Curl or Wget Execution from Container Context
editCurl or Wget Execution from Container Context
editDetects execution of curl or wget from processes whose title aligns with runc init, a common fingerprint for workloads running inside OCI/runc-backed containers on Linux hosts instrumented with Auditd Manager. After breaking out of an application container or abusing a privileged workload, attackers often pull ingress tooling (stagers, scripts, implants) or stage exfiltration with minimal HTTP clients. Those utilities are also used benignly in images, so context matters; the runc init anchor narrows the signal to the container runtime boundary where unexpected download clients are more worthy of review than the same binaries on a bare-metal admin shell.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- auditbeat-*
- logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Linux
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Command and Control
- Tactic: Execution
- Domain: Containers
- Data Source: Auditd Manager
- Resources: Investigation Guide
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
editTriage and analysis
Investigating Curl or Wget Execution from Container Context
The rule matches Auditd-backed process events where process.title is runc init and the executed program is
curl/wget (by process.name) or the argument vector suggests curl or wget paths. Use it to spot ingress tool
transfer or scripted downloads from inside a container as seen at the host audit layer.
Possible investigation steps
-
Reconstruct the full command line from
process.args/process.command_lineand identify URLs, output paths, and flags such as-O,--post-file, or TLS bypass (-k). -
Map the event to the container: cgroup,
container.id,kubernetes.pod.*, or runtime metadata if present on the document; identify the image, namespace, and workload owner. - Review egress from the host or pod network policy logs for destinations contacted shortly after the execution.
- Compare against recent image or manifest changes for the workload to rule out intentional startup scripts.
False positive analysis
- Package managers and bootstrap scripts in official images may run curl/wget once at start; document and exclude when verified.
- Security scanners or health checks running in sidecars could match; validate agent type and schedule.
Response and remediation
- If unauthorized, isolate the node or workload, revoke credentials available to the container, inspect for dropped binaries or cron/systemd additions, and rotate any secrets the container could reach.
Setup
editSetup
This rule requires data from Auditd Manager (or legacy Auditbeat shipping comparable ECS fields).
Auditd Manager Integration Setup
The Auditd Manager integration receives audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. With auditd_manager,
administrators can define audit rules, track system events, and generate reports.
Steps to deploy Auditd Manager
- In Kibana, open Add integrations, search for Auditd Manager, and add it to an agent policy deployed on Linux hosts that should emit syscall audit data.
- For integration details, see the Auditd Manager documentation.
Rule-specific notes
-
Ensure syscall coverage includes execve (or equivalent) for processes inside containers so
curl,wget, and argument lists are captured on the host. -
Confirm that
process.title(or the mapped proctitle field) reflectsrunc initfor your runtime; other runtimes may use different titles—tune the predicate if you standardize oncrun,containerd-shim, etc.
Rule query
edithost.os.type:linux and
data_stream.dataset:"auditd_manager.auditd" and
event.action:("executed" or "exec") and
process.title:"runc init" and
(
process.name:(curl or wget) or
process.args:(* curl* or */bin/curl* or *wget*)
)
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Command and Control
- ID: TA0011
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
-
Technique:
- Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
- ID: T1105
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/