New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner
editNew GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner
editThis rule detects the creation of a self-hosted Github runner from a first time seen user.name in the last 5 days. Adversaries may abuse self-hosted runners to execute workflow jobs on customer infrastructure.
Rule type: new_terms
Rule indices:
- logs-github.audit-*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Cloud
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Initial Access
- Data Source: Github
- Resources: Investigation Guide
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
editTriage and analysis
Investigating New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner
Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host.
Possible investigation steps
- Validate the user is authoried to perform this change
- Review the purpose of the self-hosted action runner and what actions will be executed.
- Verify if there is any adjascent sensitive file access or collection.
- Correlate with other alerts and investiguate if this activity is related to a supply chain attack.
False positive analysis
- Authorized github self-hosted actions runner.
Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized command execution and potential lateral movement.
- Terminate any suspicious child processes that were initiated by the Github actions runner.
- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system’s logs and configurations to identify any unauthorized changes or additional indicators of compromise.
- Restore the system from a known good backup if any unauthorized changes or malicious activities are confirmed.
- Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on the broader network.
Rule query
editevent.dataset:"github.audit" and event.category:"configuration" and event.action:"enterprise.register_self_hosted_runner"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Initial Access
- ID: TA0001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
-
Technique:
- Name: Supply Chain Compromise
- ID: T1195
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- ID: T1195.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/