Update v8.19.33
editUpdate v8.19.33
editThis section lists all updates associated with version 8.19.33 of the Fleet integration Prebuilt Security Detection Rules.
| Rule | Description | Status | Version |
|---|---|---|---|
Identifies shells, LOLBins, GTFOBins, and scripting runtimes connecting to the Azure WireServer / HostGAPlugin address 168.63.129.16 on ports 80 or 32526. The guest agent uses this fabric endpoint for GoalState, certificates, and vmSettings. Adversaries with code execution on an Azure VM (including via Run Command) use curl, PowerShell, openssl, bun, or similar tools to enumerate versions, pull transport certificates, and read HostGAPlugin /vmSettings. Azure guest-agent binaries and system python used by waagent are excluded. Descendants of the guest agent are not excluded: Run Command payloads execute in that tree. |
new |
1 |
|
First Seen Network Flow Exporter Followed by Suspicious Source Activity |
Identifies a newly observed NetFlow, IPFIX, or sFlow exporter IP followed by another detection alert with medium-or-higher severity or an elevated risk score, where that exporter IP is the source of the detected activity in the same data stream namespace. This correlation adds behavioral evidence that can help distinguish routine exporter onboarding from a potentially unauthorized or compromised exporter introduced as part of defense evasion. |
new |
2 |
Identifies failed authentication attempts against the AWS Management Console root user from the same source IP address targeting multiple AWS accounts. Password spraying uses few attempts per target across many accounts to avoid lockout, making per-account volume an unreliable signal. This rule detects the cross-account breadth pattern: a single source IP generating root ConsoleLogin failures across two or more distinct AWS accounts. Requires an AWS Organizations-level CloudTrail trail aggregating events from member accounts. |
new |
1 |
|
Detects when AWS Security Hub is disabled in a region. Security Hub aggregates security findings from AWS services (GuardDuty, Inspector, Macie, IAM Access Analyzer) and third-party tools into a single pane of glass. Disabling it suppresses centralized finding aggregation and compliance checks, removing visibility into threats across the account. This action is a documented pre-ransomware and pre-exfiltration defense evasion technique. |
new |
1 |
|
Detects enumeration of AWS Backup resources using long-term IAM access keys (AKIA* prefix). AWS Backup protects EC2 instances, EBS volumes, RDS databases, DynamoDB tables, EFS file systems, and S3 buckets. An adversary who obtains long-term access keys may enumerate backup vaults, backup plans, and protected resources as a precursor to ransomware. Identifying which resources have recent backups (indicating high-value data) and what vault access policies can be modified to delete or corrupt the backups before encrypting the primary data. |
new |
1 |
|
Detects enumeration of Amazon Simple Email Service (SES) resources using long-term IAM access keys (AKIA* prefix). Long-term access keys are associated with IAM users and are the credential type most commonly exfiltrated from repositories, configuration files, and environment variables. An adversary who obtains a long-term key may enumerate SES to discover verified email identities, sending quotas, and DKIM/MAIL FROM domain configurations as a precursor to phishing or spam campaigns launched from the compromised account’s verified domains. |
new |
1 |
|
Detects when MFA Delete is disabled on an Amazon S3 bucket. MFA Delete is an additional layer of security for versioned S3 buckets that requires multi-factor authentication to permanently delete object versions or disable versioning. When MFA Delete is disabled, an adversary with S3 write access and a compromised long-term access key can permanently delete object versions, a critical step in ransomware attacks that target S3 versioning as a backup mechanism. MFA Delete is configured via PutBucketVersioning with the MfaDelete parameter set to Disabled. |
new |
1 |
|
Detects when an AWS member account is registered as a delegated administrator for an AWS service via the RegisterDelegatedAdministrator API. Delegated administrators receive service-level administrative access across the entire organization without being the management account. An attacker who compromises a principal with organizations permissions can abuse overly permissive managed policies to register a member account they control as a delegated administrator, then use that privileged access to escalate privileges organization-wide and compromise all member accounts. |
new |
1 |
|
Detects the first time an AWS identity requests a service quota increase via the AWS Service Quotas API within a 7-day history window. Service quota increases are submitted to AWS Support and, when approved, raise the limits on EC2 instances, Lambda concurrency, VPC resources, and other services. An adversary who obtains AWS credentials may request quota increases as infrastructure preparation for large-scale cryptomining, DDoS amplification, phishing campaigns, or data exfiltration operations that require compute or network resources beyond the account’s current limits. |
new |
1 |
|
Detects when account-level email sending is explicitly enabled in Amazon SES, via the v1 UpdateAccountSendingEnabled API with Enabled: true or the v2 PutAccountSendingAttributes API with SendingEnabled: true. Account-level sending is commonly paused by an administrator, or by automation wired to CloudWatch reputation alarms when bounce or complaint rates rise. An attacker who compromises an AWS account may re-enable sending to restore a paused capability as part of phishing infrastructure setup, allowing bulk email under the victim organization’s trusted sending domain. Neither API can resume sending that AWS itself has paused. |
new |
1 |
|
Entra ID Device-Bound PRT Replay via First-Party App from Unusual IP |
Detects a first-party FOCI tooling client (Azure CLI, PowerShell, VS Code, Graph CLI, Azure AD PowerShell, or Visual Studio) redeeming a device-bound Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for Microsoft Graph, SharePoint/OneDrive, or Exchange Online from an IP that is not among that user and device’s Windows Sign-In or WAM addresses. Replay events are limited to compliant or Intune-managed devices: the stolen cookie keeps the workstation deviceid, so compliant-device Conditional Access can succeed off-box. |
new |
1 |
Detects a first-party FOCI tooling client (Azure CLI, PowerShell, VS Code, Graph CLI, Azure AD PowerShell, or Visual Studio) redeeming a device-bound Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for Microsoft Graph, SharePoint/OneDrive, or Exchange Online from a source IP that has not been seen with that deviceid. Replay events are limited to compliant or Intune-managed devices. Adversaries who steal a WAM PRT SSO cookie replay it off-box; the token keeps the workstation deviceid, so this pair is new even when Windows Sign-In for that device is outside a correlation window. |
new |
1 |
|
Entra ID Windows Hello or Passkey Sign-in from Unregistered Device |
Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID sign-in that is satisfied by a phishing-resistant, device-bound credential (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 security key, or passkey) while carrying no device identifier. Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) and passkey credentials are bound to a device’s TPM, so a genuine sign-in with one of these methods is normally accompanied by the registered device it lives on. A WHfB or passkey assertion that authenticates with an empty |
new |
1 |
Identifies the first time an Azure Storage resource receives an anonymous data-plane read (GetBlob and related Get or List operations). Anonymous requests are used to probe public containers and to test stolen blob URLs before a SAS is appended. First-seen resource ID keeps volume down while still covering WireServer-related probes of status or extension blobs. |
new |
1 |
|
Identifies the first-seen registration of a Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) credential for a Microsoft Entra ID user from a given source ASN in a tenant, based on a prefixed historic window. Enrollment is commonly part of legitimate onboarding or passwordless rollout and is not inherently malicious. Adversaries who have obtained a token that satisfies fresh (NGC) multi-factor authentication, for example by borrowing an existing WHfB key or passkey, can also enroll their own WHfB credential to establish durable, phishing-resistant persistence that survives password resets and standard session revocation. Correlate first-seen enrollments with the sign-in and device state that preceded them. |
new |
1 |
|
Potential SSH Brute Force Detected via macOS Security Events |
Identifies a high number of failed inbound SSH authentication attempts on a macOS host within a short time window, using sshd authentication messages collected by the macOS Security Events integration. Adversaries may perform password brute force or password spraying against exposed SSH services to obtain unauthorized access. |
new |
2 |
Potential Successful SSH Brute Force Attack via macOS Security Events |
Identifies a burst of failed inbound SSH authentication attempts on a macOS host followed shortly by a successful SSH authentication on the same host, using sshd authentication messages collected by the macOS Security Events integration. A successful login immediately after repeated failures indicates that a password brute force or password spraying attack against an exposed SSH service has likely succeeded. |
new |
1 |
Azure WireServer OpenSSL Certificate Decrypt or LinuxTransport Generation |
Identifies OpenSSL generating a CN=LinuxTransport certificate or decrypting CMS/PKCS7 payloads with a key that is not the Azure Linux Agent certificate under /var/lib/waagent. Adversaries can scrape WireServer certificates, mint a LinuxTransport identity, and decrypt extension protectedSettings with openssl cms -decrypt or smime -decrypt. |
new |
1 |
This rule identifies potential fileless ELF execution where a process is launched from an anonymous temporary executable path that appears as "/#<id>" in "process.executable". This pattern may be associated with "O_TMPFILE" and "execveat" with "AT_EMPTY_PATH", which can allow execution without a normal filesystem pathname. |
new |
1 |
|
Adversaries may create or modify Linux firewall rules with DROP, ACCEPT, or REJECT actions to affect how a host receives or sends network traffic. This activity may be used to bypass security controls, block defensive tooling, or gain unauthorized access to the network. |
new |
1 |
|
This rule detects when a web server process creates a file with a double extension, where the real extension is a non-web extension. This is a common technique used by attackers to bypass security measures and to hide the true nature of the file. |
new |
1 |
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Detects when curl or nscurl is spawned by a shell or osascript to make a JSON-RPC request to a blockchain endpoint for command and control purposes. Adversaries may leverage blockchain smart contracts as a covert C2 channel to retrieve commands or payload staging information, as observed in ClickFix campaigns. |
new |
1 |
|
Identifies HTTP requests to Azure WireServer (168.63.129.16) for GoalState, certificates, versions, or HostGAPlugin vmSettings that do not use a known guest-agent user agent. These requests retrieve transport certificates and extension protectedSettings, including embedded SAS URLs. Azure Linux Agent, Windows guest agent, and related platform UAs are excluded. Requests with no user agent are also excluded; that pattern is common for the Windows guest agent. |
new |
1 |
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Identifies anomalous execution of BrowserCore.exe, the Windows component used by Chromium-based browsers for native messaging with the Web Account Manager (WAM). Adversaries abuse BrowserCore to extract Entra ID Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs) without interactive browser context, enabling session hijacking. Legitimate BrowserCore launches carry a chrome-extension:// argument from the browser native-messaging host. |
new |
2 |
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Identifies newly observed execution of SoftPerfect Network Scanner or Advanced IP/Port Scanner on a Windows host. Adversaries commonly use these legitimate scanners during post-compromise discovery to map live hosts, open ports, and reachable systems, then select targets for lateral movement. |
new |
1 |
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Identifies the first time, in a historical window, a host runs AzCopy copy or sync to Azure Blob, Data Lake, or File storage, or starts Azure Storage Explorer. These Microsoft utilities are legitimate data-transfer tools; ransomware and cloud-ransomware operators drop portable copies and use SAS-authenticated jobs to pull data from victim storage and push it to attacker-controlled accounts. |
new |
1 |
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This detection correlates Suricata alerts with Elastic Defend network events to identify the source process performing the network activity. |
update |
5 |
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Detects HTTP requests to web servers whose URL or query string references cloud instance metadata endpoints or equivalent encoded variants. Attackers exploit server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in web applications to reach link-local metadata services on AWS, GCP, Azure, and similar cloud providers and harvest temporary credentials, tokens, or instance details. |
update |
2 |
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Detects the use of curl to upload files to an internet server. Threat actors often will collect and exfiltrate data on a system to their C2 server for review. Many threat actors have been observed using curl to upload the collected data. Use of curl in this way, while not inherently malicious, should be considered highly abnormal and suspicious activity. |
update |
10 |
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This rule correlate any Elastic Defend alert with a set of suspicious events from Network security devices like Palo Alto Networks (PANW), Fortinet Fortigate and Suricata by host.ip and source.ip. This may indicate that this host is compromised and triggering multi-datasource alerts. |
update |
8 |
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This rule uses alert data to determine when multiple different alerts involving the same user are triggered. Analysts can use this to prioritize triage and response, as these users are more likely to be compromised. |
update |
10 |
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AWS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from Kubernetes SA and External ASN |
Detects successful |
update |
3 |
AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity |
Detects when credentials issued through |
update |
2 |
Detects when the same GKE identity creates or modifies a Role or ClusterRole with high-risk permissions (wildcard access, RBAC escalation verbs, or access to secrets / privileged APIs) and also creates or patches a DaemonSet, Deployment, or CronJob within five minutes. This correlation is consistent with RBAC-based privilege escalation followed by payload deployment. |
update |
2 |
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Kubernetes Sensitive RBAC Change Followed by Workload Modification |
Detects a sequence where a principal creates or modifies a Role/ClusterRole to include high-risk permissions (e.g., wildcard access or escalation verbs) and then creates or patches a workload resource (DaemonSet, Deployment, or CronJob) shortly after, which may indicate RBAC-based privilege escalation followed by payload deployment. This pattern is often used by adversaries to gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources and deploy malicious payloads. |
update |
4 |
Identifies when an excessive number of files are downloaded from OneDrive or SharePoint by an authorized user or application in a short period of time. This may indicate a potential data exfiltration event, especially if the downloads are performed using OAuth authentication which could suggest an OAuth phishing attack such as Device Code Authentication phishing. |
update |
10 |
|
Identifies brute-force authentication activity targeting Microsoft 365 user accounts using failed sign-in patterns that match password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing behavior. Adversaries may attempt brute-force authentication with credentials obtained from previous breaches, leaks, marketplaces or guessable passwords. |
update |
419 |
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Detects a burst of Microsoft 365 user account lockouts within a short 5-minute window. A high number of IdsLocked login errors across multiple user accounts may indicate brute-force attempts for the same users resulting in lockouts. |
update |
10 |
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Identifies a one-on-one Microsoft Teams chat created by a user from a foreign tenant whose display name, member profile, or email local-part resembles IT help desk or Microsoft security staff. Adversaries abuse cross-tenant Teams external access to impersonate support personnel and socially engineer victims into granting remote access or disclosing credentials. |
update |
2 |
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Monitors for the execution of different processes that might be used by attackers for malicious intent. An alert from this rule should be investigated further, as hack tools are commonly used by blue teamers and system administrators as well. |
update |
110 |
|
Files that are placed in the "/etc/init.d/" directory in Unix can be used to start custom applications, services, scripts or commands during start-up. Init.d has been mostly replaced in favor of Systemd. However, the "systemd-sysv-generator" can convert init.d files to service unit files that run at boot. Adversaries may add or alter files located in the "/etc/init.d/" directory to execute malicious code upon boot in order to gain persistence on the system. |
update |
120 |
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Detects when a scripting interpreter makes an outbound network connection to an Ethereum blockchain endpoint for command and control purposes. Adversaries may leverage Ethereum blockchain infrastructure as a covert C2 channel to receive commands and exfiltrate data, as observed in campaigns like SleepyDuck malware. |
update |
3 |
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This rule monitors for the unusual occurrence of outbound network connections to suspicious webservice domains. |
update |
7 |
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An adversary can establish persistence by installing a new launch agent that executes at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories. |
update |
113 |
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This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of Telnet traffic. Telnet is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control older or embedded systems using the command line shell. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. As a plain-text protocol, it may also expose usernames and passwords to anyone capable of observing the traffic. |
update |
117 |
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This rule identifies outbound IPSEC NAT Traversal (NAT-T) traffic to an external destination IP that was not observed during the previous 5 days. IPSEC is a VPN technology that allows one system to talk to another using encrypted tunnels. NAT Traversal encapsulates IPSEC ESP traffic in UDP and, once a NAT device is detected, both peers float to UDP port 4500 for the tunnel data channel. Newly observed external NAT-T peers may indicate unauthorized VPN use or an adversary tunneling command and control or exfiltration traffic over the Internet. |
update |
114 |
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This rule identifies a potential port scan from an internal IP address. A port scan is a method utilized by attackers to systematically scan a target system for open ports, allowing them to identify available services and potential vulnerabilities. By mapping out the open ports, attackers can gather critical information to plan and execute targeted attacks, gaining unauthorized access, compromising security, and potentially leading to data breaches, unauthorized control, or further exploitation of the targeted system. This rule defines a threshold-based approach to detect connection attempts from a single internal source to a wide range of destination ports on a single destination. |
update |
16 |
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This rule identifies a potential SYN-Based port scan. A SYN port scan is a technique employed by attackers to scan a target network for open ports by sending SYN packets to multiple ports and observing the response. Attackers use this method to identify potential entry points or services that may be vulnerable to exploitation, allowing them to launch targeted attacks or gain unauthorized access to the system or network, compromising its security and potentially leading to data breaches or further malicious activities. This rule defines a threshold-based approach to detect connection attempts from a single source to a large number of unique destination ports, while limiting the number of packets per port. |
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15 |
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This rule detects network events that may indicate the use of RPC traffic to the Internet. RPC is commonly used by system administrators to remotely control a system for maintenance or to use shared resources. It should almost never be directly exposed to the Internet, as it is frequently targeted and exploited by threat actors as an initial access or backdoor vector. |
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113 |
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Specially crafted DNS requests can manipulate a known overflow vulnerability in some Windows DNS servers, resulting in Remote Code Execution (RCE) or a Denial of Service (DoS) from crashing the service. |
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113 |
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Identifies DNS queries to commonly abused Top Level Domains by common LOLBINs or executables running from world writable directories or unsigned binaries. This behavior matches on common malware C2 abusing less formal domain names. |
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5 |
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Identifies PowerShell being used to download an executable file from an untrusted remote destination. |
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117 |
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Detects an MSI installer execution followed by the execution of commonly abused Remote Management Software like ScreenConnect. This behavior may indicate abuse where an attacker triggers an MSI install then connects via a guest link with a known session key. |
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5 |
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Identifies remote access to the Windows Protected Storage Service through the IPC$ share. Attackers may abuse this named pipe to interact with the Protected Storage Service and extract sensitive credentials, certificates, or DPAPI backup keys. |
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2 |
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Identifies abuse of the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) to execute commands via proxy. This behavior is used as a defense evasion technique to blend-in malicious activity with legitimate Windows software. |
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5 |
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Identifies suspicious use of whoami.exe which displays user, group, and privileges information for the user who is currently logged on to the local system. |
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220 |
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Identifies potential hijacking of the Microsoft Update Orchestrator Service to establish persistence with an integrity level of SYSTEM. |
update |
320 |
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Identifies Windows programs run from unexpected parent processes. This could indicate masquerading or other strange activity on a system. |
update |
324 |