AWS Config Service Tamperingedit

Identifies attempts to delete an AWS Config Service resource. An adversary may tamper with Config services in order to reduce visibility into the security posture of an account and / or its workload instances.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

  • filebeat-*
  • logs-aws*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 10 minutes

Searches indices from: now-60m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100



  • Elastic
  • Cloud
  • AWS
  • Continuous Monitoring
  • SecOps
  • Monitoring

Version: 6 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.9.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.13.0

Rule authors: Elastic, Austin Songer

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Potential false positivesedit

Privileged IAM users with security responsibilities may be expected to make changes to the Config service in order to align with local security policies and requirements. Automation, orchestration, and security tools may also make changes to the Config service, where they are used to automate setup or configuration of AWS accounts. Other kinds of user or service contexts do not commonly make changes to this service.

Investigation guideedit

## Config

The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.

Rule queryedit

event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and
and event.action:(DeleteConfigRule or DeleteOrganizationConfigRule
or DeleteConfigurationAggregator or DeleteConfigurationRecorder or
DeleteConformancePack or DeleteOrganizationConformancePack or
DeleteDeliveryChannel or DeleteRemediationConfiguration or

Threat mappingedit


Rule version historyedit

Version 6 (7.13.0 release)
  • Updated query, changed from:

    event.dataset: aws.cloudtrail and event.action: DeleteConfigRule and
Version 5 (7.12.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 4 (7.11.2 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 3 (7.11.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 2 (7.10.0 release)
  • Formatting only