Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Toolsedit
Identifies attempts to disable EventLog via the logman Windows utility, PowerShell, or auditpol. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection on a system.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 3
Rule authors:
- Elastic
- Ivan Ninichuck
- Austin Songer
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule queryedit
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
((process.name:"logman.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "Logman.exe") and
process.args : "EventLog-*" and process.args : ("stop", "delete")) or
((process.name : ("pwsh.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or process.pe.original_file_name in
("pwsh.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")) and
process.args : "Set-Service" and process.args: "EventLog" and process.args : "Disabled") or
((process.name:"auditpol.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "AUDITPOL.EXE") and process.args : "/success:disable")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Indicator Removal on Host
- ID: T1070
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Clear Windows Event Logs
- ID: T1070.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/