Persistence via Docker Shortcut Modificationedit
An adversary can establish persistence by modifying an existing macOS dock property list in order to execute a malicious application instead of the intended one when invoked.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- auditbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- macOS
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 100 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule queryedit
event.category : file and event.action : modification and file.path : /Users/*/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist and not process.name : (xpcproxy or cfprefsd or plutil or jamf or PlistBuddy or InstallerRemotePluginService)
Threat mappingedit
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Create or Modify System Process
- ID: T1543
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/
Rule version historyedit
- Version 100 (8.5.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.category : file and event.action : modification and file.path : /Users/*/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist and not process.name : (xpcproxy or cfprefsd or plutil or jamf or PlistBuddy or InstallerRemotePluginService)
-
- Version 3 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.15.0 release)
-
- Formatting only