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AWS CLI with Kali Linux Fingerprint Identified

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AWS CLI with Kali Linux Fingerprint Identified

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Identifies usage of the AWS CLI from a client reporting a user agent string indicating the request was made from a Kali Linux distribution. Kali Linux is commonly used for offensive security testing and adversary tradecraft. While not inherently malicious, AWS CLI activity originating from Kali is uncommon in most production environments and may indicate compromised credentials, unauthorized access, or post-exploitation activity using valid cloud accounts.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • logs-aws.cloudtrail-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-6m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Cloud
  • Data Source: AWS
  • Data Source: Amazon Web Services
  • Data Source: AWS CloudTrail
  • Tactic: Initial Access
  • Use Case: Cloud Threat Detection
  • Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 3

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Triage and Analysis

Investigating AWS CLI with Kali Linux Fingerprint Identified

AWS CloudTrail captures the user agent string for API requests, which can provide insight into the operating system and tooling used. The presence of distrib#kali strongly suggests the AWS CLI was executed from a Kali Linux environment. Kali is widely used for penetration testing, red teaming, and adversarial operations, making its appearance in AWS API telemetry noteworthy, especially when associated with sensitive actions or unexpected identities.

This detection focuses on successful AWS CLI activity and should be evaluated in the context of who performed the action, what was accessed or modified, and where the request originated.

Possible investigation steps

Identify the actor - Review aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id to determine which IAM principal was used. - Check whether this principal normally interacts with AWS via CLI tooling and whether Kali Linux usage is expected.

Review access patterns and actions - Examine the API calls associated with this user agent for high-risk activity such as IAM changes, data access, snapshot sharing, logging modification, or persistence-related actions. - Look for sequences indicating initial access or expansion, such as GetSessionToken, AssumeRole, or privilege escalation attempts. - Determine whether the activity scope aligns with the role’s intended permissions and business function.

Inspect source network and tooling context - Review source.ip, source.geo fields, and ASN to determine whether the request originated from an expected corporate network, VPN, or known security testing infrastructure. - Analyze user_agent.original to confirm CLI usage and identify automation versus interactive usage. - Sudden shifts from console-based access to CLI usage from Kali may indicate credential compromise.

Correlate with surrounding activity - Search for additional CloudTrail events tied to the same access key or session before and after this detection. - Look for evidence of follow-on actions such as resource creation, configuration changes, or attempts to disable logging and monitoring services. - Assess whether the activity represents a single isolated request or part of a broader behavioral chain.

False positive analysis

  • Internal red team or security testing activity may legitimately generate Kali-based AWS CLI traffic. Confirm scope, timing, and authorization with security leadership.
  • Compare against historical behavior for the same IAM principal to determine whether Kali usage is a deviation from baseline access patterns.

Response and remediation

  • If the activity is unauthorized, immediately revoke or rotate the affected access keys or invalidate the active session.
  • Review IAM permissions associated with the identity and reduce scope where possible to enforce least privilege.
  • Investigate for additional indicators of compromise, including unusual role assumptions, new credential creation, or data access from the same identity.
  • Notify security operations and incident response teams if the activity aligns with known adversary behaviors or appears part of a larger intrusion.
  • Consider adding guardrails or conditional access controls (such as source IP restrictions or MFA enforcement) for sensitive IAM principals.

Additional information

Rule query

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any where event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail"
  and user_agent.name: ("aws-cli", "Boto3")
  and stringContains (user_agent.original, "distrib#kali")
  and event.outcome == "success"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

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