Potential Credential Access via DuplicateHandle in LSASSedit

Identifies suspicious access to a Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) handle via DuplicateHandle from an unknown call trace module. This may indicate an attempt to bypass the NtOpenProcess API to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100



  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Credential Access

Version: 3

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guideedit

## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule queryedit

process where event.code == "10" and

 /* LSASS requesting DuplicateHandle access right to another process */
 process.name : "lsass.exe" and winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess == "0x40" and

 /* call is coming from an unknown executable region */
 winlog.event_data.CallTrace : "*UNKNOWN*"