Machine Learning Detected a Suspicious Windows Event with a High Malicious Probability Scoreedit
A supervised machine learning model (ProblemChild) has identified a suspicious Windows process event with high probability of it being malicious activity. Alternatively, the model’s blocklist identified the event as being malicious.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- endgame-*
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*
- winlogbeat-*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-10m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- OS: Windows
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Use Case: Living off the Land Attack Detection
- Rule Type: ML
- Rule Type: Machine Learning
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Setupedit
Setup
The rule requires the Living off the Land (LotL) Attack Detection integration assets to be installed, as well as Windows process events collected by integrations such as Elastic Defend or Winlogbeat.
LotL Attack Detection Setup
The LotL Attack Detection integration detects living-off-the-land activity in Windows process events.
Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for LotL Attack Detection.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the documentation.
- Windows process events collected by the Elastic Defend integration or Winlogbeat(https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/_winlogbeat_overview.html).
- To install Elastic Defend, refer to the documentation.
- To set up and run Winlogbeat, follow this guide.
The following steps should be executed to install assets associated with the LotL Attack Detection integration:
- Go to the Kibana homepage. Under Management, click Integrations.
- In the query bar, search for Living off the Land Attack Detection and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Follow the instructions under the Installation section.
- For this rule to work, complete the instructions through Configure the ingest pipeline.
Rule queryedit
process where ((problemchild.prediction == 1 and problemchild.prediction_probability > 0.98) or
blocklist_label == 1) and not process.args : ("*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.txt*", "*C:\\WINDOWS\\temp\\nessus_*.tmp*")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Masquerading
- ID: T1036
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Masquerade Task or Service
- ID: T1036.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004/