.dll",
"%SystemRoot%\\System32\\davclnt.dll") )

Threat mappingedit

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version historyedit

Version 2 (8.1.0 release)
  • Formatting only