Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In with Non-Standard User Agent

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Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In with Non-Standard User Agent

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Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-in activity where the Microsoft Authentication Broker authenticates is using a user agent that is not consistent with common browser, mobile, or Windows platform authentication clients. Adversary-in-the-middle and OAuth phishing tooling often presents scripted or relayed user agents (for example Node.js, Python, or generic HTTP libraries) while still targeting first-party resources through the broker.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

  • logs-azure.signinlogs-*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Cloud
  • Domain: Identity
  • Data Source: Azure
  • Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID
  • Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Initial Access
  • Tactic: Credential Access
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 1

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Triage and analysis

Investigating Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In with Non-Standard User Agent

Review azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name, user_agent.original, azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name, azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, source.ip, and source.as.organization.name.

Confirm whether the user or application intentionally used a non-browser client against the requested resource.

Possible investigation steps

  • Inspect user_agent.original for automation libraries (for example node, axios, python-requests, curl).
  • Correlate azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id with other sign-ins, device registration audit events, or Graph activity in the same time window.
  • Review conditional access outcomes and identity protection signals for the user.
  • Compare source.ip and ASN against expected VPN, MDM, and developer egress.

False positive analysis

  • Microsoft platform and mobile clients using Mozilla-, Dalvik-, CFNetwork-, or Windows-AzureAD-Authentication-Provider- style user agents are excluded by design.
  • First-party CLI tools and test harnesses that legitimately broker tokens may still match if they use uncommon user agent strings.

Response and remediation

  • If malicious, revoke refresh tokens for the user, review newly registered devices, and reset credentials per policy.
  • Escalate when paired with suspicious ASN sign-ins, multi-IP OAuth flows, or follow-on Graph data access.

Setup

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Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs (logs-azure.signinlogs-*) must populate user_agent.original, azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name, and azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name.

Rule query

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data_stream.dataset:"azure.signinlogs" and event.action:"Sign-in activity" and event.outcome:(success or Success) and
(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name:"Microsoft Authentication Broker" or azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id:"29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e") and
user_agent.original:(* and not (Mozilla* or Dalvik* or *CFNetwork* or Windows-AzureAD-Authentication-Provider* or Java*ThinkPad*)) and
azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name:*

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM