Potential Credential Access via DuplicateHandle in LSASSedit
Identifies suspicious access to an LSASS handle via DuplicateHandle from an unknown call trace module. This may indicate an attempt to bypass the NtOpenProcess API to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Credential Access
- Sysmon Only
Version: 101 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.16.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.6.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guideedit
Rule queryedit
process where event.code == "10" and /* LSASS requesting DuplicateHandle access right to another process */ process.name : "lsass.exe" and winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess == "0x40" and /* call is coming from an unknown executable region */ winlog.event_data.CallTrace : "*UNKNOWN*"
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
-
Technique:
- Name: OS Credential Dumping
- ID: T1003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 101 (8.6.0 release)
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- Formatting only
- Version 100 (8.5.0 release)
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- Formatting only
- Version 5 (8.4.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.code == "10" and /* LSASS requesting DuplicateHandle access right to another process */ process.name : "lsass.exe" and winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess == "0x40" and /* call is coming from an unknown executable region */ winlog.event_data.CallTrace : "*UNKNOWN*"
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- Version 3 (8.2.0 release)
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- Formatting only
- Version 2 (8.0.0 release)
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- Formatting only