IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32edit
Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
Version: 4 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.13.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positivesedit
Microsoft Windows installers leveraging RunDLL32 for installation.
Rule queryedit
process where event.type == "start" and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.parent.command_line != null and /* common FPs can be added here */ not process.parent.args : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\SHELL32.dll,RunAsNewUser_RunDLL", "C:\\WINDOWS\\*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc")
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 4 (7.13.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and /* common FPs can be added here */ not process.parent.args : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\SHELL32.dll,RunAsNewUser_RunDLL"
-
- Version 3 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only