Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modificationedit
Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) SQLite database. This may indicate an attempt to bypass macOS privacy controls, including access to sensitive resources like the system camera, microphone, address book, and calendar.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- auditbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- macOS
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 100 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
Rule queryedit
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.name : "sqlite*" and process.args : "/*/Application
Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db" and not process.parent.executable :
"/Library/Bitdefender/AVP/product/bin/*"
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- ID: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 100 (8.5.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 5 (8.4.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "sqlite*" and process.args : "/*/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db"
-
- Version 3 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.15.0 release)
-
- Formatting only