Suspicious PowerShell Engine ImageLoadedit
Identifies the PowerShell engine being invoked by unexpected processes. Rather than executing PowerShell functionality with powershell.exe, some attackers do this to operate more stealthily.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule queryedit
library where dll.name : ("System.Management.Automation.ni.dll", "System.Management.Automation.dll") and /* add false positives relevant to your environment here */ not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\sdiagnhost.exe") and not process.executable regex~ """C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\*\.exe""" and not process.name : ( "Altaro.SubAgent.exe", "AppV_Manage.exe", "azureadconnect.exe", "CcmExec.exe", "configsyncrun.exe", "choco.exe", "ctxappvservice.exe", "DVLS.Console.exe", "edgetransport.exe", "exsetup.exe", "forefrontactivedirectoryconnector.exe", "InstallUtil.exe", "JenkinsOnDesktop.exe", "Microsoft.EnterpriseManagement.ServiceManager.UI.Console.exe", "mmc.exe", "mscorsvw.exe", "msexchangedelivery.exe", "msexchangefrontendtransport.exe", "msexchangehmworker.exe", "msexchangesubmission.exe", "msiexec.exe", "MsiExec.exe", "noderunner.exe", "NServiceBus.Host.exe", "NServiceBus.Host32.exe", "NServiceBus.Hosting.Azure.HostProcess.exe", "OuiGui.WPF.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "pwsh.exe", "SCCMCliCtrWPF.exe", "ScriptEditor.exe", "ScriptRunner.exe", "sdiagnhost.exe", "servermanager.exe", "setup100.exe", "ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe", "SPCAF.Client.exe", "SPCAF.SettingsEditor.exe", "SQLPS.exe", "telemetryservice.exe", "UMWorkerProcess.exe", "w3wp.exe", "wsmprovhost.exe" )
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: PowerShell
- ID: T1059.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/