GKE Certificate Signing Request API Client Signer Requested
editGKE Certificate Signing Request API Client Signer Requested
editDetects creation of a GKE CertificateSigningRequest (CSR) that requests the kubernetes.io/kube-apiserver-client signer. This signer issues general API client certificates with few subject restrictions, unlike the restricted kubelet signers used for node certificate rotation. Attackers with CSR permissions use this signer to mint long-lived credentials for privileged identities such as system:kube-controller-manager, enabling persistence and privilege escalation that survives token revocation and RBAC changes.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- logs-gcp.audit-*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-6m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/certificate-signing-requests/
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/
- https://www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-rbac-privilige-escalation/
- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.persistence.create-client-certificate/
Tags:
- Domain: Cloud
- Domain: Kubernetes
- Data Source: GCP
- Data Source: GCP Audit Logs
- Data Source: Google Cloud Platform
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Persistence
- Tactic: Privilege Escalation
- Resources: Investigation Guide
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
editTriage and analysis
Investigating GKE Certificate Signing Request API Client Signer Requested
Identify the actor (client.user.email), source.ip, and user_agent.original. Legitimate GKE node certificate
rotation uses kubernetes.io/kube-apiserver-client-kubelet or kubernetes.io/kubelet-serving — not this signer.
Review gcp.audit.request.spec.signerName and decode gcp.audit.request.spec.request when present to extract the
requested Common Name (CN).
*Full decoded PEM block* echo "<gcp.audit.request.spec.request>" | base64 -d *Parsed CSR details (subject, key type/size, extensions, signature)* echo "<gcp.audit.request.spec.request>" | base64 -d | openssl req -noout -text *Subject only* echo "<gcp.audit.request.spec.request>" | base64 -d | openssl req -noout -subject
Possible investigation steps
- Confirm whether the principal is authorized to request API client certificates and whether the activity aligns with approved PKI workflows.
-
Decode
gcp.audit.request.spec.requestand inspect the CSR subject for privileged identities such assystem:masters,system:kube-controller-manager, orsystem:admin. -
Correlate with CSR approval or patch activity on the same
gcp.audit.resource_nameand follow-on API access from unusual networks. -
Review RBAC grants on
certificatesigningrequestscreate andcertificatesigningrequests/approvalfor the actor.
False positive analysis
- Custom PKI or admin workflows may legitimately use this signer outside kube-system. Baseline and tune for known operators.
Related rules
- GKE Certificate Signing Request Privileged Identity Requested - 4159bec9-76ad-4cdc-a797-4a8572073bbe
- GKE Certificate Signing Request Self-Approved - e155e658-3dcd-4d27-a4e5-1d8da6704b0e
- GKE Client Certificate Signing Request Created or Approved - ec67ab57-945a-4edb-84f8-1d7a51f46544
Response and remediation
- Deny or delete suspicious CSRs, rotate cluster signing trust if abused, and remove excessive CSR RBAC from untrusted identities.
Setup
editThe GCP Fleet integration with GKE audit logs enabled is required. Request body capture for CSR create events (gcp.audit.request.spec.signerName) typically requires RequestResponse audit level on CertificateSigningRequest resources.
Rule query
editdata_stream.dataset:"gcp.audit" and service.name:"k8s.io" and event.outcome:"success" and event.action:"io.k8s.certificates.v1.certificatesigningrequests.create" and gcp.audit.request.spec.signerName:"kubernetes.io/kube-apiserver-client" and not client.user.email:( "system:gcp-controller-manager" or "system:serviceaccount:kube-system:certificate-controller" )
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Additional Container Cluster Roles
- ID: T1098.006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/006/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Additional Container Cluster Roles
- ID: T1098.006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/006/