Identifies when a child process is spawned by the screensaver engine process, which is consistent with an attacker’s malicious payload being executed after the screensaver activated on the endpoint. An adversary can maintain persistence on a macOS endpoint by creating a malicious screensaver (.saver) file and configuring the screensaver plist file to execute code each time the screensaver is activated.
Rule type: eql
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
- Threat Detection
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.16.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
## Triage and analysis - Analyze the descendant processes of the ScreenSaverEngine process for malicious code and suspicious behavior such as downloading a payload from a server - Review the installed and activated screensaver on the host. Triage the screensaver (.saver) file that was triggered to identify whether the file is malicious or not.
process where event.type == "start" and process.parent.name == "ScreenSaverEngine"