IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Startup Folder Persistence via Unsigned Processedit
Identifies files written or modified in the startup folder by unsigned processes. Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 41
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-6m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 1
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License
Rule queryedit
sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=5s [process
where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.code_signature.trusted == false and /* suspicious paths can
be added here */ process.executable : ("C:\\Users\\*.exe",
"C:\\ProgramData\\*.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*.exe",
"C:\\Intel\\*.exe", "C:\\PerfLogs\\*.exe")
] [file where event.type != "deletion" and user.domain != "NT
AUTHORITY" and file.path :
("C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start
Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*",
"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start
Menu\\Programs\\StartUp\\*") ]
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- ID: T1547
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/