Update v8.19.31
editUpdate v8.19.31
editThis section lists all updates associated with version 8.19.31 of the Fleet integration Prebuilt Security Detection Rules.
| Rule | Description | Status | Version |
|---|---|---|---|
Identifies when a service account impersonation role is granted on a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) service account via a SetIamPolicy operation. Roles such as "roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator", "roles/iam.serviceAccountUser", and "roles/iam.serviceAccountOpenIdTokenCreator" allow a principal to mint access or identity tokens for the target service account, or to act as it when deploying resources. Adversaries who have obtained sufficient privileges may grant themselves or an attacker-controlled principal one of these roles to impersonate a higher-privileged service account, escalating privileges and establishing durable, key-less persistence that survives credential rotation. This is a New Terms rule that alerts when the granting principal has not been observed performing this action in the last weeks. |
new |
1 |
|
Potential CertiGhost AD CS Machine Identity Mismatch (CVE-2026-54121) |
Identifies successful Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate issuance events where a machine-account requester differs from the Remote Machine Discovery (RMD) chase target while the event’s DNS subject alternative name (SAN) matches that target. This requester-to-target mismatch may indicate CertiGhost (CVE-2026-54121) or similar abuse of AD CS request-context chase processing. |
new |
2 |
Identifies a successful PKINIT ticket-granting ticket request followed within five seconds on the same domain controller and source address by a successful user-to-user service-ticket request whose service SID matches the PKINIT principal SID. This sequence is consistent with the KDC-visible ticket requests used in an UnPAC-the-Hash attack, before client-side PAC credential decryption and NT hash recovery. The certificate used for PKINIT may have been obtained through CertiGhost or another certificate-abuse path. |
new |
1 |
|
Identifies high risk Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins by leveraging Microsoft’s Identity Protection machine learning and heuristics. Identity Protection categorizes risk into three tiers: low, medium, and high. While Microsoft does not provide specific details about how risk is calculated, each level brings higher confidence that the user or sign-in is compromised. |
update |
113 |