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Suspicious SUID Binary Execution (Auditd Sequence)

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Suspicious SUID Binary Execution (Auditd Sequence)

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Detects suspicious sequences where a non-root user launches a high-risk parent process (interpreter, shell one-liner, or execution from user-writable paths) and then quickly executes a common privilege elevation helper (su, sudo, pkexec, passwd, chsh, newgrp) that gains an effective UID of 0 while the real UID remains non-root. This can indicate misuse of SUID/SGID helpers, polkit/sudo abuse, or interactive privilege escalation attempts captured via Auditd Manager telemetry.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • auditbeat-*
  • logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Data Source: Auditd Manager
  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Linux
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Privilege Escalation
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 1

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Triage and analysis

Investigating Suspicious SUID Binary Execution (Auditd Sequence)

Confirm whether the non-root real user should be invoking su, sudo, pkexec, or account utilities as root. Review the parent process chain and whether the parent executable location or shell invocation suggests a one-liner or staging from user-writable paths.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review process details for script paths, temp directory execution, or suspicious interpreters.
  • Check sudoers / polkit policy changes and recent authentication events for the user.
  • Pivot for follow-on persistence (cron, systemd units) or credential access from the same session.

Response and remediation

  • If unauthorized, contain the session, revoke elevated access, and review sudoers and polkit configuration for tampering.

Rule query

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sequence by host.id with maxspan=30s
  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
   event.action == "executed" and
   user.id != "0" and user.effective.id != "0" and
   (
     process.name like ("python*", "perl*", "ruby*", "php*", "lua*", ".*") or
     process.name in ("node", "bun", "java") or
     process.executable like ("/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/user/*", "/var/run/user/*", "/home/*/*") or
     (
       process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "mksh") and
       process.args in ("-c", "--command", "-ic", "-ci", "-cl", "-lc")
     )
   )
  ] by process.pid

  [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
   event.action == "executed" and
   user.effective.id == "0" and user.id != "0" and
   (
     (process.name in ("sudo", "pkexec") and
      not process.args like "-*" and
      not process.args : ("/usr/*", "/bin/*", "/sbin/*", "/opt/*")) or
     (process.name == "su" and
      not process.args in ("--command", "-c", "--shell", "-s")) or
     (process.name in ("passwd", "chsh", "newgrp") and
      not process.args in ("--shell", "-s", "--help"))
   )
  ] by process.parent.pid

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

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