« Azure VM Extension Deployment by User Azure VM Serial Console Connection with Unusual User and ASN »
Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security [8.19] ›Detections and alerts ›Prebuilt rule reference

Azure VM Managed Run Command Created or Updated with Unusual Principal

edit
IMPORTANT: This documentation is no longer updated. Refer to Elastic's version policy and the latest documentation.

Azure VM Managed Run Command Created or Updated with Unusual Principal

edit

Identifies the creation or update of a managed Azure Run Command resource ("MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMANDS/WRITE" or the virtual machine scale set equivalent) by an identity that has not performed this operation recently. Unlike the action-based Run Command ("runCommand/action"), the managed Run Command is a persistent resource on the VM whose creation or update executes the supplied script as System (Windows) or root (Linux). Because creating a managed run command both executes code and leaves a durable object, adversaries can use it as an alternative to the action invocation to evade detections that only watch "runCommand/action". Alerting on the first time a given principal performs this operation surfaces unusual or unauthorized use while suppressing routine automation that repeatedly manages the same run commands.

Rule type: new_terms

Rule indices:

  • logs-azure.activitylogs-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Cloud
  • Domain: Endpoint
  • Data Source: Azure
  • Data Source: Azure Activity Logs
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Execution
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 1

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit

Triage and analysis

Investigating Azure VM Managed Run Command Created or Updated with Unusual Principal

The managed Run Command (runCommands/write) creates or updates a persistent run command resource on a VM or VM scale set. Creating the resource executes the supplied script as SYSTEM (Windows) or root (Linux). This rule uses a new terms approach keyed on the acting principal, so it fires the first time a given identity performs this operation within the history window.

Triage checklist

  • Identify the acting principal via azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id and azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_type (User vs ServicePrincipal). Service principal or managed identity activity is more suspicious than a known admin user.
  • Is the source IP/ASN consistent with corporate infrastructure or a known VPN?
  • Inspect azure.resource.id for the target VM/VMSS and the run command resource name. Attacker-created names are often random or descriptive of intent.
  • Did the same principal recently perform reconnaissance, role assignments, or other VM operations (runCommand/action, extensions/write, serial console connect)?
  • Correlate with endpoint telemetry on the target host: process activity parented by the Azure guest agent (WaAppAgent.exe / walinuxagent) within ~120 seconds of the write timestamp.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review the principal’s Entra ID sign-in logs and RBAC role assignments on the subscription, resource group, and VM.
  • Retrieve the run command script content from the VM (the activity log does not contain the script body) to assess intent.
  • Pivot on the VM for credential access, new local accounts, or outbound C2 connections following execution.

Response and remediation

  • If unauthorized, delete the managed run command resource, isolate the VM, rotate credentials reachable from it, and review RBAC on the affected scope.
  • Collect endpoint and activity log artifacts per incident procedures.

Rule query

edit
data_stream.dataset:azure.activitylogs and
    event.action:(
        "MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMANDS/WRITE" or
        "MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINESCALESETS/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMANDS/WRITE"
    ) and event.outcome:(success or Success) and
    azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id: *

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

« Azure VM Extension Deployment by User Azure VM Serial Console Connection with Unusual User and ASN »