---
title: Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell
description: Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this method to load executables and DLLs without...
url: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_posh_assembly_load
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell
Detects the use of Reflection.Assembly to load PEs and DLLs in memory in PowerShell scripts. Attackers use this method
to load executables and DLLs without writing to the disk, bypassing security solutions.
**Rule type**: query
**Rule indices**:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.powershell*

**Rule Severity**: medium
**Risk Score**: 47
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
- [[https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
- Tactic: Execution
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: PowerShell Logs

**Version**: 320
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Setup

The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
```
Computer Configuration >
Administrative Templates >
Windows PowerShell >
Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
```

Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
```
reg add "hklm\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
```


## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Suspicious .NET Reflection via PowerShell

PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
Attackers can use .NET reflection to load PEs and DLLs in memory. These payloads are commonly embedded in the script, which can circumvent file-based security protections.> **Note**:
This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks.
- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
  - Analyze the script using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
  - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
  - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
  - $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
  - $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.


### False positive analysis

- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately outside engineering or IT business units. As long as the analyst did not identify malware or suspicious activity related to the user or host, this alert can be dismissed.


### Related rules

- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
- Potential Process Injection via PowerShell - 2e29e96a-b67c-455a-afe4-de6183431d0d
- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a


### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).


## Rule Query

```kuery
event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
    "[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load" or
    "[Reflection.Assembly]::Load" or
    "Assembly.Load("
  ) and
  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
        ("CommonWorkflowParameters" or "RelatedLinksHelpInfo") and
        "HelpDisplayStrings"
  ) and
  not (powershell.file.script_block_text :
        ("Get-SolutionFiles" or "Get-VisualStudio" or "Select-MSBuildPath") and
        file.name : "PathFunctions.ps1"
  ) and
  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
        "Microsoft.PowerShell.Workflow.ServiceCore" and "ExtractPluginProperties([string]$pluginDir"
  ) and 
  
  not powershell.file.script_block_text : ("reflection.assembly]::Load('System." or "LoadWithPartialName('Microsoft." or "::Load(\"Microsoft." or "Microsoft.Build.Utilities.Core.dll") and 
  
  not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Defense Evasion
- Id: TA0005
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Process Injection
- Id: T1055
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Dynamic-link Library Injection
- Id: T1055.001
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Portable Executable Injection
- Id: T1055.002
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Reflective Code Loading
- Id: T1620
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/)

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Execution
- Id: TA0002
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- Id: T1059
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: PowerShell
- Id: T1059.001
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)