Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Processedit
A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate process hollowing or another form of code injection.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule queryedit
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
process.name : ("esensor.exe", "elastic-endpoint.exe") and
process.parent.executable != null and
/* add FPs here */
not process.parent.executable : ("C:\\Program Files\\Elastic\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault*.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Masquerading
- ID: T1036
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/