Anthropic Sensitive Claude Project Role Assigned to User

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Anthropic Sensitive Claude Project Role Assigned to User

Detects when a Claude project owner or editor role is granted through a role_assignment_granted event. Project owners and editors can access project chats, artifacts, and knowledge bases that may hold sensitive data. An attacker with organization access can grant these roles to persist access to high-value project content without holding organization admin privileges.

Rule type: new_terms

Rule indices:

logs-anthropic.audit-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list

Tags:

Domain: GenAI
Platform: Anthropic
Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs
Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
Use Case: Threat Detection
Use Case: UEBA
Resources: Investigation Guide
Rule Type: New Terms
Tactic: Persistence
Tactic: Privilege Escalation

Version: 1

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit

Triage and analysis

Investigating Anthropic Sensitive Claude Project Role Assigned to User

First-seen grant of chat_project:owner or chat_project:editor on a Claude project (organization.id
anthropic.audit.resource_id). Organization membership admin promotions (claude_user_role_updated) are covered by Anthropic Admin Role Assigned to User. Self-assignment at project creation is common; user.id may be absent for anthropic_actor.

Unauthorized = grant to an unexpected collaborator (especially external), no project onboarding ticket, or followed by export / public artifact sharing / logging changes on the same project. Close as FP for known team staffing with ticket or a recurring collaborator baseline on that project.

Possible investigation steps

When user_actor, identify assigner via email/IP/UA. Review role, anthropic.audit.resource_id, and grantee fields (anthropic.audit.target_id / target_type / related.user) when present.
Correlate with org membership changes, exports, or artifact sharing involving the same project or users.
Escalate when the grantee is new/external or privileged data access follows; close when ticket/baseline matches.

False positive analysis

Routine project staffing and self-assignment at creation are expected — baseline recurring collaborators.

Response and remediation

On unauthorized grant: revoke the project role on that anthropic.audit.resource_id, review other changes on the same project/org, and audit project content access and recent exports.

Rule query

edit

data_stream.dataset: "anthropic.audit" and
    event.category: "iam" and
    event.action: "role_assignment_granted" and
    user.target.roles: ("chat_project:owner" or "chat_project:editor")

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Additional Cloud Roles
- ID: T1098.003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Additional Cloud Roles
- ID: T1098.003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/

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