Agentic Frameworks

Practical Considerations for Building AI-Augmented Security Systems

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Abstract

Traditional security automation faces significant challenges in adapting to the dynamic and nuanced landscape of modern cyber threats and IT environments. This paper focuses on bringing practical agentic solutions to the security industry by exploring how agentic frameworks can fundamentally transform detection engineering workflows. Drawing parallels from sequential diagnosis in medicine, we illustrate an iterative investigation approach where autonomous AI agents dynamically gather evidence, reason, and adapt their behavior to significantly enhance alert triage, contextual enrichment, and detection rule creation/tuning. The paper provides a deep dive into core agent design within these frameworks, detailing aspects such as structured I/O, tool integration, RAG, and prompt engineering, alongside advanced control mechanisms like guardrails, orchestration, and critique loops. It further addresses crucial engineering considerations for deploying these systems, including scalability, evaluation methodologies, and managing inherent limitations. Ultimately, this work serves as a comprehensive guide for security professionals and engineering teams, empowering them to implement best practice, AI-augmented security solutions capable of decision-making and adaptive threat responses in real-world environments.

Introduction & foundational concepts

From traditional automation to agentic systems

Traditional security automation relies on static playbooks and hard-coded logic that execute a fixed sequence of actions on alerts or data. This works well for well-defined, repetitive tasks but struggles with complexity or nuance. Agentic systems, by contrast, embed intelligence, often via large language models (LLMs), into the workflow to perform tasks that achieve specific goals. These agentic systems don't just follow a script; they can interpret context, make decisions, call tools, and adapt their behavior. In detection engineering, this means moving from simple "if X then Y" automations to AI-driven agents capable of reasoning over alerts, enriching data, and potentially updating themselves in response to adversaries. At the heart of it all is automation and token prediction, but with Agents driven by reason and decision-making.

Several organizations have released foundational articles on agents, prompt engineering techniques[1], core concepts[2][3], and even securing AI agents, outlining core principles such as defining human controllers, limiting agent powers, and ensuring observable actions and planning[4]. For a deeper dive into the fundamental principles guiding AI agent development as a precursor to diving into agentic frameworks, there are comprehensive resources like 'Principles of Building AI Agents'[5], which walk through fundamentals that are often abstracted away via agentic frameworks. This work, for instance, categorizes agents by their levels of autonomy

[1] https://www.kaggle.com/whitepaper-prompt-engineering
[2] https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/building-effective-agents
[3] https://cdn.openai.com/business-guides-and-resources/a-practical-guide-to-building-agents.pdf
[4] https://research.google/pubs/an-introduction-to-googles-approach-for-secure-ai-agents/
[5] https://hs-47815345.f.hubspotemail.net/hub/47815345/hubfs/Principles2%20cover%20(1)-merged.pdf

(e.g., low-level for binary choices to high-level for planning and task management), emphasizes the critical importance of selecting LLMs based on factors like 'context window size,' which directly impacts an agent's ability to process vast amounts of data, describes formal testing and evaluation methods (e.g. Evals), and even introduces nuanced prompting techniques (e.g. seed crystal, formatting tricks), providing a core understanding of agent capabilities. While there's also a great deal of security research, including guides like the OWASP AI Testing Guide[6] that address the critical aspects of securing agentic systems and LLMs, this article focuses instead on the practical application of agentic frameworks to empower security practitioners.

This topic remains a rich area for continued investigation, and agentic detection engineering systems hold practical significance, particularly within the detection engineering workflow. Unlike the conversational instructions common in chatbots, agentic detection engineering relies on product-focused prompts, which are meticulously hardened and optimized like production code for scaled, reliable operation within security workflows. Multiple times, the alert triage process is used as an example, examining it from multiple angles as it applies to different agentic framework core constructs. This paper explores such relevance and further discusses how, in reality, an agentic system can be utilized with well-known constructs like guardrails, evaluation tools, monitoring, and orchestration considerations.

Suppose that in practice, an agentic detection engineering system might ingest an alert, understand the alert's content and relevant detection rule, identify when it should gather additional context (like threat intelligence or host data), reason over if the alert is a true threat or a false positive, and even suggest improvements to detection logic. Unlike a traditional pipeline, the agentic system can handle ambiguous cases more gracefully. It can ask itself questions, critiquing initial analysis, retrieve more information as needed, and refine its conclusions iteratively. The result is automation that behaves more like a skilled analyst than a static script.

It's important to note; however, that while these systems represent a significant leap beyond static scripts (*or even no-code solutions*), they are stepping stones. They are sophisticated applications of agentic workflows rather than the Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) often depicted in futuristic scenarios. AGI remains a distant prospect, and the goal here is reliable augmentation, enhancing the capabilities of security engineers, not replacing them. This opportunity lays the groundwork for how such agent-based approaches are transforming detection engineering workflows. This paper is meant to promote best practices for security professionals and engineering teams when developing robust agent-based systems. In the sections that follow, we'll explore practical applications in alert triage, data enrichment, and rule tuning, highlighting relevant engineering considerations for building intelligent security systems with agent frameworks.

Definition: An Agent (or agentic system) *is a piece of software that autonomously performs tasks to achieve specific goals by using an LLM for reasoning and decision-making, often interacting with various tools and systems.*

[6] https://github.com/OWASP/www-project-ai-testing-guide/blob/main/Document/README.md

Agentic systems in detection engineering workflows

Agentic AI can enhance several key workflows in modern detection engineering. Let's examine how autonomous agents apply to common tasks: 1) alert triage and classification, 2) context enrichment, and 3) detection rule creation/tuning. Note: Several examples leverage the OpenAI Agents SDK framework for illustration purposes, but many recent frameworks provide similar constructs demonstrated in the example.

Use case 1: Contextual enrichment via agent-based tools

A major part of detection engineering (and alert investigation) is data enrichment, pulling in additional context about an alert. Traditionally, this might be done by scripts or a Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) calling threat intelligence feeds, asset databases, user directories, etc., or by an analyst manually querying similar sources. While traditional automation excels at performing predefined lookups, agentic systems introduce a dynamic layer to enrichment. Agents in this case use their inherent understanding of the alert to intelligently select and execute the most relevant tools on the fly, then extract, normalize, and infer relevant information within the data. While structured data is always the best approach, consider a contextually driven lookup that can extract the most relevant datapoints from unmapped data sources.

Imagine a situation where using a reputation tool is expensive, and we would like to triage a suspicious binary. Traditional automation can leverage available functions based on if-else or typical switch statements. An agent can choose to automatically query a threat intelligence service (like VirusTotal) for that file's reputation, check an internal asset inventory to see if the host is high-value, or cross-reference the hash against known malware databases. Rather than blindly calling every data source or statically defining a series of conditional checks, the agent decides which enrichment is relevant. The decision could be based on raw alert context, additional context provided, or steering instructions (e.g., *"only use the tool if absolutely necessary to save cost"*).

If the alert is about a suspicious URL, the agent might call a `vt_url_lookup` tool to get reputation scores, whereas for a process execution alert, it might use a `get_vt_hash_info` function to see how many engines flagged the file as malicious. Each tool returns structured data (or a summarized finding) that the agent incorporates into its analysis. For example:

Python

```
@function_tool
def get_vt_hash_info_tool(file_hash: str) -> str:
   """OpenAI Agents SDK tool to fetch VirusTotal analysis stats
for a file hash indicator."""
   url = f"https://www.virustotal.com/api/v3/files/{file_hash}"
```

```
    headers = {"x-apikey": api_key}
    resp = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=10)
    data = resp.json()
    return (
        data.get("data", {})
        .get("attributes", {})
        .get("last_analysis_stats", {})
    )
```

This context gathering can be orchestrated into an agentic system or workflow by a dedicated *Evidence Collector* agent or by the analysis agent itself using the available tools. The key point is that agents can extend their knowledge by invoking external functions or APIs, effectively consulting specialized “tools” or “assistants” (also referred to as subagents depending on the framework) for evidence. The outcome of all the aggregated evidence is a richly informed picture of the alert; not just the raw SIEM fields, but also threat intel hits, user/account info, recent similar alerts, etc. All of this happens with the agent driving the process, deciding when to use a tool and how to use the results. By autonomously enriching alerts, the agentic system ensures decisions are made with the best available evidence, mirroring what a thorough human analyst would do.

Use case 2: Automated alert triage and classification

Under normal circumstances, analysts attempt to quickly triage incoming alerts, deciding which are likely false positives (e.g., benign or expected behavior from an operating system update) and which are true security incidents (e.g,. emerging threat) requiring immediate action. Agentic systems can provide value to help triage mundane efforts. For example, leveraging a few-shot prompt engineering with specific alert classification examples, an *Alert analysis agent* can review an alert’s details (such as the triggering rule logic, event data, and context) and autonomously classify the alert as benign or malicious. Instead of a simple static check, the agent uses the detection rule’s intent and the alert’s actual event data to reason about whether the alert truly indicates a threat. It can produce a structured verdict (e.g., “verdict: FP or TP or Inconclusive”) along with a justification explaining its reasoning to avoid the risk of misattribution due to a lack of proper context.



Figure: Orchestration flow of agents for an alert. The alert is summarized, routed by domain to specialized agents, and then an evidence collector and final analysis agent produce a verdict. A critique agent provides feedback for iterative refinement.

This is not just a keyword match; the agent effectively reads the alert like an analyst would. It might note, for instance, *"The rule expected any PowerShell invocation with encoded commands to be malicious, but in this alert the script matches an approved admin utility, so it's likely a false positive."* An agent can reduce the volume of alerts needing human review by automatically closing obvious false positives (or tagging them as such). The classification isn't binary; it comes with an explanation and even a confidence score, so the system can decide to auto-escalate uncertain cases to humans. By handling routine triage, agentic systems free up human analysts to focus on more nuanced alerts and aid in rule tuning.

Python

```
class AnalysisResult(BaseModel):
   """Analysis result model."""

   summary: str = Field(description="High-level, user-facing
summary (concise)")
   verdict: str = Field(description="FP, TP, Suspicious")
   detailed_justification: str = Field(description="Key reasons
for the verdict")
   evidence: list[str] = Field(description="Evidence supporting
the analysis")
   recommendations: str = Field(description="What to do next")
   confidence_score: float = Field(description="0.0-1.0")
```

Typically, the unspoken challenge here is determining the right signals to feed the agent while balancing classical software engineering challenges (e.g, performance, cost). Building production-grade agentic systems for cybersecurity requires designing scalable, distributed systems and cloud-native architectures to handle the volume of security telemetry and ensure high availability. In addition to well-written prompt investment and structured responses, we need to supply *just enough* context to make a sound decision following the organizationally defined reasoning process. An analyst may have a series of questions that should be answered before making a determination, but nuance often requires an extra set of human-in-the-loop analysis. For example, the analysts may investigate the prevalence of the behavior seen through the data, the context of the behavior itself, and whether there were external factors (e.g., global system updates). These questions hint at whether the activity is legitimate, but start to break down in different scenarios (e.g., is the activity related to an ongoing assessment), in which case it can only confirm that further investigation is needed. Even though 100% accuracy may be an unrealistic goal today, it's still worth considering applying these workflows to cases where minor reasoning is required. An example might include an Agent triaging thousands of daily low-severity alerts, where simple automation would struggle to define exhaustive, brittle rules for every benign software update, legitimate admin action, or slightly unusual but harmless user action. Instead, the Agent could consider the broader, more ambiguous context of process, user, and system history to infer legitimacy with a degree of nuanced understanding beyond the rigid comparisons.

Use case 3: Intelligent detection rule tuning

Another core step in the detection engineering lifecycle that agentic systems can assist in is proactively improving detection rules through intelligent tuning. This is particularly important as rule tuning represents a significant pain point in Security Operations Center (SOC) environments, often being a manual, labor-intensive process that struggles to keep pace with evolving threats and alert volumes. Tuning is inherently challenging due to the diverse and dynamic nature of modern IT environments. External factors such as frequent operating system updates, legitimate software installations by users that might initially appear suspicious, and unique developer activities on their machines can all generate benign events that trigger detection rules, requiring continuous and nuanced tuning to minimize false positives without sacrificing true threat detection.

Detection engineers constantly tune rules to reduce false positives and catch new adversary techniques. Agents can help by analyzing patterns across alerts and suggesting rule modifications. For instance, an agent observing many false positives identified by rule exceptions for a Windows login failure rule might identify a common benign cause (e.g., a monitoring script triggering the rule) and propose an exclusion. The Agent could then review these exclusions for trends and propose recommendations to either include similar exclusions in other rules or specifically tune that particular rule.

This iterative refinement, akin to a continuous critique loop, allows agent-driven rule tuning to dramatically speed up the detection engineering lifecycle by periodically tuning rules, continuously learning from what was triaged. Of course, human oversight remains important

(e.g., an engineer might review and approve any agent-proposed rule changes), but the heavy lifting of analyzing data and refining rules can be offloaded. This is especially valuable in large environments where the volume of alerts and evolving threats outpaces human reaction capabilities.

Lessons from sequential diagnosis: An iterative security investigations approach

We're starting to see exciting use cases of agentic systems used in other domains like the medical field, where the Microsoft AI Diagnostic Orchestrator (MAI-DxO) was able to correctly diagnose patients four times more than experienced physicians[7]. We can draw significant parallels from the medical field's approach to sequential diagnosis. Just as physicians iteratively formulate and revise diagnostic hypotheses (requesting additional patient details or tests based on evolving evidence), security analysts and AI agents can adapt their alert triage investigative workflows. This iterative process allows agents to dynamically decide what information is most relevant to retrieve next, moving beyond pre-defined playbooks to a more adaptive, evidence-driven investigation.

A key lesson observed in medical diagnostics is to use the gatekeeper model, where findings are revealed only when explicitly queried. In detection engineering science, this would translate to accessing the right contextual data. Security telemetry is often dispersed across various systems and domains, each with its own retrieval cost, latency, and access controls. An AI Gatekeeper component could manage requests for data, associating cost (quality, analysts' time, compute resources, tokens) with each piece of information retrieved. This approach encourages agents to then make judicious decisions about which data to fetch, making sure investigations are efficient and cost-effective.

By applying the medical focus on diagnostic accuracy alongside the cost of tests performed to inform the security analyst workflow, we can build workflows that not only aim for high true/false positive accuracy, but also consider the return on investment for each investigative step. This ensures the most critical alerts receive the necessary in-depth analysis, while less severe or low-confidence alerts are triaged efficiently.

Core agent design & implementation

Selecting an agent framework: Why and when to invest

Building an agentic system from scratch is intricate (e.g., *try developing a single tool using the json tool schema compared to defining a tool via a framework)*. Fortunately, a number of agent frameworks have emerged to ease development, including OpenAI's Agents SDK, LangChain's LangGraph module, Microsoft's Autogen, the PydanticAI framework, most recently Google's

[7] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.22405

Agent Development Kit (ADK), Agno, and others. Choosing whether to invest in such a framework (and which one) depends on your needs.

When are agent frameworks worthwhile? Agent frameworks become essential when your use-case demands capabilities beyond simple, stateless LLM calls. This includes scenarios involving multi-step reasoning, adaptive tool usage, or dynamic decision flows. For instance, successfully orchestrating multiple specialized agents and their respective tools (as in the alert triage example) intrinsically involves complex inter-agent communication, conditional handoffs, and managing state across various interactions. Similarly, if your process has a critical requirement for consistently structured outputs or the maintenance of memory over extended workflows, these are inherent complexities that naturally align with a framework's design. While frameworks abstract away significant boilerplate logic, which is a key feature for developer efficiency, developers should be mindful that this abstraction can sometimes hide underlying complexities. This could be a trade-off to consider, especially if it may lead down a distracting path away from the actual detection engineering goal.

Why not just call the LLM via API directly? For a simple one-shot task (e.g., “summarize this log file”), a direct prompt to an LLM might suffice. But as soon as the workflow involves conditional logic (like “if alert domain is X, use a different approach”), sophisticated external data integration (via tools), or the need to maintain conversational state across multiple turns, an agent-oriented framework becomes invaluable. Beyond defining agents and orchestrators with flexible model options, these frameworks typically include critical features like built-in traceability for debugging, robust error handling, efficient parallel tool calls, seamless handoffs between agents, enforced structured outputs, and essential guardrails and validation mechanisms. In detection engineering, these capabilities translate directly to more reliable, auditable processes.

Here is a brief note on some available frameworks:

- **OpenAI agents SDK (GitHub - openai/openai-agents-python: A lightweight, powerful framework for multi-agent workflows)**, A lightweight but powerful production-ready framework for building multi-agent workflows with OpenAI models. It emphasizes simplicity and production readiness, with core concepts of agents, tools, and a runner to execute agent plans. In the code snippets throughout, this SDK underpins the agents and their orchestration.

- **LangGraph (GitHub - langchain-ai/langgraph: Build resilient language agents as graphs.)**, An orchestration framework (part of the LangChain ecosystem) that models agent workflows as graphs or state machines. It’s useful when you need fine-grained control and stateful flows (like complex incident response playbooks). LangGraph trades some simplicity for flexibility in defining Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) style flows with conditional branches and persistent state.

- **CrewAI (GitHub - crewAIInc/crewAI: Framework for orchestrating role-playing, autonomous AI agents.)**, A pattern focusing on role-specific agents collaborating in a team (a “crew”). This aligns well with detection engineering, where you might have a

triage agent, enrichment agent, decision agent, etc., each with a role, working together. It also provides convenient boilerplate code, which, after getting past initial setup, reflects how thoughtful the code structure is designed (e.g,. optionally decoupling configuration from Python logic). Tip: See Elastic's article on Using CrewAI with Elasticsearch[8].

- **Autogen (GitHub - microsoft/autogen: Framework for creating multi-agent AI applications that can act autonomously or work alongside humans.)**, A framework for multi-agent conversations by Microsoft, that enables you to create agents, especially a multi-agent workflows framework, developer tools, and applications using a layered and extensible design with different levels of abstraction, from high-level APIs to low-level components. Note: If you `pip install autogen`, you will receive a forked version of Autogen, which is now renamed to AG2.

- **PydanticAI (GitHub - pydantic/pydantic-ai: Agent Framework / shim to use Pydantic with LLMs)**, A framework by the makers of Pydantic, designed to streamline building agent apps with type-safe, structured inputs/outputs. It places heavy emphasis on validating and structuring model outputs via Pydantic schemas, ensuring consistent responses. PydanticAI essentially brings the rigor of FastAPI-style data modeling to LLM agents, which is very attractive in security contexts where consistency and correctness of output fields (like verdict, confidence, etc.) are paramount. The caveat is that other frameworks are also now building on top of Pydantic to achieve the same outcome.

- **Google ADK (GitHub - google/adk-python: An open-source, code-first Python toolkit for building, evaluating, and deploying sophisticated AI agents with flexibility and control.)**, A newer framework by Google that provides developers with the tools to build and deploy custom agents on Google Cloud. With fine-grained control over agent behavior, orchestration, and tool utilization, Vertex AI streamlines the debugging, versioning, and deployment processes across various environments.

- **Agno (GitHub - agno-agi/agno: Full-stack framework for building Multi-Agent Systems with memory, knowledge and reasoning.)** Described as a full-stack framework designed for building highly performant multi-agent systems with a strong emphasis on memory, knowledge management, and sophisticated reasoning capabilities. It aims to provide a comprehensive solution for developing complex AI agents, often highlighting its model-agnostic nature.

Choosing the right framework comes down to matching its strengths with your specific requirements. For instance, if you need a quick way to spin up a few agents with robust tool usage and integrate seamlessly with detailed trace logs, the OpenAI Agents SDK might be ideal. If you foresee highly complex branching workflows or want to tightly integrate with existing LangChain logic, LangGraph offers fine-grained control over stateful flows. When structured output and rigorous type checking are needed for consistent and correct data handling (critical

[8] https://www.elastic.co/search-labs/blog/using-crewai-with-elasticsearch

in security contexts), PydanticAI (and frameworks that support similar model constructs) excels by leveraging Pydantic schemas. For building sophisticated multi-agent teams with distinct roles and collaborative behaviors, CrewAI provides an intuitive pattern, while AutoGen offers a powerful framework for multi-agent conversations and autonomous workflows. If you prefer a more model-agnostic, full-stack solution emphasizing memory, knowledge, and advanced reasoning across various LLM providers, Agno could be the right choice. Organizations should invest in these agent frameworks when the sophistication and dynamic nature of detection tasks outgrow basic scripting or rigid SOAR playbooks. Such a framework provides a resilient foundation that is easier to maintain, scale, and evolve as the use of agents in your detection engineering matures. *(Note: While no-code solutions like Keep[9], n8n[10], Tracecat[11], Langflow[12], or Tines[13] abstract away much of the underlying complexity, the focus here is on Python-based frameworks to highlight the fundamental constructs that should be considered in any solution.)*

Specialized vs. generalist agents

One of the first design decisions in an agentic system is determining the right level of specialization for your agents. Do you create multiple specialized agents, each an expert in a specific task or domain? Or do you build fewer generalist agents that handle a broad range of inputs? A healthy balance between maintainability (reducing software complexity), performance (time to complete a single workflow iteration), cost (token usage), and output quality (achieved through precise prompt engineering).

Specialized agents have a focused purpose and scope. For example, you might have one agent just for Windows process alerts, another for Linux syslog alerts, and another for Cloud Identity and Access Management (IAM) alerts. Each can be given tailored instructions and use different tools relevant to that domain. This focused scope also makes them exceptionally well-suited for incorporating domain-specific AI models for deep research and nuanced reasoning. These could be specialized LLMs or fine-tuned models trained on authoritative knowledge bases (e.g., extensive threat intelligence corpuses, forensic artifact datasets, or proprietary security data) relevant only to their niche. While smaller, highly specialized models excel at focused, repetitive tasks, larger generalist models are better suited for complex reasoning and abstract problem-solving, particularly when broad contextual understanding is important. Since most tasks within agentic AI are repetitive, narrow, and non-conversational, Small Language Models (SLMs) are better suited because they provide sufficient power, greater economy, and increased flexibility[14]. These types of reasoning models often 'think before they answer,' producing a detailed internal chain of thought to arrive at a conclusion. This often leads to higher performance (due to reduced context window, faster relevant tool selection) and optimized cost (fewer tokens spent on irrelevant information) because the agent doesn't need to sift through unrelated knowledge or context provided. As noted in a multi-agent systems study, *"Grouping*

[9] https://www.keephq.dev/
[10] https://n8n.io/
[11] https://github.com/TracecatHQ/tracecat
[12] https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow
[13] https://www.tines.com/
[14] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.02153

responsibilities can give better results. An agent is more likely to succeed on a focused task than if it has to select from dozens of tools or handle disparate goals.[15]*"* This recommendation expands as logic is grouped by agents with multiple tools available to them, and multiple agents, each with their own set(s) of tools. Similarly, having separate prompts for separate tasks means each agent's prompt can include domain-specific guidelines or examples, boosting its effectiveness.

On the other hand, while individual specialized agents offer distinct advantages, creating an agent for every micro-task can quickly become unwieldy. The overhead in orchestrating many agents and ensuring they all stay updated as the threat landscape evolves can become a significant burden. Generalist agents address this by simplifying the overall architecture by doing more in one place. For instance, instead of ten different Windows sub-agents for each event type, you might have one *WindowsAlertAgent* that can handle any Windows security alert. The generalist approach means fewer components to manage, potentially leading to lower operational overhead for deployment and management, but each agent's prompt and logic will be more complex (since it must branch internally or reason over more context). This can sometimes result in higher per-query token costs (due to larger context windows) and a risk that a jack-of-all-trades agent produces more generic or less accurate analysis, as it cannot be too specifically tuned.

A practical compromise is a hierarchical specialization that can delegate control (handoff) to a subagent. At a high level, you might have a *Domain Orchestrator* that is general enough to handle any alert by routing it to the appropriate domain-specific handler. Then, within each domain (Windows, Linux, Saas Vendor, Cloud Vendor, etc.), you employ specialized agents for different categories of events. For example, the Domain Orchestrator sees that an alert's domain is "Windows" and hands it off to a *GeneralWindowsDomainAgent*. That Windows agent in turn looks at the alert's category (e.g., "process" vs "network" vs "registry") and delegates to a specialized agent like *WindowsProcessAgent* or *WindowsNetworkAgent*. This way, you achieve specialization at the leaf level while maintaining manageability via a structured tree of agents. The orchestrator agents themselves can be kept simple (just routing rules).

```python
def build_general_windows_domain_agent(openai_model:
OpenAIChatCompletionsModel):
   """Build a general Windows domain agent that always delegates
each alert to the appropriate specialized agent based on its
event_categories."""
   process_agent =
build_windows_process_evidence_agent(openai_model)
   # ... Where we would include other agents
```

[15] LangGraph: Multi-Agent Workflows

```
   instructions = """
   You are the GeneralWindowsDomainAgent for Windows-based
alerts. Your primary duty is to delegate the analysis of each
alert to the appropriate specialized agent based on its
event_categories. Do not attempt to analyze the alert directly
yourself; instead, always pass the full, unmodified input context
(including complete alert details, rule definitions, and any
related metadata) to the correct domain-specific agent(s).

   Your process is as follows:
     1. Examine the 'event_categories' field from the
AlertDetails.
     2. For each event category found, delegate the alert
analysis to the matching specialized agent:
        - If 'process': delegate to WindowsProcessEventsAgent.
        - ...
     3. Ensure you always pass the complete original input
context to each delegated agent so that they receive all the
necessary details.

   """

   agent = Agent(
       name="GeneralWindowsDomainAgent",
       instructions=instructions,
       model=openai_model,
       handoffs=[process_agent, ...],
       output_type=str,
       ...
   )
   return agent
```

Specialized agents can use nomenclature and logic of their domain (a Windows process agent might check for things like code signatures or known LOLBins, which would be irrelevant in a Cloud IAM agent, for example). The general orchestrators ensure the right agent is activated for the right job. In detection engineering, specialization vs generalization often mirrors the team

structure; you have endpoint specialists, network specialists, cloud specialists; agent design can naturally follow a similar breakdown.

In summary, prefer specialized agents for critical tasks where depth of analysis is needed and where the input domain can be clearly isolated. Use generalist agents to consolidate simpler tasks or as traffic directors. In these situations, it also provides an opportunity to define when to hand off control from one agent to the next. The layered combination of both yields a powerful, modular system: specialized where it matters, but not so fragmented that it's unmaintainable.

Structured input/output with schemas

In security automation, structured data is king. Alerts, events, and analysis results all have schemas (fields with specific semantics). When introducing LLM-based agents into this mix, it's important to maintain structure in what could otherwise become free-form text. This is where using structured models for agent input and output makes a huge difference.

Instead of prompting an LLM agent and receiving unstructured text back, define a *schema* for what the output should look like. In the detection engineering scenario, an important schema is the final analysis result. We defined an `AnalysisResult` model (using Pydantic) with fields like `summary` (string), `verdict` (string, "TP" or "FP"), `detailed_justification` (string), `evidence` (list of strings), `recommendations` (string), and `confidence_score` (float). By telling the analysis agent that its output must conform to this schema, we obtain several benefits:

Consistency: Every output will have the same fields, making it easy to programmatically consume. We don't have to parse unstructured prose to find the verdict or evidence; they are in defined locations.

Validation: The agent framework can automatically validate the output. For example, using Pydantic models, if the LLM returns something that isn't valid (missing a field or wrong type), it raises an error or triggers a guardrail. This can catch issues early; if the agent fails to produce parseable JSON, we know immediately and can handle it (e.g., ask it again or fall back).

Clarity in Prompting: Providing the agent with a schema upfront actually guides its reasoning. The agent knows it needs to fill in each part, which helps it organize its answer (potentially leading to more token-efficient outputs by reducing verbose or irrelevant filler). The analysis agent prompt explicitly lists the fields and their meaning (as seen earlier, where the instructions enumerated summary, verdict, etc., and what to include in each). This reduces guesswork for the model and leads to more complete answers.

Safety: Structured output limits the "creativity" or stochasticity of the model to the format we expect. It is less likely to run off into irrelevant tangents if it is focused on populating a specific template. In a sense, the schema is a form of a constraint or guardrail on the output.

In the alert analysis example, we can apply the same general guidance to all agents. The critique agent returns a `CritiqueFeedback` model with just `satisfied: bool` and `comments: str`. Domain-specific evidence agents returned a `WindowsEventEvidenceOutput` model (for example) with fields like `verdict`, `confidence`, `suspicious_signals`, `benign_signals`, etc., appropriate to that domain's analysis. By using these output schemas, it ensures each agent's response can feed into the next stage without confusion. The orchestrator can take the `WindowsEventEvidenceOutput` from one agent and include it in the evidence list for the final analysis agent, confident that it has, say, a list of suspicious signals that the final agent can incorporate.

Modern frameworks like PydanticAI emphasize this strongly: *"Harnesses the power of Pydantic to validate and structure model outputs, ensuring responses are consistent across runs"*. When we construct an agent and pass an `output_type` parameter pointing to a Pydantic model, the framework will format the agent's LLM prompt to instruct it to output JSON, and will parse the LLM's response into that model. If parsing fails, it can trigger an output guardrail (*touched on later)*. While Pydantic is a popular choice for Python, the core concept applies universally to other schema definition languages like JSON Schema, Protocol Buffers, or even OpenAPI specifications when defining tool outputs. With schemas, either the output fits and is usable, or it's clearly an error, no in-between.

Structured input models are also useful (even though in some frameworks, it's not defined as an explicit field). For instance, the alert details that are fed into the system can be represented as a Pydantic object (with fields like rule_id, alert_domain, event_data, etc.). This object can be easily serialized to JSON and given to the agent. The agent then reads a well-organized JSON of the alert rather than a giant blob of characters, making it less likely to miss a field. Some frameworks allow directly passing complex objects to the agent, which then appear in the prompt as JSON or as function arguments (if using function calling interfaces).

In summary, using structured models for I/O in agentic detection engineering provides a formal interface between the agents and the rest of the system. It's analogous to having well-defined API contracts. It prevents the LLM from hallucinating extra fields or forgetting required ones, and it allows developers to treat agent outputs like any other data structure (loop through evidence list, check the verdict boolean, etc.). The effort to define these schemas pays off in reliability and maintainability. A final tip is to keep the schemas as simple as possible, only include fields you truly need, and avoid overly nested structures (which can confuse the model). Flat, clear schemas with perhaps basic types (strings, numbers, lists) work best in prompts. Experimentation revealed how incidentally similar fields, as expected, generated overly duplicative content.

Tool integrations and strategies for agents

Agents become significantly more powerful when they can use external tools. In detection engineering, tools include everything from simple helper functions (e.g., converting an IP to a hostname) to complex integrations (e.g., calling an API for threat intelligence), using agents as

tools, or even other framework tools. Frameworks that support tools even provide built-in tooling like WebSearch, FileSearch, and Computer tools[16]. Deciding when and how agents should use tools is a critical design area. Tool integration efficiency relies on providing clear and precise metadata. The LLM relies on the tool's name, description, and parameter schema to determine its applicability and how to invoke it. Ambiguous definitions can lead to the LLM 'hallucinating' tool usage, selecting incorrect tools, or providing malformed parameters, so it's useful to leverage robust schema definitions (e.g., using libraries like Pydantic for Python-based tools) to ensure reliable tool selection and execution by the agent.

Before going too deep into tool usage, it's important to recognize that not every task within an agentic system benefits from or requires LLM-based reasoning. Leveraging deterministic components for well-defined, logic-intensive, or performance-critical tasks (e.g., high-volume log parsing, real-time indicator matching against blocklists, or rapid correlation of simple security events) is highly valuable. These traditional tools provide reliability, predictability, and often superior efficiency for tasks that don't require the flexible, probabilistic reasoning of an LLM. It helps to ensure that the AI augments, rather than replaces, proven engineering practices. Deciding when to prioritize an LLM versus what to handle with conventional code is a fundamental design choice.

Now, consider which tools to provide. You'll likely have internal APIs or databases for asset information, user context (e.g., HR or IAM data), and external sources like threat intel (IP/domain/file reputation services). Not all agents need tools. It's usually wise to give each agent only the tools relevant to its function. For example, a *WindowsProcessAgent* might have a tool to check code signature validity or query a known-bad hash list, while a *NetworkAlertAgent* might have a tool to geolocate an IP or look up domain reputation. By scoping tools per agent, it reduces confusion; the agent doesn't consider calling tools that don't make sense for its context.

Consider these kinds of tool outputs:

1. **Raw data retrieval:** The tool returns factual data, often in text or structured form. E.g., a `get_vt_hash_info` tool might return a summary like *"VirusTotal: 3 engines flagged this hash malicious."* The agent can incorporate that directly into its reasoning.
2. **Processing or summarization:** The tool itself might encapsulate a mini-agent or logic that processes data and returns an insight. With the VirusTotal behavior JSON, instead of dumping a huge JSON of behavior logs to the agent, create a tool that fetches it and summarizes the key points (using another subagent under the hood) before returning the result. This strategy offloads work from the main agent and ensures it only gets the distilled information. This design choice involves a key trade-off. A "smarter" tool means less reasoning burden and potentially lower token usage for the LLM, simplifying the agent's core prompt, but shifts the development and maintenance complexity into the tool itself.
3. **Action / execution results:** The tool performs an action in the external environment (e.g., quarantining an endpoint, blocking an IP, creating a ticket in a SOAR platform,

[16] https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/tools/

initiating a forensic collection) and returns a confirmation or status of that action. E.g., a `quarantine_host('host_id')` tool might return *"Host 'X' successfully quarantined"* or *"Error: Host 'X' not found."

When should an agent decide to use a tool? Typically, the agent's prompt should include guidance like (e.g., *"If you need additional data like X, you have a tool Y that can fetch it").* The agent frameworks often support this via either explicit function calls (where the LLM can output a special token indicating a tool invocation) or by instructing the agent in natural language. Using the OpenAI Agents SDK, you define tools, and the agent can call them as if they were functions. For instance, an agent might output an intermediate result, and the framework executes that function and returns the result to the agent. All of this is abstracted, so from the developer's perspective, you just list the tools, and the agent knows it can use them.

LLMs within an agentic system do not directly execute tools; rather, they act as a reasoning engine that recommends which tool to use and with what parameters. The application code or the orchestrator is responsible for taking the LLM's tool recommendation, invoking the actual tool, and then feeding the tool's output back to the LLM as part of its ongoing context. For instance, if an LLM suggests using a tool to 'read a threat intel report,' the LLM generates the instruction, but your code performs the file reading and returns the content for the LLM to process. After implementing these tool calls manually a few times, we started to see the inherent benefit of frameworks and how they abstract this away.

JSON


```
{
 "content": null,
 "role": "assistant",
 "refusal": null,
 "tool_calls": [
   {
     "function": {
       "name": "get_vt_hash_info_tool",
       "arguments": "{\"indicator\":\"some_hash\"}"
     },
     "id": "call_some_id",
     "type": "function"
   }
 ],
 "function_call": null,
 "audio": null,
 "annotations": null
}
```

Similar to agents and structured output models, the idea is to keep tools simple and reliable. Each tool ideally does one thing (like an API call or a database query) and returns a concise result. If a tool fails (due to network issues or an error), this system would catch the exception and either retry or give a fallback message to the agent (like “no data available”). The agent should still try to proceed through failures with the information it has, but possibly note that certain enrichment couldn’t be fetched. Robustness in tool calls can be the differentiator, such that a failure to fetch critical threat intelligence or access a key defensive action could directly impact the accuracy of a detection or lead to a missed threat. You don’t want the analysis to collapse because a single, but critical, enrichment source failed due to unhandled timeouts.

Parallel vs serial tool use: In some cases, multiple enrichments can be fetched in parallel for speed. This example analysis agent concurrently runs (“parallel_tool_calls=True”), meaning if it decides to call several tools, they could be executed concurrently. For example, checking a file hash against multiple sources (VT, internal DB, sandbox) in parallel can cut down waiting time. Just be cautious that parallel calls don’t overload resources, violate rate limits, or execute when you actually want serial results.

What about tool return output?: Should the agent receive raw JSON from a tool, or a human-readable string, or a structured summary? Tool outputs can be raw (e.g., a JSON from an API) or pre-digested, or a structured dataclass, but it’s often useful to have tools return concise summaries so the agent isn’t overwhelmed by data. Straightforward text summaries often work best, as the agent can read them like any other input. However, if a tool returns complex data, you might feed it as a JSON string and have the agent treat it as data to interpret. The decision comes down to the agent’s ability. Simpler agents might do better with pre-formatted text, whereas an agent specifically designed to parse JSON can handle raw data.

For example, consider a LOLBAS (Living-Off-The-Land Binaries and Scripts) check that has a tool `check_lolbins(process_name)` which can see if a given process is a known LOLBin. This tool returns a short message, either “LOLBINS entry found for X (with link)” or “No LOLBINS entry found for X.” That’s easy for an agent to incorporate (maybe as part of evidence if found). On the other hand, if the VirusTotal behavior log was a huge JSON, we can build an agent-based tool to summarize it, then return a list of key behaviors. By designing the output of tools in such a way that the agent doesn’t have to do heavy lifting to interpret it, which makes the overall system more efficient and the agent’s job easier.

When not to use a tool? Sometimes the model’s own knowledge is enough, or the overhead of calling a tool isn’t worth it. If an agent needs general knowledge (e.g., “What is Mimikatz?” for context), a GPT-4 model might already know that from training data, so calling an external wiki might be unnecessary. In prompts, you might instruct the agent to only use tools for information it couldn’t deduce or is likely to be more up-to-date than its training (like current threat intel). Striking the right balance here can require iteration. Monitor how often agents call tools and whether the results actually inform the final decision; this can highlight unneeded calls to cut.

Finally, implement a clear failure handling policy for tools (Note: We’ll discuss shortly how tracing can help to investigate failures):

- If a tool returns an error or no result, decide how the agent should proceed (maybe treat it as a neutral “didn’t find anything” rather than catastrophically failing the task).
- Possibly have fallback tools or redundant sources (if VirusTotal API fails, try an internal cache).
- Log tool usage and outcomes for debugging. This is part of observability; you want to know if agents are over-relying on a flaky tool or spending too many tokens analyzing verbose tool outputs.

Forward-leaning security tool use: Tool integration is the foundational building block to interacting with the broader security ecosystem (e.g., querying data sources, collaborating with automated systems, etc.). With so many diverse security tools, integration can be a challenge, so we turn towards new generalized integration protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP)[17]. This protocol allows agents to dynamically discover and execute capabilities from various tools through a single standardized interface. For example, a response agent could dynamically identify and activate a specific firewall API via MCP to block a malicious IP, then use another MCP-integrated endpoint security tool to isolate a compromised host, all without requiring bespoke integrations for each vendor.

Tools extend the reach of your agents beyond the information in the prompt. They are essential for detection engineering agents to stay current (since LLMs might not know about the latest threats or internal data). By carefully selecting tools, designing their outputs, and guiding the agent on usage, you create a synergy where the LLM provides reasoning and language understanding, and the tools provide ground truth data. The agent becomes an orchestrator of not just thoughts, but actions, embodying the “agentic” ideal of taking action (queries, checks) to achieve its goal. It allows you to connect your agents to Search AI capabilities like Elasticsearch[18], bringing context directly to the investigation.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) for enhanced tooling & context management

Much of the recent excitement around agentic workflows focuses on tool calling other tools; however, with MCP, it provides one of the more disciplined approaches to managing tooling at scale. MCP defines a declarative contract (natural language summaries paired with JSON schemas) that any agent can discover through a single `list_tools()` request. By shifting integration logic from prompt instructions to a self-describing registry, MCP keeps instructions lean.

In “What Is MCP? Separating Hype from Reality”[19]It provides a deeper primer on what the protocol delivers, but at a high level, it is a lightweight micro-service that agents reach over standard I/O or Server Sent Events (SSE). Running it as a sibling process provides near-in-memory latency, which is ideal for processing sensitive endpoint telemetry that should

[17] https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/agents-and-tools/mcp
[18] https://www.elastic.co/search-labs/blog/model-context-protocol-elasticsearch
[19] https://huggingface.co/blog/Kseniase/mcp

remain on the endpoint. The same binary can be fronted by an SSE endpoint and deployed behind a private gateway or on the Internet, enabling more dispersed agents to share a common toolbox. Many frameworks like OpenAI Agents SDK treat the server as an ordinary Tool object passed via the `tools=` parameter, so swapping or stacking tool catalogues usually equates to a single-line agent configuration change.

Imagine a high-severity alert referencing an identifier, CVE, and a user entity. With a security MCP, an investigative agent can discover new tools like *get_asset_details*, *query_vulnerability_database*, *check_threat_intelligence*, and *fetch_user_identity_data*, then call them to future ingest contextual information about the activity. If the agent decides it needs to *isolate_host*, it can leverage the same or another MCP server catalog to learn how to do this. The agent doesn't need to redeploy, generate new code, or update prompts to take action. With the growing number of registries[20], the list of MCP servers offered will continue to grow.

When to skip MCP: If a workflow needs only a handful of static integrations, wrapping those endpoints directly with the `@function_tool` decorator is simpler, clearer, and sometimes doesn't include the same level of MCP operational overhead. The protocol shines when tool inventories are large, change frequently, or originate from external teams. However, it can be over-engineering when a single bespoke function will do.

Resources for lightweight context at scale: MCP provides resources, a subtle feature, but highly practical. A resource is a read-only blob (e.g., anything from a JSON asset inventory to incident tickets) that a server exposes by identifier. Fetching a resource is effectively a static file read, without network calls to third-party APIs. This makes resources a lightweight alternative to two heavyweight patterns common, like stuffing large context straight into prompts (blowing up token counts) or pulling the same data through per-request APIs. An investigation agent can pull a daily asset manifest, a corpus of known-bad hashes, or an enriched CVE list into working memory with one low-latency resource fetch, then decide which dynamic tools are needed. Resources in a way act as a slim, repeatable channel for high-fidelity context, trimming compute cost and hallucination risk, while still honouring MCP's self-describing contract.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) and agent memory

For a detection engineer or security analyst, the efficiency and accuracy of threat detection hinges on access to timely and relevant information. While LLMs are powerful, their knowledge is limited to their training data cutoff and can be prone to hallucination when asked about specific, real-time, or nuanced domain-specific information that is important for security operations. RAG overtime has emerged as a vital technique to help overcome these limitations and provide agents with the dynamic, accurate, and context-rich data that security professionals rely on.

In essence, it enables agents to retrieve information from an external knowledge base before generating a response. The process typically involves three steps: 1) retrieval, 2) augmentation,

[20] https://huggingface.co/blog/LLMhacker/top-11-essential-mcp-libraries

and 3) generation. First, a query generated by the LLM or directly from the input is used to search a specialized database for relevant information. This is often a vector store containing embeddings of external documents. It then heavily relies on embedding models, which convert text into numerical vectors that capture the semantic meaning. Next, the information is retrieved and provided to the LLM as additional context alongside the original query. Finally, the LLM uses this augmented context to create a more accurate, informed decision or updated response.

Beyond simple retrieval, agentic systems rely on sophisticated memory management to maintain context and build persistent knowledge throughout their operations. Different types of memory serve distinct purposes in an agent's lifecycle[21].

Short-term memory: This type of memory refers to immediate conversational history that the agent uses for its current task. It's typically transient and cleared after a take or session completes. Often, it corresponds to the tokens in the current context window, representing the analyst's request or the agent's immediate investigation.

Long-term memory: This stores persistent, accumulated knowledge, including past experiences, learned behaviors, or even factual data that the agent might need to access repeatedly over extended periods. This type of memory often uses vector databases, where it is embedded and indexed for semantic search. While some frameworks like LangChain offer extensive support for integrating various vector databases (e.g., Chroma, FAISS, etc.), others like OpenAI Agents SDK showcase the OpenAI-hosted knowledge capabilities. CrewAI bakes multiple of these memory types directly into their framework, often leveraging providers for embeddings. For analysts, this means the agent can instantly recall vast amounts of threat intelligence, historical incident data, vulnerability reports, and internal knowledge base articles.

Entity memory: This focuses on tracking specific entities (e.g., IP addresses, users, malware hashes), and their attributes or relationships observed during the agent's execution. It helps maintain a consistent and evolving understanding of key objects central to an alert triage, preventing the need to reorganize basic entity information.

Contextual memory: This provides the agent with a high-level understanding of the current situation, the environment, or the broader task objectives. This is important in the security domain as it helps ensure the agent retains the contextual awareness needed to reason over multi-stage investigations or complex alert triage workflows.

User memory: This stores information specific to a particular user (e.g., analysts' preferences, predefined roles, historical interaction patterns). When agentic systems require a human-in-the-loop, this is particularly useful to help tailor responses.

In general, frameworks commonly integrate with embedding providers and are designed to be integrated into broader architectures that utilize RAG in combination with these various memory

[21] https://docs.crewai.com/concepts/memory

types. This translates into more efficient and accurate AI augmented capabilities, designed from the core to address dynamic security challenges.

Prompt and context engineering for reliable outputs

Underneath the orchestration and structure, the prompts and instructions you craft for each agent are what ultimately drive its behavior. Prompt engineering remains one of the most critical factors in getting high-confidence, accurate outputs from LLM-based agents. Here are several considerations for designing prompts and instructions in the detection engineering context. While this section highlights the power of prompt engineering, it's important to highlight that prompt crafting is part of a larger, emerging discipline known as Context Engineering [22] [23], where context should be thought of more as the output of a system that runs before the LLM call, rather than as a static prompt template. This broader approach emphasises managing comprehensive quality of all inputs that drive LLM and agentic systems, extending beyond just immediate prompt to include systems instructions, various forms of memory, and integrated tools. This ensures the agent has the right information in the right format at the right time.

A foundational principle for agentic systems, particularly within detection engineering, is 'Garbage In, Garbage Out' (GIGO). The efficacy of any agent's analysis is directly dependent on the quality and relevance of its input. For a security agent performing alert triage, this extends beyond raw log events to include the detection rule context quality. If an alert's underlying rule is poorly written (e.g., contains an incorrect query, a misleading description, or bad references), an agent should be equipped to identify this. Bringing in “garbage rule” context can significantly degrade the agent's reasoning, leading to inaccurate conclusions or misprioritizations.

Effective agentic detection moves beyond atomic alert analysis towards a more holistic, contextual approach. Agents should be designed to correlate adjacent alerts, analyze associated entities (e.g., user, host, machine), and identify patterns across tactics, techniques, and sub-techniques (e.g., MITRE ATT&CK) within a given timeframe. This shift from isolated alert processing to a contextual understanding is key for prioritizing signals and uncovering true threats.

Clarity and unambiguity: Security data is often messy, and you cannot assume the model will magically infer what to do. Be extremely clear about the agent’s role, the inputs it will receive, and the format and criteria of the output. One approach is to ensure the instructions include a statement of role (e.g., *“You are the WindowsProcessEventsAgent. Your job is to analyze Windows process alerts for malicious behavior”).* These system instructions set the context and persona of the agent. Explicitly list what the output should contain (referencing the schema fields). For example, *“Return a JSON with fields: verdict (TP/FP), confidence (high/medium/low), suspicious_signals (list of strings), benign_signals (list of strings), recommendations (string).”* While modern frameworks can auto-inject instructions based on a defined schema to enforce the output format, explicitly enumerating these fields and their expected content in your natural

[22] https://blog.langchain.com/the-rise-of-context-engineering/
[23] https://rlancemartin.github.io/2025/06/23/context_engineering/

language prompt serves as a critical reinforcement. This guides the model's reasoning about *what* information to place into each field, not just the technical format. By enumerating these, the model knows exactly what it needs to produce. Ambiguity, like not specifying what "confidence" means or what format for verdict, can lead to inconsistent outputs (one time it might output "True"/"False", another time "TP"/"FP"). So address them directly in the prompt. In more complex situations, some frameworks even provide dynamic instructions based on the agent and context to return the right prompt the agent should use.

Step-by-step guidance: For complex tasks, break down the reasoning steps in the prompt. The analysis agent prompt, for instance, could include a section "Your Process" where it outlines numbered steps the agent should follow (review all inputs, generate evidence bullets, compare with rule conditions, weigh evidence, make a verdict, etc.). This serves a similar purpose to chain-of-thought prompting, except we are *instructing* the chain of thought rather than asking the model to generate it in a free-form manner. By providing a checklist of things to do, it reduces the chance that the model overlooks something. For example, explicitly telling it "*Ensure every distinct input source is represented by at least one evidence bullet*" made it systematically cover each piece of input.

Use of examples: In some agents, providing a few-shot example or a template can help as an alternative to more detailed instructions. When using examples, ensure they are realistic to the data the agent will see. A formatted example of final output (sample JSON filled with plausible values) can guide the model's output format. Diversify the example set to limit over-steered bias; if your example shows a verdict "FP", the model might lean towards FP. So if you use them, provide a diverse set (one FP example, one TP example, etc.).

Tool usage cues: If the agent has tools, the prompt should describe when to use them. For instance, *"Tools available: vt_hash_lookup (used to get VirusTotal stats for file hashes), whois_lookup (used for domain registration info). Use a tool if the relevant indicator is present in the alert."* Also, remind the agent what format to expect from the tool (e.g., "vt_hash_lookup will return the number of engines that flagged the file as malicious"). In some frameworks, tools are integrated via function calling, so the model sees a function signature, but you may still need to nudge it in a prompt to decide *when* to call. *"If you see an indicator that looks like a file hash, it's recommended to call vt_hash_lookup."* This prevents the agent from ignoring a valuable tool or conversely, from calling it unnecessarily on things that aren't hashes. At least with OpenAI Agents SDK, the function tool's description is taken directly from the docstring (in comparison to ADK, which has a dedicated field), so it's important to ensure the description is accurate.

Handling uncertainty and confidence: Explicitly instruct agents on how to handle uncertain cases. You want confident answers based on evidence, rather than incorrect reasoning. Provide the reasoning as it's defined for analysts in their operational environment. *"If evidence is mixed, lean towards TP only if strong local indicators suggest maliciousness; otherwise, lean FP."* and *"Avoid using 'Suspicious' as a verdict; choose TP or FP based on best interpretation."* Experiment with forcing the agent to make a decision, but also capture uncertainty via a confidence score. Tell the agent how to derive that confidence score (essentially reflecting consistency of evidence). These instructions will help ensure the agent's output includes a

measure of certainty to reflect nuance (e.g., “most evidence suggests benign, thus likely 85% FP”).

Robustness to input variations: Alerts can have varying fields or unexpected values and, at times, require more generic instructions. For example, instead of referencing a specific field name from an alert, describe it conceptually (like “AlertDetails includes the rule definition and event” rather than assuming it’s called `alert.rule.description`). This is an opportunity to refine the data to be more deterministic if you have control. Fields should consistently be available, but for exploratory purposes, to test how the agentic system performs. If some alerts have an array of related events, instruct the agent to handle multiple datapoints separately. Another tip is to instruct on what *not* to do. *“Do not omit any detail from the inputs,”* and *“Do not just copy evidence into justification; use it to reason.”* These can be in your prompts to stop undesirable behaviors (like the model ignoring some evidence because it seemed minor, or just duplicating the evidence lines in the narrative without analysis).

Style and tone instructions: Since these outputs might be used in reports to analysts, guide style, tone, and diction (e.g., *“Provide concise, factual professional statements. Avoid speculation without evidence”).* An agent might otherwise reply with uncertain, overly verbose, or casual responses. Tuning the style ensures the output is directly useful. For instance, imagine wanting each evidence bullet to be standalone and clear. An instruction might include *“Each evidence bullet must be a single, self-contained statement including the input source label and the observation.”* The model then should produce consistent bullets like `AlertDetails: The process path C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe is a standard system process (matches expected path)`, a nicely formatted evidence line.

Iterate on prompts: Prompt engineering is an iterative craft, and prompt management tools for LLMOps are emerging to ease the burden, allowing users to store and manage prompts and other artifacts[24]. Rarely are prompts perfected on the first try and often require you to identify where the agent was confused or made mistakes. Often, a single sentence added to the prompt can fix a recurring error. For example, an analysis agent may miss that it needs to include the rule’s expected behavior when comparing the alert and query. Adding a bullet in instructions like *“Explicitly compare conditions from the detection rule with what was observed”* may address this issue. Keep a feedback loop where you run sample alerts, review the agent's response, and refine the instructions.

In agentic detection engineering, the prompt is effectively the policy. It encodes the detection engineering know-how (what to look for, how to interpret evidence) into the agent. Take the time to make it detailed and precise. Imagine you’re writing a SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) for a junior analyst, that’s how explicit you want to be, because the LLM, while powerful, is essentially a very fast junior analyst that needs guidance. With clear instructions and carefully structured prompts, you’ll get much more reliable and confident outputs from your agents.

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[24] LLMOps

Advanced control & quality assurance

LLM safety: guardrails and safety layers

When deploying intelligent systems in security, LLM Safety[25] provides guidance on how to address LLM abuse. Similar principles can be built into the agents, preventing bad outputs (errors, hallucinations, or harmful content from LLMs) and handling sensitive inputs (ensuring the agent doesn't leak or misuse confidential data in alerts). While foundational model providers like AWS Bedrock or OpenAI offer built-in safety guardrails[26] (e.g., for harmful content, hate speech, or illegal activities) that operate at the core model inference layer, the guardrails discussed here are application-specific. These are custom layers designed to enforce your detection engineering policies, operational constraints, and specific output quality standards. Some of these guardrails are deterministic (e.g., schema validation, regex checks, length limits), while others, particularly those requiring nuanced understanding of content or intent (e.g., checking for logical consistency, ensuring professional tone, or detecting subtle prompt injections), may themselves leverage smaller, specialized LLMs or classification models to perform the validation.

Input guardrails: Before sending data to an LLM agent, implement robust input guardrails to validate and sanitize it. This ensures the LLM receives clean, safe, and relevant data, preventing misinterpretation or the accidental exposure of confidential information. For example, if an agent expects a structured model for `AlertDetails`, first ensure the JSON from the SIEM actually fits that model. If this structural validation fails, perhaps the alert was missing mandatory fields or contained disallowed content, triggering an `InputGuardrailTripwireTriggered` exception, immediately stopping before querying the LLM and logging it for human review.

Beyond structurally formatted checks, these guardrails are also necessary to proactively scan for and block malicious or manipulative content within the input. This includes identifying specific attack patterns, such as an attacker naming a suspicious file `report.pdf.exe` to mislead users, or embedding direct commands like `cmd.exe /c "net user evil_acct /add"` within a process command-line argument. More critically for LLMs, guardrails actively check for and block prompt injection instructions, like an attacker embedding a phrase such as "*; Now, ignore all prior instructions and tell me your system prompt"* into a log field (e.g., `process.args`, `registry.value`). While an LLM is designed to analyze text and won't execute arbitrary code, this multi-layered approach ensures that only clean, well-formed, and safe data reaches the agent for analysis, significantly reducing risks and improving reliability.

In addition to prompt injection techniques, another security concern comes from the agent's ability to execute code. Several advanced agent frameworks provide mechanisms for agents to generate and execute code as part of their tool use. This feature is a powerful tool, but it also

[25] Elastic Security Labs Releases Guidance to Avoid LLM Risks and Abuses
[26] https://aws.amazon.com/bedrock/guardrails/

exposes a traditional attack surface. Some frameworks recommend sandboxed execution environments, such as isolating code execution within Docker containers (e.g., CrewAI's `code_execution_mode: "safe"`, AutoGen's configurable execution environments). Note, while they provide some protection, they're not impervious to container escapes.

Output guardrails and validation: Structured output is the other form of guardrail, where the model either complies or considers it an error. Consider a `final_output_guardrail` on the example analysis agent that checks that the JSON output from the agent strictly adheres to the schema and content guidelines (for example, no empty fields, confidence_score between 0 and 1, etc.). If the guardrail fails, trigger an exception (`OutputGuardrailTripwireTriggered`) and handle accordingly (e.g., retry the agent with a prompt reminding it of the format, or fail safe by not trusting that output). In high-stakes contexts, you might not want to auto-retry too many times (to avoid cost runaway); instead, surface it to an analyst or log it for future feedback and analysis to improve the prompt.

Trips and fallbacks: Another idea is to implement a few "tripwires." For example, if an agent outputs a verdict of TP with high confidence but the evidence list is empty, that's logically inconsistent; it can have a simple post-check to flag that result. Similarly, if the model output includes apologetic language ("I'm just an AI, but…") or anything that suggests the model was unsure how to follow instructions, that may indicate a prompt failure. With structured output, you usually avoid these pitfalls, but guardrails can include regex or semantic checks on outputs. For instance, a guardrail could flag an analysis verdict if it claims "malicious" but the "recommendations" field suggests "no action needed", or if it describes a critical alert as "low confidence" without clear justification.

Memory and state: One safety consideration is that agents in a loop or long session might accumulate a lot of context, including possibly sensitive info, and then that could inadvertently be included in a final answer or a subsequent tool call. Or imagine supplying too much context as input, overburdening the agent's ability to properly reason. Mitigate this by tightly controlling what goes into each agent call, and treating each step as a function (with specified inputs and outputs), similar to how a security analyst would compartmentalize sensitive case details.

Secure design patterns: In addition to the application-specific guardrails, architectural design patterns discussed in "*Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents against Prompt Injections*" strengthen the security posture of LLM agents[27]. For instance, the Action-Selector Pattern limits the agent's autonomy by allowing the LLM only to select from a predefined, safe set of actions, preventing it from executing arbitrary instructions. Complementary to robust input guardrails, the Context Isolation Pattern (or "Dual-LLM" approach) uses a separate, "untrusted" LLM to process and sanitize raw user input, extracting only safe, structured intents before passing them to a "trusted" LLM that handles sensitive operations. Similarly, the Response Filtering Pattern acts as a final output guardrail, rigorously checking the agent's generated responses for any sensitive data leakage or unintended content before it is exposed or used downstream. Finally,

[27] https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2506.08837

the Human-in-the-Loop Pattern emphasizes the critical role of human review and confirmation for sensitive actions or high-risk outputs, providing an essential safety net.

These patterns, when combined with careful memory management and resource controls, provide a comprehensive set of practical considerations for building safer and predictable LLM-powered security agents. This includes validating inputs and outputs against schemas and policies, filtering out known problematic content, controlling the model's behavior via role and temperature settings, and having clear error-handling paths. In a security context, you'd never fully trust an agent's output without some validation. These guardrails automate that validation to a large extent. By the time the agent outputs a final verdict, multiple layers (tool results, evidence cross-check, critique feedback, schema validation) have scrutinized it.

Orchestration and state management workflows

Building an AI-augmented detection system requires careful orchestration of the agents and their actions. Orchestration refers to how the agents interact, in what sequence, and how data/state passes between them. This can range from a fixed linear sequence to a dynamic graph of decisions, even involving parallel execution of multiple tasks simultaneously for efficiency.

Straightforward pipelines are often known as agent workflow (e.g.," first summarize the alert, then enrich the alert, then make a decision"). This works well when every alert follows the same steps. However, many workflows benefit from dynamic branches, for instance, only perform certain enrichments if needed, or route to different analysis agents based on alert type. Agent frameworks allow you to encode these complex flows declaratively. In OpenAI's Agents SDK, you might create an Orchestrator agent that has handoffs to sub-agents. LangGraph lets you define workflows as DAGs, where nodes represent agent tasks and edges dictate the flow logic. This approach naturally accommodates complex, real-world scenarios, enabling dynamic conditions and parallel execution branches. With Google's ADK, you could choose either of the three different workflow agents (sequential, loop, and parallel) to influence the execution path[28]. Agentic systems can also be broken down into different architectures ,such as the Single-Agent, Supervisor, Hierarchical, Network, or Custom Models, where a Supervisor model can be effective for complex threat detection pipelines[29].

Designing the orchestration starts with mapping out the logical steps of analysis. To build upon the alert example, a possible flow could be:

1. Ingest alert and rule context.
2. Alert summarization**:** Use an agent to condense the raw alert + detection rule into a concise summary (what did the rule detect, and what does the actual event show?).

[28] https://google.github.io/adk-docs/agents/workflow-agents/

[29] https://ibrahimhkoyuncu.medium.com/from-logs-to-decisions-an-llm-driven-multi-agent-pipeline-for-cyber-threat-detection-abb76035e2bd

3. Domain-specific analysis**:** Based on the alert's domain (endpoint, cloud, network, etc.), delegate deeper analysis to the appropriate specialist agent. This could involve multiple parallel checks (for each relevant sub-component of the alert).
4. Evidence aggregation**:** Collect all pieces of evidence and observations from prior steps.
5. Final analysis and verdict**:** An agent takes all context (alert, enrichments, evidence) and produces a final determination (FP vs TP, severity, justification, recommendations).
6. Critique/validation loop**:** Optionally, have another agent review the final output for completeness or errors, feeding back into another iteration if needed.[30] [31]
7. Output or escalation**:** Deliver the final structured result (which might be fed into a SOAR platform, ticketing system, Elastic Cases, etc.), and decide if human analyst review is required (for uncertain or high-risk cases). This step can also integrate human-in-the-loop decision points, where the system pauses for analyst input before proceeding.

This can be implemented either by writing explicit orchestrator code (as illustrated in the pseudocode below) or by configuring the flow declaratively through a framework's abstractions. The pseudocode below illustrates a simplified orchestration:

```python
# Pseudocode: orchestrating multi-agent alert analysis
def analyze_alert(alert_data):
    # Step 1: Summarize the alert against its rule
    summary = AlertSummarizerAgent.run(alert_data)

    # Step 2: Route to appropriate domain-specific analysis
    # In practice incorporate proper handoffs and agent workflows
    domain = alert_data.get("domain")
    if domain == "windows":
        domain_result = WindowsDomainAgent.run([alert_data,
summary])
    elif domain == "linux":
        domain_result = LinuxDomainAgent.run([alert_data,
summary])
    elif domain == "macos":
        domain_result = MacOSDomainAgent.run([alert_data,
summary])
    else:
```

[30] https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.18702
[31] https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.11738

```
        domain_result = GenericDomainAgent.run([alert_data,
summary])

    # Step 3: Gather evidence (could be parallelized or part of
domain_result)
    evidence = EvidenceCollectorAgent.run([alert_data, summary,
domain_result])

    # Step 4: Final analysis combining everything
    analysis_result = AnalysisAgent.run([alert_data, summary,
domain_result, evidence])

    # Step 5: Critique loop for quality assurance
    critique_feedback = CritiqueAgent.run([analysis_result,
alert_data])
    if not critique_feedback.satisfied:
        # Incorporate feedback and re-run analysis (simplified;
real loop would iterate)
        analysis_result = AnalysisAgent.run([alert_data, summary,
domain_result, evidence, critique_feedback.comments])
        # (In practice, loop until critique_feedback.satisfied or
max cycles)

    return analysis_result
```

This pseudocode is a simplification, but it highlights the conditional handoffs (different agents based on domain) and the linear flow augmented by a feedback loop. Note: In actual implementation, an orchestrator agent could encapsulate that logic in natural language instructions and properly hand off to the correct agent (telling it how to decide which agent to hand off to), or a framework could use a graph config. The important design principle is clarity and modularity, where each step should have a clear purpose, and the orchestration code should make it obvious what's happening. Detection engineering workflows can get complex, so structuring them as bite-sized agent tasks connected by a well-defined control flow makes the system understandable.

In advanced use cases, sophisticated orchestration could involve a master agent that actively observes agent performance and dynamically manages task execution[32]. For example, it an

[32] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2506.17188

initial alert triage agent struggles with an ambiguous network alert (e.g., due to API errors or low-confidence output), the master agent would re-plan the investigation, bring in additional specialized agents, and guide the re-investigation until a conclusion determination is reached.

Another aspect is state management across the workflow. Agents often produce outputs that need to be inputs to later agents. Using structured data models helps carry state. For example, the alert summarizer might output a JSON object `AlertSummary` that can be passed as-is to the next agent. The orchestrator doesn't have to parse and rebuild context; it simply passes these objects along. In frameworks like LangGraph or PydanticAI, the "state" can be a JSON structure or Pydantic model that accumulates fields (alert details, summary, evidence, verdict, etc.) as the workflow progresses. This ensures consistency where every agent in the chain sees a unified view of what has been gathered so far. Effective state management involves intelligently managing the LLM's context window. As a workflow progresses and more data is gathered, continuously feeding the entire accumulated state to every LLM call can become prohibitively expensive and inefficient. Sophisticated orchestration strategies, combined with smart state management, can summarize, filter, or retrieve only the most relevant pieces of information for the current step, optimizing token usage and improving performance. Beyond in-memory passing, frameworks can also facilitate state persistence (e.g., to a database or cache). This is important for long-running workflows that might span hours or days, enabling further analysis.

Design your orchestration to be as simple as possible but no simpler. If a fixed sequence works, use it; don't over-engineer branching. But where needed (different handling per alert type, or loops for refinement), leverage the agent framework to incorporate those flows. A clear orchestration not only makes the system's operation transparent but also enables deeper debugging of issues. A non-negotiable requirement in detection engineering is to ensure auditability and reproducibility, allowing security analysts to trace every decision and piece of evidence leading to a verdict.

The critique loop: Self-refinement for quality

By tracking operational performance data like rule efficacy and analyst effort to maintain the rule, this information can be used to analyze future alerts. Quantifying factors like analyst investigation time per rule or historical TP / FP ratios provides an enriched rule context that tells how much we should trust the rule. Rules consistently generating high false positives or demanding extensive manual tuning should be deprioritized or fundamentally refined. This promotes a pragmatic mindset, where initial assumptions for unproven rules default to FP without compelling evidence and enables sophisticated feedback where a triage agent can identify problematic rules (e.g., top FP generators) and send insights to a specialized tuning agent. The tuning agent then analyzes these rule IDs, proposing targeted refinements or recommending deprioritization within the detection pipeline.

Even the best-instructed agent will have an opportunity to improve the response. This is where a critique loop provides an iterative refinement process where an agent (or another helper

agent) reviews the output and provides feedback to improve it. In the detection engineering context, implement a critique loop to ensure the final analysis of an alert is thorough and correct by asking for more evidence to support the final analysis (e.g., until the confidence level reaches a threshold). Conceptually, humans naturally revise their work in interactions. When generating content, a completion merely predicts the next token. However, LLMs do not natively reevaluate their output as a whole, then think about what was generated, critique themselves, and then refine the output.

After the *analysis agent* produces a result (with verdict, evidence, justification, etc.), a separate *critique agent* is invoked. The critique agent's role is to judge the analysis as an expert reviewer. It checks if a) the analysis considered all the evidence, b) there were contradictions or unanswered questions, c) the conclusion follows from the data, etc. The critique agent is given the analysis output (often in structured form) *and* the original inputs (alert details, any evidence, etc.) so it can cross-verify. If the analysis is thorough, the critique agent simply outputs that it is satisfied. If not, it produces a detailed list of what's missing or questionable.

That feedback is then fed back into the analysis process. In an automated loop, the system can take the critique and prepend it to the inputs of the analysis agent (essentially asking the analysis agent to "address this feedback"). The analysis agent, with the new prompt that includes critique comments, will attempt to fix any gaps in the next iteration. This loop can repeat for a few cycles until the critique agent is satisfied or a max iteration count is reached. The result is a form of self-refinement where the agentic system corrects and improves itself.

Why is this powerful? It mimics a common human workflow. Write a draft, review it critically, and then improve it. LLMs can surprisingly catch their own mistakes or omissions when prompted to critique. By explicitly separating the roles, one agent generates an answer, another agent (or the same agent in a different mode) evaluates it, and we reduce the chance of blind spots. In detection engineering, this can be the difference between an analysis that misses a key indicator and one that is comprehensive. The critique agent might notice, for example, that the analysis concluded "benign" but one piece of evidence was never explained; it will point that out, forcing the analysis agent to incorporate an explanation or reconsider the verdict.

Here's a simplified representation of a critique loop algorithm, as implemented in the system's `AnalysisManager`:

```python
def run_analysis_with_critique(all_inputs):
    max_cycles = 3
    for cycle in range(max_cycles):
        result = AnalysisAgent.run(all_inputs)           #
produce analysis result (structured)
```

```
        evidence = EvidenceCollectorAgent.run(all_inputs) #
ensure evidence list is comprehensive
        result.evidence = evidence.evidence              #
attach collected evidence to the result
        feedback = CritiqueAgent.run([result, *all_inputs])  #
critique the analysis result
        if feedback.satisfied:
            return result  # analysis is good, exit loop
        # Not satisfied: incorporate feedback and iterate
        all_inputs.insert(0, {"role": "user", "content":
f"Feedback: {feedback.comments}"})
        # (Prepend the critique comments as a new user input for
the next cycle)
    return result  # return last result even if not fully
satisfied
```

In this pseudocode, after each analysis run, call an evidence collector agent to gather any evidence bullets (this is an extra safety to ensure the evidence list is populated). The critique agent then reviews the AnalysisAgent's output and returns a structured output like `{"satisfied": false, "comments": "What about X and Y?"}`. If not satisfied, modify the input to the next iteration by adding the critique as a new input message (essentially telling the analysis agent what to improve) and loop again. This continues until either the critique agent is satisfied or reaches a cycle limit (to avoid infinite loops).

This approach aligns with well-known techniques in LLM prompting, such as Self-Refine[33] or the ReviewCritique[34] model, where the model iteratively improves its answer based on its own feedback. For example, explicitly use a second agent for feedback to provide an independent "voice" of critique. However, it could also be done with a single agent (prompting it to critique and refine its prior answer). The key is the iterative nature where you generate → evaluate → refine, which greatly enhances the reliability of the final output.

For critical analysis steps within the typical alert triage or rule tuning process, leveraging a powerful reasoning model (even if other agents in the system use different models) can be highly beneficial. The final alert analysis that the system produces is far more likely to be trustworthy (which is important if you plan to act on its recommendations or let it close alerts autonomously). It's worth noting that a critique loop will add some latency and cost (multiple LLM calls instead of one), so it should be used when quality is a top priority. In high-volume

[33] https://learnprompting.org/docs/advanced/self_criticism/self_refine
[34] https://google.github.io/adk-docs/agents/multi-agents/#reviewcritique-pattern-generator-critic

scenarios, you might only apply it to certain alerts (e.g., those above a severity threshold or where the initial analysis confidence is low).

Even just one cycle of critique and feedback can catch issues that a single pass might miss. It serves as a safety net against both trivial errors (like output not matching the required schema) and substantive analytic misses. As a result, critique loops are becoming a best practice in agentic system design whenever the stakes for accuracy are high. Note that this approach to feedback is described in the context of evaluating a single alert. However, in a production setting, additional feedback mechanisms that leverage prior results would be incorporated into the decision workflow.

Evaluation & reference architecture

Evaluation and continuous improvement

With an operational agentic detection system running, how do you know it's effective? Rigorous evaluation is necessary to measure accuracy, performance, and cost, and to identify areas for improvement. Some frameworks like OpenAI Agents SDK provide capabilities to evaluate style and content criteria[35]. Detection engineering typically already has organizationally driven processes for measuring rule performance (like false positive rates, detection coverage, etc.), and this needs to be extended to other AI-augmented components. A robust evaluation framework, utilizing data-driven benchmarks and realistic threat scenarios with ground truth, can assess an agent's ability to identify true/false positives, find and interpret evidence of malicious activity, and provide a high-level overview of an attacker's actions. These tests may highlight older LLM versions outperforming newer models or reveal regressions in prompt engineering. They also help identify circumstances where chain-of-thought models, compared to simpler models, are more effective.

Accuracy and correctness: Treat agent outputs as you would treat a human junior analyst's work, providing feedback and reviewing them for correctness. This implies constructing high-quality evaluation datasets from sample alerts (including ones where you have ground truth) and comparing the agent's verdicts and justifications to the ground truth. For example, if there are labeled historical alerts confirming false (benign events) and the agent labels them as true positives, then a deeper analysis of the inputs and outputs between agents should be conducted to understand why the agent got it wrong. This often involves reviewing detailed traces of the agent's execution, which can highlight missing context or flaws in prompt logic, as demonstrated in practical applications. Often, this pointed to either missing data (maybe the agent didn't have some context a human had) or a flaw in prompt/logic. You can address that by adding a tool or tweaking the prompt and continuing to reevaluate.

Similarly, for true positive alerts, did the agent correctly identify them as malicious, and did it find the key evidence? As a maturation step, these evaluations can be quantitative (accuracy % of

[35] https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/evals

classification) and qualitative (does the explanation make sense?). For qualitative assessment, leveraging an *LLM as a Judge* approach can evaluate criteria such as Correctness (factual accuracy compared to the expected results), Completeness (coverage of all key details of the attack scenario), and Hallucination (absence of false or extraneous information, where a high score indicates fewer hallucinations). For example, building a small test harness to run the agent pipeline on a collection of example alerts (provided as JSON files) to automate this. While not as formal as a machine learning model evaluation, it can still provide precision/recall-like metrics on the alert classification. From there, it's practical to also track how often the critique loop was needed. If every alert required a critique iteration, the initial analysis prompt might need improvement.

False positive reduction vs false negative tolerance: In detection engineering, there's often a trade-off. You don't want to miss true threats (false negatives), but you also want to minimize noisy alerts (false positives). Experiment with tuning your agent to have a slight bias toward avoiding false negatives; that is, if uncertain, it should lean toward classifying an event as suspicious. In a triage system where the agent does not make final blocking decisions, classifying a benign event as suspicious (a true positive) simply means it will be double-checked by a human, which serves as a conservative approach. On the other hand, if the agent labels a real attack as benign FP, that could be dangerous if it leads to ignoring a threat. Pay special attention to any false negatives (agent said FP but it was a TP) and treat it as a pivot point to investigate the agent pipeline and determine if you need to adjust weights in reasoning or add a rule in the prompt like "if any doubt, do not declare benign."

Speed and performance: Measure how long each alert takes to process through the pipeline. This includes the LLM latency and any tool calls. If an alert analysis took, say, 30 seconds, is that acceptable for your environment with many alerts? Depending on volume and expected threshold, you might need to optimize by leveraging traditional data science techniques in deterministic agent tools (e.g., "identify noisy rules and select sample rules from specific time windows"). Identify the slowest parts (often external API calls or expensive LLM reasoning). For example, VirusTotal lookups can be a few seconds each; doing four of them sequentially would be slow. Avoid unnecessary lookups (only call if certain fields exist) and allow parallelization. Or experiment with caching for repeated indicators. If two alerts in a row ask about the same hash, cache the result so the second doesn't call out again. Over a large dataset, these optimizations matter. When using external calls to analyze large outputs (e.g., "Detailed VT results"), limiting the input to summarize capping the `max_token` output also improved performance.

Leveraging RAG with efficient vector search capabilities, as demonstrated in Elastic Security's GenAI features article[36], can significantly boost performance. By dynamically retrieving and supplying highly relevant content (e.g., historical alerts, threat intel, and detection rules) to the agent, RAG will help minimize token consumption and improve the agent's reasoning, which are all important factors for speed and performance.

[36] https://www.elastic.co/blog/elastic-security-generative-ai-features

Security-Specific ROI and Impact Metrics: A comprehensive agentic system involves assessing its impact on quantifiable security-specific key performance indicators (KPIs). These include Mean Time To Detect (MTTD) and Mean Time To Respond (MTTR), analyst fatigue and efficiency, and progress in addressing detection coverage gaps.

When evaluating MTTD and MTTR, consider how the agentic system contributes to accelerating the detection and response lifecycle. An agent, equipped with a robust tool registry, can integrate with diverse security tools (e.g., SIEM APIs, threat intelligence platforms) to perform automated querying and execution for initial alert triage and evidence gathering. This moves beyond rigid SOAR playbooks, as an agent intelligently analyzes the initial alert, reasons about ambiguous clues, and dynamically constructs an investigative plan. For example, if an agent identifies a suspicious hash, it can adapt its subsequent actions based on real-time findings, perhaps pivoting from a reputation lookup to analyzing command-line arguments or behavioral indicators if initial checks yield no results. This dynamic, adaptive orchestration should perform automated investigative workflows that directly contribute to overall response time reduction.

Assess how the system helps reduce human review overhead and its impact on an analyst's fatigue and efficiency. This may include creating a system safely designed with high autonomy that leverages structured output and can automatically process, filter, and resolve high volumes of routine or low-fidelity alerts. Compare how many FP alerts are removed from manual review. The continuous improvement enabled by a critique loop further defines agent decision-making, minimizing false positives and ensuring analysts focus on complex, high-fidelity threats, leading to a more optimized workload.

When addressing coverage gaps, analyze how the system enhances detection capabilities against emerging threats. With reasoning models, RAG, and diverse memory types, agents are poised to correlate disparate data from various security telemetry sources. Evaluate their capacity to dynamically adapt and infer subtle anomalies or novel attack patterns. Additionally, assess how multi-agent collaboration helps identify threats that would otherwise remain undetected.

Agentic systems can also use advanced techniques like multi-agent joint optimization (e.g., using Multi-Agent PPO[37]). This allows agents with potentially conflicting individual goals (like one agent focused on maximizing true positives, another on minimizing false positives) to collectively work towards a unified objective like reducing alert fatigue while maintaining high detection rates.

Trust and verification: The integrity of agentic workflows and systems relies on secure tools and protocols like MCP. Just as guardrails protect against prompt injection in alerts, you must also consider the security risks of the underlying agent infrastructure. Vulnerabilities stemming from excessive permissions, weak authentication, or misconfiguration of MCP servers and their connected tools could lead to data exposure, exfiltration, or even allow adversaries to impersonate MCP servers. To mitigate this, thoroughly review MCP server logic, clearly define

[37] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.15228

expected MCP permissions, and deploy robust security guardrails. Beyond these foundational security considerations, building comprehensive trust in agentic systems also requires rigorous evaluation of their decision-making reliability and transparency.

Introduce confidence scores when binary decisions are difficult to reach. In the Analysis Result example, the agent quantified its certainty (`0.0` to `1.0`). During evaluation, manually check the correlation of that score with correctness, and then use the result to explore agent outputs quantitatively with future experiments. If the agent says confidence `0.9`+, was it almost always correct? And when it gave low confidence (say `0.4`), was it often the case that it was wrong or needed human review? Ideally, the confidence metric can be used as a triage (e.g., auto-close alerts with confidence > `0.8` FP, escalate anything with confidence < `0.5` or any TP verdict (since TP means potential incident). With more data, you could calibrate a threshold (maybe at 0.7 confidence) for deciding to trust the agent's decision versus sending it to a person. This becomes a policy decision informed by metrics: e.g., *"Out of 1000 low-severity alerts, the agent auto-closed 800 with 95% accuracy. The remaining 200 it flagged for human review. This saved X hours."* This is a great outcome to report.

Evaluate systematically and use a mix of quantitative metrics (accuracy, precision/recall, timing, cost) and qualitative review (Are the explanations sufficient? Would a new analyst learn from this output?). Expect to iterate and treat the agents as living things that you'll tweak as you gather more results. By continuously measuring and improving, you'll not only ensure the system's effectiveness, but also build trust with the analysts and stakeholders that this agentic system is doing the right thing. The goal is to reach a point where the agentic system is a proven asset, reliable enough that humans start to trust its outputs.

Cost management and operational efficacy

Operational cost of agentic detection engineering systems should be associated with a business justification, and ideally, their efficiency should be quantifiable against manual human analysis. Quantifying the cost per alert processed by an autonomous triage agent or the daily expense for a threat intelligence enrichment service can later be used to compare against the cost of human effort. Costs measured can also be used to build hard stop mechanisms, where an agent stops processing if the projected cost for additional analysis exceeds the value or becomes less economical than a manual investigation by a security analyst. These measured costs then unlock optimization efforts like evaluating the impact of different LLM models, trimming agent steps, or optimizing orchestration workflows.

Each agent call consumes tokens (prompt + completion) and possibly API credits for external services. Log token usage similar to the performance, using native or third-party tracing capabilities, and decide if the overall token cost/benefit value is justified. Optimize prompt instructions to reduce tokens (e.g., ensuring you don't include an entire log line if it's huge and irrelevant, trimming long lists of reference URLs in rule definitions before feeding to the model, etc.). There's often a trade-off between detail and token count, so experiment to find a sweet

spot where the model has enough context to be accurate but not so much information that the LLM starts to hallucinate. Remember, even agent instructions are included in the token count.

Analyze the number of tool calls per alert on average. If one agent is overzealous in calling tools, that could incur API costs or rate limit issues. During agent evaluation, you may discover that most iterations invoke only 4-5 evidence gathering tools (like a hash lookup and maybe a LOLBIN check if a process name looked suspicious). However, after more refinement, the agent may improve its decision reasoning and limit additional function calls. If an agent calls an above-average number of tools for one alert, investigate why (perhaps the prompt made it think it should call everything in ambiguous circumstances).

Cost can also be seen as a measure of system health. An agentic system can loop or call many tools, so put guardrails in place for repetitive tool calls (e.g., Tool has already looped 3 times in critique, stop; if an agent tries to call a tool 5 times in a row with no useful result, break out to prevent infinite loops). Similarly, set a low temperature when appropriate (`0.0` or near zero) for these agents to reduce randomness, to ensure deterministic, policy-following behavior, and avoid unintended creative interpretations.

Design principles for agentic systems

Designing an agentic detection engineering system involves marrying sound software architecture with AI-specific considerations. The following enumerates key best practices and principles for building intelligent security workflows.



Figure: A high-level architecture diagram for building agentic AI systems, including modular agents, maintainability features, production considerations, and foundational enablers

- **Modularity and separation of concerns:** Each agent should be treated as a component with a single responsibility. This is basically the single-responsibility principle applied to agents. The diagram separates the *what* (the logic of analysis) from the *how* (the mechanics of calling an LLM). For instance, it is advisable to have distinct agents for summarization, evidence gathering, analysis, and critique, each encapsulating a piece of the logic. This modularity means you can upgrade or modify one agent (say, improve the WindowsProcessAgent's prompt) without affecting the others, as long as it respects the same input/output contract.

- **Explicit state management:** Rather than relying on implicit conversation history, state should be passed explicitly through structured inputs. The advantage is predictability; any developer can see what data goes into which agent. Hidden states should be avoided that could lead to "Why did it output that? It might be remembering something from earlier…" issues. Data classes or dicts should be used to carry state from step to step. If using a framework like LangGraph, use its state machine features to track global state (like an incident context that agents update). This also makes debugging easier, as the state object can be logged at each transition.

- **Scalability and parallel processing:** Async patterns should be embraced, especially when calling external services or multiple model calls. For example, leveraging Python's `asyncio` builtin to run your agents concurrently. In larger workflows (imagine scanning 100 alerts with agents), it's recommended to utilize parallelism to process several concurrent tasks. Just be mindful of rate limits on the LLM API, use a queue or semaphore if needed to throttle. Consider how the system will scale if it needs to handle thousands of alerts a day. Some frameworks are advertised as production-ready, which might help determine where to invest long-term. This approach to scalability is concretely demonstrated by frameworks like Autogen, which offer a distributed agent runtime built on gRPC. For example, a `GrpcWorkerAgentRuntimeHost` can manage the overarching communication, while multiple `GrpcWorkerAgentRuntime` instances function as clients. Each runtime can host and execute agents, and `asyncio.gather` can be leveraged to concurrently dispatch tasks to these distributed worker agents. This enables the system to process numerous agent operations in parallel across different processes or machines, gaining high-performance inter-agent communication capabilities provided by gRPC.

- **Logging and tracing:** Agents should be instrumented with logging and even integrate the OpenAI tracing capabilities (`with trace(...)` context manager around the main routine). Tracing creates a log of the agent calls for each alert, which is invaluable for both debugging and explaining the system to stakeholders. For instance, if someone asks "how did the system arrive at this conclusion?", you can pull up the trace: Alert -> Summarizer output -> Domain agent output -> Final analysis output, etc., each with intermediate data. It demystifies the AI's reasoning to some extent because you see the chain of events. For advanced debugging of non-deterministic agentic behavior, some frameworks like Langraph offer time-travel capabilities that allow developers to review the trace, rewind, and replay the agent's execution from any past state[38]. Alternatively, you can plug in a fully local tracer (e.g., a file-backed JSON span log, a lightweight SQLite trace store, or any framework-specific span collector) to avoid sending trace data outside the environment.

[38] https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraph/concepts/time-travel/



Figure: A trace view of the FPAnalysis_windows workflow showing execution times and nested agent activities, including input guardrails, generation steps, and tool invocations, used to analyze system performance and behavior.

- **Idempotent and deterministic where possible:** Given a fixed input, running an agent twice should ideally yield the same output. Experiment with the temperature (e.g., by first setting it to 0 to ensure determinism). This is important for reproducibility. If an analyst questions a result, one can re-run the pipeline on that alert and get the same explanation. It also helps with caching. You can cache the result of an agent for a given input because it won't change randomly. The only non-deterministic parts are where the model might have slight variations, but with temperature 0, it's mostly stable (especially for structured outputs). If any randomness is used (perhaps to inject some variability in phrasing), do it deliberately and in places where it will not affect the core outcome.

- **Error handling and fallbacks:** The system should handle exceptions gracefully at each layer. If a tool fails, log it and proceed (maybe with a stub result). If an agent fails to produce output (e.g., LLM service down or it returns irrelevant results), have a fallback. A simple fallback is to retry once. A more elaborate fallback for critical pieces could be using a smaller on-prem model or a heuristic approach. For example, if the final AnalysisAgent fails, as a fallback, you might mark the alert as requiring human review (with a note "AI analysis unavailable"). The key is to not drop the ball. Always have the pipeline end in some result, even if that result is "Could not analyze, please investigate manually." That's better than nothing.

- **Configuration and tuning:** Many of these parameters (like which agents to use, how many critique cycles, tool API keys, etc.) should be configurable. Externalize model settings (like temperature, max tokens) via environment or config, so you can tweak without code changes. Over time, you might want to A/B test different configurations (say, run with critique loop vs without to see the difference in accuracy vs cost). Having those as easy toggles helps.

- **Security considerations:** Ensure that the LLM and tools cannot be abused if an attacker tries to craft an alert to trick the agent (e.g., as a form of prompt injection or manipulation). Agents should be prevented from executing arbitrary code; they should only call pre-defined tools. Input sanitization guardrails should be in place to prevent misuse. Another consideration is to protect sensitive outputs. If the agent recommends something like "We should terminate host ABC," ensure that the suggestion is just advisory (not automatically executed without approval, unless you deliberately automate the response with very high confidence).

- **Maintainability:** Code and prompt definitions should be kept in a repository with version control and follow traditional software development best practices. Document the design for future maintainers, explaining each agent's purpose, what tools exist, etc. This system crosses the boundary of software and knowledge engineering, so both detection engineers, software engineers, and ML engineers are all roles to consider.

- **Monitoring in production:** Continuously monitor the system once live. Log every decision (with key fields) to an index, e.g., log an event "Alert X classified as FP by the agent with 0.95 confidence". In the long term, this can feed a dashboard showing what the agent is doing. If it starts doing something weird (like a sudden spike in TP verdicts), you catch it. Also monitor failure rates (how often did a guardrail trigger or a fallback get used). This helps catch issues early and is part of that continuous improvement cycle.

- **User interface and integration:** While not core architecture, consider how analysts will consume the output. The final analysis should be formatted as JSON, which can be ingested into a SIEM or a case management system, but you might also present it in a UI (e.g., as a markdown report in an internal tool). Ensure the format is easily renderable. The structured nature helps, but small things like line breaks, bullet indentations should be considered for readability. If possible, integrate into the existing analyst workflow (for example, when an analyst opens an alert in the SOC platform, show the AI's summary and verdict directly).

By adhering to these principles, you can build a system that is robust, transparent, and adaptable. It's not a black box that magically does SecOps; it's a carefully structured ensemble of intelligent components following a well-defined process. This architecture not only works well now but is prepared for future evolution, whether that means swapping in a better LLM model, adding a new agent for a new data source, or scaling out to more alerts or new use cases (like incident response or threat hunting assistance). The guiding principle is to treat the agents as

first-class components in the software design, subject to the same quality and engineering standards as any other critical system.

Realities of inherent limitations

AI agents introduce novel approaches to traditional security operations, but building quality agentic systems for use cases like alert triage remains inherently challenging. Security teams often lack comprehensive visibility, and the sheer volume of data makes it difficult to obtain. While countless hours of detection engineering are poured into quality detection rules, the alerts, *at times*, serve as investigation entry points, rather than definite answers. Exploring and verifying leads across extensive information is a complex process and difficult to scale, even with meticulously designed playbooks.

Agentic systems can interpret complex situations and construct plausible narratives; however, the fundamental limitation is their systematic coverage and the ability to ensure every critical investigative path is thoroughly examined. Even with low temperature settings, LLMs operate on probabilistic choices that select actions that appear relevant at a given moment. Achieving complete thoroughness and precision is complicated, which is why we need to introduce evidence gathering and critique workflows. Comprehensive coverage is still a deeply felt gap, even with these systems able to help prioritize alerts, interpret data, and perform complex reasoning. Until this issue is addressed, either human oversight will still be a component in this system, or agentic systems will continue to prioritize low-severity, low-risk triage situations. They effectively augment security analysts, rather than fully replace the meticulous effort required.

While the excitement around agentic capabilities often focuses on rapid prototyping, the transition from proof-of-concept to robust, production-grade systems presents its own set of significant engineering and operational challenges. This journey, often characterized as LLMOps or Platform Ops, requires applying established principles like GitOps, Site Reliability Engineering (SRE), and DevSecOps to ensure scalable, secure, and compliant deployments. Similar to traditional software development challenges, it forces agentic system developers to eventually consider establishing robust CI/CD pipelines, implementing comprehensive observability, and maintaining strong governance over deployment processes. Achieving reliable, production-grade agentic systems is an inherently iterative process, requiring continuous refinement and dedicated attention, rather than solely relying on agentic frameworks or external turnkey solutions (which often appear as “magic”).

Conclusion and key takeaways

Agentic systems bring a new level of adaptability and intelligence to detection engineering. By leveraging specialized agents that can reason, use tools, and collaborate, we can automate complex security workflows that previously required human analysis. We discussed how agents can triage alerts, enrich them with context, and even help maintain detection rules, all while producing structured, explainable results. We discussed the importance of agent specialization,

the value of critique loops to self-improve output quality, and strategies for keeping the system reliable through guardrails, schemas, and thorough prompt design.

For detection engineers and security teams considering this approach, here are the key takeaways. Understand what matters by starting with the problem, working through simple bottom-up challenges akin to a scientist, versus focusing on the solution (e.g., deciding which framework to use) like an engineer. Then define the metric to evaluate success, before working through these next essential points to consider:

Use agents for complex tasks: Simple automation still has its place, but when tasks involve interpretation, decision-making, or varied inputs, agentic systems are worth investing in. Frameworks like OpenAI's Agents SDK or LangGraph can jump-start your development, offering built-in support for multi-agent orchestration, tool usage, and output validation.

Specialize agents and orchestrate them: Break down the detection workflow into discrete roles, e.g., one agent per domain or per function (triage, enrichment, decision, etc.). Specialization yields more accurate results. Employ an orchestrator (or hierarchical routing) to coordinate these specialists, ensuring each alert is handled by the best-suited logic path[39].

Enforce structure and safety: Define clear schemas for inputs/outputs and validate against them. This keeps agents on track and produces parseable output. Implement guardrails to catch errors or risky content. Essentially, make the agent follow the same rules and data formats as the rest of your system, so it cleanly integrates and can be trusted in automation pipelines.

Empower agents with tools (wisely): Augment agent capabilities with tools for data lookup and actions. This allows real-time enrichment and ensures the latest information is considered. Design tool interactions such that agents call them only when needed and handle their output gracefully[40]. Supercharge the agents with powerful models and then scale down once the solution is working.

Iterate with critique and feedback: Don't settle for the first output. Use a critique agent or self-reflection mechanism (e.g., Reflexion) to have the agent double-check its work. This extra loop improves accuracy and completeness significantly, providing higher confidence in autonomous decisions. It's like having a built-in peer review for every analysis the agent does[41]. Keep in mind that context engineering will pay off in the long run as opposed to focusing solely on prompt engineering.

Measure, tune, and trust (but verify): Continuously evaluate the system on known data. Track metrics like accuracy of classifications, false positive reduction, processing time, and cost. Tune prompts and logic based on these results. Over time, as you gain confidence, you can allow the system to handle more without human intervention, but always keep monitoring for drift or anomalies in behavior. For those looking to practically implement agentic system evaluations,

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[39] https://arxiv.org/html/2506.12508v1
[40] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2302.04761
[41] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.11366

the “Frequently Asked Questions (And Answers) About AI Evals” post offers valuable insights into establishing a minimum viable evaluation setup, understanding the critical role of error analysis, selecting appropriate evaluation metrics, and specifically, evaluating complex agentic workflows[42].

Maintain human oversight and transparency: Finally, ensure the system’s workings are transparent to the team. Analysts should be able to see why an agent concluded something (via the evidence and justification it provides). Keep humans in the loop for high-impact decisions or whenever the agent expresses low confidence. The goal is to augment your team, not replace it. The agents take care of the grunt work and provide second opinions, while humans handle verification and edge cases.

“Agentic Detection Engineering” represents a fusion of classic detection engineering expertise with modern AI-augmented capabilities. It’s an exciting frontier with agents able to reason about context, adapt to new information, and potentially improve themselves iteratively. Consider new agent workflows where agents are requesting specialized external agents to assist in the alert triage. Or imagine taking full advantage of security-related models in lieu of just using the latest powerful model. The rise of "Internet of Agents" will be fueled by technologies like Cisco's AGNTCY[43], MIT's NANDA[44], and protocols like Google's A2A[45] and Anthropic's MCP[46], which they point towards greater interoperability. Perhaps in the distant future, multimodal detection engineering approaches may surface where we ingest logs, audio recordings, screenshots, etc., to fully provide context to an alert, all powered by an Internet of Agents. These are beginning steps to a much larger opportunity to enhance detection engineering, resulting in a more scalable and adaptable way forward.

[42] https://hamel.dev/blog/posts/evals-faq/
[43] https://agntcy.org/
[44] https://nanda.media.mit.edu/
[45] https://developers.googleblog.com/en/a2a-a-new-era-of-agent-interoperability/
[46] https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/agents-and-tools/mcp