IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Code Signing Policy Modification Through Built-in toolsedit
Identifies attempts to disable/modify the code signing policy through system native utilities. Code signing provides authenticity on a program, and grants the user with the ability to check whether the program has been tampered with. By allowing the execution of unsigned or self-signed code, threat actors can craft and execute malicious code.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
- endgame-*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- macOS
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
- Elastic Endgame
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule queryedit
process where event.type == "start" and
(
/* Windows */
((process.name: "bcdedit.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "bcdedit.exe") and process.args: ("-set", "/set") and
process.args: ("TESTSIGNING", "nointegritychecks", "loadoptions", "DISABLE_INTEGRITY_CHECKS")) or
/* MacOS */
(process.executable: "/usr/bin/csrutil" and process.args: "disable")
)
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Subvert Trust Controls
- ID: T1553
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Code Signing Policy Modification
- ID: T1553.006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006/