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Potential Remote File Execution via MSIEXEC

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Potential Remote File Execution via MSIEXEC

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Identifies the execution of the built-in Windows Installer, msiexec.exe, to install a remote package. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

logs-endpoint.events.process-*
logs-endpoint.events.network-*

Severity: low

Risk score: 21

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References: None

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Windows
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Initial Access
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Data Source: Elastic Defend

Version: 3

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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sequence with maxspan=1m
 [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and
    process.name : "msiexec.exe" and process.args : "/V"] by process.entity_id
 [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "msiexec.exe" and
    event.action == "connection_attempted"] by process.entity_id
 [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and
  process.parent.name : "msiexec.exe" and user.id : ("S-1-5-21-*", "S-1-5-12-1-*") and
  not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\srtasks.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\srtasks.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\taskkill.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\Installer\\MSI*.tmp",
                            "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
                            "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\ie4uinit.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ie4uinit.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\sc.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\Wbem\\mofcomp.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\twain_32\\fjscan32\\SOP\\crtdmprc.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\taskkill.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\schtasks.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\schtasks.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\sdbinst.exe") and
  not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Citrix Systems, Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
  not (process.name : ("regsvr32.exe", "powershell.exe", "rundll32.exe", "wscript.exe") and
       process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
       process.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")) and
  not (process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe") and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
  not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args : "printui.dll,PrintUIEntry")
  ] by process.parent.entity_id

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Initial Access
- ID: TA0001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Technique:
- Name: Phishing
- ID: T1566
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Spearphishing Link
- ID: T1566.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
- ID: T1218
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Msiexec
- ID: T1218.007
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/

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