Suspicious HTML File Creation | Elastic Security Solution [8.13]

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Suspicious HTML File Creationedit

Identifies the execution of a browser process to open an HTML file with high entropy and size. Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References: None

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Windows
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Initial Access
Data Source: Elastic Defend

Version: 106

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Setupedit

Setup

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2. Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp. For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html

Rule queryedit

sequence by user.id with maxspan=5m
 [file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action in ("creation", "rename") and
  file.extension : ("htm", "html") and
   file.path : ("?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*",
                "?:\\Users\\*\\Content.Outlook\\*",
                "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Temp?_*",
                "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\7z*",
                "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Rar$*") and
   ((file.Ext.entropy >= 5 and file.size >= 150000) or file.size >= 1000000)]
 [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and
  (
   (process.name in ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "whale.exe", "browser.exe", "dragon.exe", "vivaldi.exe", "opera.exe")
    and process.args == "--single-argument") or
   (process.name == "iexplore.exe" and process.args_count == 2) or
   (process.name in ("firefox.exe", "waterfox.exe") and process.args == "-url")
  )
  and process.args : ("?:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*.htm*",
                      "?:\\Users\\*\\Content.Outlook\\*.htm*",
                      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Temp?_*.htm*",
                      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\7z*.htm*",
                      "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Rar$*.htm*")]

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Initial Access
- ID: TA0001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Technique:
- Name: Phishing
- ID: T1566
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Spearphishing Attachment
- ID: T1566.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Spearphishing Link
- ID: T1566.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
- ID: T1027
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
Sub-technique:
- Name: HTML Smuggling
- ID: T1027.006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006/

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