Potential Secure File Deletion via SDelete Utility
editPotential Secure File Deletion via SDelete Utilityedit
Detects file name patterns generated by the use of the Sysinternals SDelete utility to securely delete a file via multiple file overwrite and rename operations.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 6
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
## Triage and analysis Verify process details such as command line and hash to confirm this activity legitimacy. ## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule queryedit
file where event.type == "change" and file.name : "*AAA.AAA"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Indicator Removal on Host
- ID: T1070
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: File Deletion
- ID: T1070.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/