AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Updateedit
Identifies attempts to modify an AWS IAM Assume Role Policy. An adversary may attempt to modify the AssumeRolePolicy of a misconfigured role in order to gain the privileges of that role.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 10 minutes
Searches indices from: now-60m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Cloud
- AWS
- Continuous Monitoring
- SecOps
- Identity and Access
Version: 4 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.9.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positivesedit
Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Policy updates from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If a known behavior is causing false positives, it can be excluded from the rule.
Investigation guideedit
The AWS Filebeat module must be enabled to use this rule.
Rule queryedit
event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:iam.amazonaws.com and event.action:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy and event.outcome:success
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Valid Accounts
- ID: T1078
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 4 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.10.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.module:aws and event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:iam.amazonaws.com and event.action:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy and event.outcome:success
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