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Potential Account Takeover - Mixed Logon Types

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Potential Account Takeover - Mixed Logon Types

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Identifies a user account (often a service account) that normally logs in with high volume using one logon type suddenly showing successful logons using a different logon type with low count. This pattern may indicate account takeover or use of stolen credentials from a new context (e.g. interactive or network logon where only batch/service was expected).

Rule type: esql

Rule indices: None

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 15m

Searches indices from: now-30m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Windows
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Privilege Escalation
  • Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 1

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Triage and analysis

Investigating Potential Account Takeover - Mixed Logon Types

A high-volume account (e.g. service account tied to a specific logon type such as Batch or Network) that also shows successful logons with a different logon type and low count may indicate credential compromise and use from a new context (account takeover or misuse).

Possible investigation steps

  • Confirm with the account owner or service owner whether the additional logon type is expected (e.g. new automation, RDP for maintenance).
  • Review which logon types appear in Esql.logon_type_values and which has the low count (likely the anomalous one).
  • Correlate with other alerts for the same user (e.g. logon from new source IP, password changes, MFA changes).
  • Check whether the account is a known service account; if so, verify if any new scripts or systems were authorized to use it.

False positive analysis

  • Legitimate expansion of use (e.g. service account also used for occasional interactive logon for troubleshooting) can trigger this. Tune thresholds (e.g. max_logon >= 1000, min_logon ⇐ 10) or add exclusions for known service accounts with documented multi-context use.
  • New scheduled tasks or automation that use a different logon type may cause a short-lived spike in the "other" logon type; review over a longer window if needed.

Response and remediation

  • If takeover or misuse is confirmed: force password reset, revoke sessions, rotate service account credentials, and restrict logon type or source where possible.
  • Investigate how credentials may have been compromised and address the vector.

Rule query

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from logs-system.security*, logs-windows.forwarded*, winlogbeat-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| WHERE event.category == "authentication" and event.action == "logged-in" and winlog.event_id == "4624" and
        event.outcome == "success" and not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
        to_lower(user.name) != "administrator"
| STATS logon_count = COUNT(*) by user.name, winlog.logon.type
| STATS
    Esql.max_logon = MAX(logon_count),
    Esql.min_logon = MIN(logon_count),
    Esql.logon_type_values = VALUES(winlog.logon.type),
    Esql.count_distinct_logon_types = COUNT_DISTINCT(winlog.logon.type) by user.name

// high count of logons is often associated with service account tied to a specific service, if observed in use with a different logon type it's suspicious
| WHERE Esql.count_distinct_logon_types >= 2 and Esql.max_logon >= 1000 and (Esql.min_logon >= 1 and Esql.min_logon <= 10)
| EVAL winlog.logon.type = MV_FIRST(Esql.logon_type_values)
| KEEP user.name, winlog.logon.type, Esql.*

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

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