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Entra ID OAuth Application Redirect URI Modified

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Entra ID OAuth Application Redirect URI Modified

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Identifies modifications to OAuth application redirect URIs (ReplyUrls) in Entra ID. Adding an attacker-controlled redirect URI to an existing trusted application allows interception of OAuth authorization codes when users authenticate through that application’s normal login flow, enabling token theft without requiring a new application registration or consent event.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

  • logs-azure.auditlogs-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Cloud
  • Domain: Identity
  • Data Source: Azure
  • Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID
  • Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs
  • Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
  • Tactic: Persistence
  • Tactic: Credential Access
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 1

Rule authors:

  • Elastic
  • descambiado

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Triage and analysis

Investigating Entra ID OAuth Application Redirect URI Modified

A redirect URI addition to an existing trusted application does not generate a consent event and does not require registering a new application — both of which are commonly monitored. The modified application retains all existing user consents.

Possible investigation steps

  • Identify the actor who modified the application (azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by) and verify whether the change was authorized by the application owner or a change management ticket.
  • Review the specific URIs added by comparing modifiedProperties.oldValue and newValue for the ReplyUrls field in the audit event’s target_resources.
  • Geolocate and WHOIS the domain of any newly added URI — hosting providers, recently registered domains, or URL shorteners are strong indicators of compromise.
  • Check whether the actor recently became an owner of this application: look for "Add owner to application" events in AuditLogs for the same application object ID.
  • Review the application’s Graph API permissions — applications with Mail, Files, or directory scopes are the highest-value targets for redirect URI hijacking.

False positive analysis

  • Localhost and loopback URIs (http://localhost:*, http://127.0.0.1:*) added by developers are expected in non-production applications. Verify the application’s sensitivity before closing.
  • CI/CD-driven URI updates typically originate from service principal actors, not human users.

Response and remediation

  • Remove the unauthorized redirect URI via Entra ID > App registrations > Authentication.
  • Revoke all tokens issued to the application since the modification timestamp.
  • Review sign-in logs for the application for any sign-ins from unexpected sources after the change.
  • If the URI was externally controlled, treat as a full OAuth token compromise for all users of the application and initiate token revocation and user notification.

Rule query

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data_stream.dataset: "azure.auditlogs" and
azure.auditlogs.operation_name: "Update application" and
event.outcome: ("Success" or "success") and
azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.*.modified_properties.*.display_name: "AppAddress"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

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