Suspicious Execution via Scheduled Taskedit
Identifies execution of a suspicious program via scheduled tasks by looking at process lineage and command line usage.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule queryedit
process where event.type == "start" and
/* Schedule service cmdline on Win10+ */
process.parent.name : "svchost.exe" and process.parent.args : "Schedule" and
/* add suspicious programs here */
process.pe.original_file_name in
(
"cscript.exe",
"wscript.exe",
"PowerShell.EXE",
"Cmd.Exe",
"MSHTA.EXE",
"RUNDLL32.EXE",
"REGSVR32.EXE",
"MSBuild.exe",
"InstallUtil.exe",
"RegAsm.exe",
"RegSvcs.exe",
"msxsl.exe",
"CONTROL.EXE",
"EXPLORER.EXE",
"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
"msiexec.exe"
) and
/* add suspicious paths here */
process.args : (
"C:\\Users\\*",
"C:\\ProgramData\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*",
"C:\\PerfLogs\\*",
"C:\\Intel\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Debug\\*",
"C:\\HP\\*")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Scheduled Task/Job
- ID: T1053
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Scheduled Task
- ID: T1053.005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/