IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Unusual Child Processes of RunDLL32edit
Identifies child processes of unusual instances of RunDLL32 where the command line parameters were suspicious. Misuse of RunDLL32 could indicate malicious activity.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- winlogbeat-*
Severity: high
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 2 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.10.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License
Rule queryedit
sequence with maxspan=1h [process where event.type in ("start",
"process_started") and (process.name : "rundll32.exe" or
process.pe.original_file_name == "RUNDLL32.EXE") and
process.args_count == 1 ] by process.entity_id [process where
event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.parent.name :
"rundll32.exe" ] by process.parent.entity_id
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Signed Binary Proxy Execution
- ID: T1218
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 2 (7.11.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
sequence with maxspan=1h [process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and /* uncomment once in winlogbeat */ (process.name : "rundll32.exe" /* or process.pe.original_file_name == "RUNDLL32.EXE" */ ) and process.args_count < 2 ] by process.entity_id [process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" ] by process.parent.entity_id
-